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Oppgavetekst  
 
This master thesis looks at the corporate governance tools that are used for implementing anti-
corruption programmes, and which of these that are best suited for reducing the risk of 
corruption in Norwegian MNCs. More specifically, this thesis studies the following research 
questions (RQs): 
 
RQ1:  What constitutes a ‘good’ anti-corruption programme?  
 
RQ2: What are the crucial factors in ensuring efficient implementation of, and 
compliance with anti-corruption programmes in Norwegian MNCs? 
 
RQ3: How do employee perspectives on Norwegian MNCs’ anti-corruption  
efforts align with that of top management? 
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Abstract 
 
 
This master thesis looks at how Norwegian multinational companies (MNCs) may choose to 
structure their implementation processes and compliance function to fight corruption. It seeks to 
bring to the forefront the key factors that need to be in place in order to secure that a company is 
efficient and successful with regards to their anti-corruption programmes. The thesis is structured 
around the cross-level analysis of national, company and employee perception and following its 
implications to the success of the compliance function in Norwegian companies. The main focus 
lies however within the company level and how corporate management may design their 
programmes as to ensure successful implementation at an operational level. The research is 
based on a series of interviews of national corruption experts as well as in-depth interviews with 
Compliance Officers from 13 Norwegian MNCs. Furthermore, the officers have ranked a list of 
factors with regards to the efficiency of implementing anti-corruption programmes, and the 
authors have conducted an employee survey within two of these companies.  The findings 
highlight the inextricability of factors, however nine key factors are highlighted and henceforth 
provide the foundation of the adoption of a new ‘compliance function lifecycle’ model. This 
model hopes to aid practitioners and scholars alike in the quest to better understand the 
mechanisms behind creating a system which adequately addresses the design-reality gap and 
warrant wanted behaviours, and by extension ensures the successful implementation of anti-
corruption programmes.  
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Sammendrag 
 
Denne masteroppgaven ser på hvordan norske multinasjonale selskaper kan bekjempe korrupsjon 
ved å strukturere sine implementeringsprosesser og compliance-funksjoner på en hensiktsmessig 
måte. Målet med oppgaven er å se på hvilke faktorer som leder frem til et effektivt og 
velfungerende antikorrupsjonsprogram. For å komme frem til disse, foretas et tverrstudie av tre 
nivåer: lands-, selskaps- og medarbeidernivå. Utgangspunktet er å kartlegge de ulike 
oppfatningene av bedriftenes antikorrupsjonsinitiativer og hvordan disse påvirker hvorvidt 
compliance-fuksjonen i norske selskaper lykkes i sin oppgave. Masteroppgavens hovedfokus er 
på selskapsnivået og hvordan selskapsledelsen bør designe programmene på en måte som sikrer 
implementering på operasjonelt nivå. Forskningen baseres på en rekke intervjuer av nasjonale 
korrupsjonseksperter, samt på dybdeintervjuer av compliance-offiserer i 13 norske selskaper. 
Videre rangerer  offiserene en liste med faktorer basert på hvor stor påvirkning hver av disse har 
på effektiviteten av implementeringsprosessene, og det er også foretatt en spørreundersøkelse av 
hvordan disse programmene oppfattes av de ansatte i to av bedriftene. Funnene peker på hvordan 
faktorenes bør anses som nærmest uatskillelige , og ni faktorer trekkes frem som de viktigste å 
ha på plass som et grunnlag for å ta i bruk den introduserte ’compliance function lifecycle’-
modellen. Denne modellen skal fungere som et nyttig verktøy for både utøvere og teoretikere 
som ønsker å forstå mekanismene bak hvordan man utvikler et system som adresserer gapet 
mellom design og virkelighet, fremmer ønsket oppførsel, og dermed sikrer vellykket 
implementering av antikorrupsjonsprogrammer.  
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1 Introduction  
 
When Transparency International Norway asked 600 Norwegian business managers in 2014, 
69% of them did not see the issue of corruption as pertinent to their operations (Transparency 
International Norway, 2014). Simultaneously, the national media reports on Norwegian 
companies being involved in corruption scandals of unprecedented magnitudes. If we are to 
adhere to the global trends in which a corruption sentence may result in the company being 
barred from the world’s largest stock exchanges or from global tenders, we may in coming years 
see the Norwegian business environment in a frantic panic wishing to revise their previous 
statements of corruption being a concept only relating to others.  
 
When abroad, Norwegian multinational corporations (MNCs) undisputedly have to navigate in a 
business environment with significantly higher levels of corruption and risk than what they 
experience at home. Systematic corruption in the form of public official kickbacks, and an at 
times rather opaque local business structure may make it hard to adequately assess said risks. 
Rapid globalisation has led to increased levels of transparency which in turn have given society 
insight into the overarching effects of global corruption - resulting in outcries from the socially 
aware consumer (Blowfield and Murray, 2011). Globalisation has also made it increasingly 
difficult to draw distinct lines between the private and public sector and so forth the perceived 
responsibilities of global corporations have greatly changed. Increased global awareness of the 
implications of corruption is ‘forcing organizations to open up their decision-making structures 
and processes for perusal and participation’ (Benn and Dunphy, 2007, p. 10). Corrupt practices 
threaten ‘shareholder confidence, brand reputation, production stability, employee trust, and 
other corporate assets, both tangible and intangible’ (Blowfield og Murray, 2011, p. 6). As a 
result, external auditing has increasingly been seen as a key factor for acquiring legitimacy and a 
‘license to operate’ from the sceptical consumer base (Sullivan, 2009; Benn and Dunphy, 2007). 
Consequently, many MNCs are suffering a crisis of credibility and governments have become 
increasingly interested in preventing future corruption scandals. The increased awareness of the 
problem of corruption related to private companies is reflected in academic literature and it has 
resulted in a ‘sharp focus on corporate governance issues’ (Mallin, 2013, p. 7). 
 
When faced with this issue of corruption however, Norwegian companies are to a large extent 
left to develop their own ethics programmes (Bjerknes, 2014). This presents numerous 
challenges, as the work of fully understanding the implications of private corruption in Norway 
is itself at its nascent stages of exploration. The ramifications of this are claimed to be evident in 
the lack of national awareness and competency within the business community. 
 
Legislation on corruption, which is often seen as the baseline of what companies and employees 
should adhere to, is notoriously ambiguous and presents itself as a multitudinous maze for 
companies operating globally. However, Norwegian legislation, which since 2004 and the 
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Statoil-Horton case has been stacking up on its legal precedent (Andresen & Borgen, 2014), has 
shown how companies are held accountable for their actions even prior to legislation was put in 
place. Moreover, if the evolution of Norwegian juridical system is to mirror that of the American 
and British, whom may be seen at the forefront of private corruption legislation, merely having a 
good anti-corruption programme will not be sufficient to shield companies from the risks of 
prosecution. Experts claim that one is likely to see a stricter policy that ties into the 
implementation and compliance of said programmes (Søreide, 2015). This then opens a whole 
other proverbial can of worms as Norwegian MNCs are expected to ensure that their programme 
meet the infamously difficult criteria of being ‘good enough’ when there seems to be a lack of 
globally recognised frameworks that guide companies to understand what ‘good enough’ entails. 
They also need to ensure that their programme is engrained in company culture by securing an 
efficient process of implementation and employee compliance, both globally and within each 
local subsidiary. 
 
Aim of the study  
The aim of this study is to look at the factors that drive the efficiency of implementation and 
compliance of anti-corruption programmes in Norwegian MNCs. By conferring with corruption 
experts we aim to get a thorough overview of the current national landscape with regards to anti-
corruption efforts and how these shape the present-day mode of business for Norwegian MNCs.  
In extension, we wish to examine some of the largest companies in Norway to map out how they 
approach the process of integrating an anti-corruption programme into their organisation, with 
particular emphasis on how they secure the implementation and compliance efforts. By mapping 
how the different Compliance Officers rank various factors relating to implementation and 
compliance of their programmes we wish to present a more practically applicable study, in line 
with the call for more empirical research on the effectiveness of anti-corruption programmes 
(Kaptein, 2014). This may highlight some of the pitfalls of current compliance programmes, as 
well as alleviate some of the resource constraints by presenting a guide to more efficient resource 
spending. Lastly we wish to gain a better understanding of how employees interact with these 
programmes, both in Norway and abroad. The aspect of employee-interaction has been largely 
ignored in current academic literature and we consider including this perspective in the debate to 
be of vital importance, seeing how ’the only way companies can be ethical, is for people to be 
ethical’ (Arjoon, 2005, p. 345). 
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Research questions  
In order to achieve the aim outline above the research of this thesis is rooted in the three research 
questions (RQ’s) presented below:  
 
RQ1:  What constitutes a ‘good’ anti-corruption programme?  
 
RQ2: What are the crucial factors in ensuring efficient implementation of, and 
compliance with anti-corruption programmes in Norwegian MNCs? 
 
RQ3: How do employee perspectives on Norwegian MNCs’ anti-corruption  
efforts align with that of top management? 
 
The first RQ aims to provide a backdrop for the current status quo of the work done in Norway 
today with regards to compliance programmes and private corruption.  This will be answered 
mainly through the empirical findings from expert interviews and relevant theoretical and 
regulatory documents. The findings from this process then goes into the design of a research 
framework in which we scope our investigations within each of the 13 companies in order to be 
able to separate on a case-by-case basis but also examine any overarching general trends on the 
issue. These empirical findings will also be used to design an employee-survey to help answer 
RQ3 relating to the employees. This is meant to provide a new understanding of the employee 
level dynamics as well as a much needed aspect to current theory, which to a certain extent have 
neglected the influence of this interaction in their examination of at anti-corruption programmes.  
 
Scope of the study 
The scope of this study is limited to Norwegian MNC’s that operate in high-risk countries and 
have already formulated a strategic anti-corruption programme, which they have implemented or 
are in the process of implementing. We initially look at the development of such strategies from 
a national business environment level in order to understand how corrupt practices develop and 
anti-corruption strategies are formed. Subsequently, we turn to our primary focus that lies within 
the organisations internal efforts at the company level, and examine the internal interaction 
between corporate management, local line managers and employees as we see them as an 
instrumental part in the implementation and compliance process. With regards to implementation 
and compliance we have chosen to focus on which factors may have the largest effect on the 
efficiency of such processes. This ties to the need for a greater understanding of the mechanisms 
behind what constitutes a successfully implemented programme, which in turn will provide the 
greatest value for future Norwegian businesses and better equip them in the fight against 
corruption.  
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Structure of the study  
This thesis follows a linear-analytical structure as outlined by Yin (2009), as shown in Figure 1. 
First we provide a theoretical overview of the relevant literature and present a theoretical 
framework. Further, the methodological research process of the research is discussed in detail as 
to ensure the reader has a good understanding of the methods used as to ensure any future 
replicability. Chapter 4 then goes on to present the findings on the basis of the theoretical 
framework introduced in chapter 2. This includes findings from the in-depth interviews of 
experts and Compliance Officers, the ranking of factors thought to affect the efficiency of 
implementation, and, lastly, the results from the employee-survey. These findings will then be 
discussed in detail under nine main topics with regards to how they relate to the presented 
theory, and we introduce recommendations for practitioners based on the implications of the 
findings. Subsequently in Chapter 6, we introduce a new model to help more explicitly illustrate 
how the nine topics interact, called the Compliance function lifecycle. The thesis afterwards 
contains a discussion of the implications for theory, limitations of the results and future research, 
before it ends with concluding remarks tied to the research questions in Chapter 8. 
 
	  
Figure 1: Structure of the study 
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2 Theoretical Background 
 
The literature on anti-corruption programmes is, as mentioned, in many aspects in its nascent 
stages. The literature is divided into three levels; national or external level, company level and 
employee level as displayed in figure X. The national or external level was to a large extent 
presented in chapter 1, which highlights the historical development of anti-corruption 
frameworks and how they shape the current business environment. This chapter will therefore 
predominantly focus on the company and subsequent employee level, as they are the primary 
focus of this thesis and its empirical research. The chapter is structured on an analysis of three 
levels as shown in Figure 2. 
 
	  
Figure 2: Three levels underlying the thesis’ structure 
 
Selection of literature 
The literature selection is based on a previously performed literature review (Andresen & 
Borgen, 2014) as well as additional research on the practical implications of corporate ethics and 
compliance programmes.  Such a multilevel and cross-disciplinary approach is deemed necessary 
given the scope of this thesis, as well as the limited amount of relevant research available, 
warrant the need for a greater understanding of the various factors that may influence the 
external and internal dynamics of an anti-corruption programme. 
  
Until now, much of the work tied to the practical aspects of anti-corruption programmes has been 
left to non-academic institutions and management consultants. The field of business ethics, 
corporate governance and codes of ethics however has gained some academic notice and so this 
thesis works on extending this logic to be applicable to the issue of anti-corruption. 
  
Structure of literature 
As mentioned above this chapter is primarily concerned with the theoretical landscape as it 
applies to company and employee level. To ensure the reader’s understanding of the general 
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aspects of how anti-corruption programmes fit in with wider aspects of corporate governance this 
chapter first sets out to give a thorough account of the role, and development, of such 
programmes. We then go on to talk more on the particularities of anti-corruption and how the 
design of such programmes may be successful. In addition, this section seeks to provide some 
understanding for why certain process fail or exhibit negative traits with regards to 
implementation effectiveness. Relevant theories include aspects such as the notion of the 
‘design-reality gap’ and the role of culture. Furthermore, this chapter attempts to provide a 
thorough account of the current academic research with regards to what characterizes a ‘good’ 
anti-corruption initiative. 
  
2.1 Conceptual Background and External Environment 
 
This preliminary section is presented as to introduce the reader to the concept of corruption, and 
how it relates to the world of business. Furthermore, it seeks to increase the understanding of the 
external pressures and motivations that govern the environment in which Norwegian MNCs 
operate. These issues lay somewhat outside the immediate scope of this thesis, and are tackled 
more as an attempt to provide a framework and contextual setting that envelops the more 
company specific research focus.  
 
2.1.1 Concept of Corruption 
 
The concept of corruption can be ‘traced back to early history and is almost as old as humanity’ 
(Hirsch and Watson, 2010, p. 13). Nonetheless it may be seen as a shadowy, changing 
phenomenon and finding a definition is always a hazardous exercise (Argandoña, 2001). Until 
recently, research on corruption was limited to the scope of interaction between public 
institutions and private entities. It has, however, become evident that one can no longer neglect 
the issue of private-to-private corruption due to the global influence and power of private actors. 
 
Barro (1996) identified that corruption leads to suboptimal economic growth while Kwok and 
Tadesse (2006) claimed that corruption distorts efficient resource allocation and rewards 
unproductive behaviour by channelling unmerited contracts to companies in exchange for bribes, 
at the expense of innovative firms. Furthermore corruption is seen to result in a decrease in the 
level of trust or social capital by citizens (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Corruption is also deemed a 
criminal activity, but as it hinges on the consent of both parties, much of corruption is concealed 
and such the risk may seem less explicit (Ryan, 2000). Pair this with the opaque nature of 
corruption and one may see why it is seemingly so hard to quantify the level of corruption, and 
thereby implement adequate measures to remove incentives for engaging in corrupt activities.   
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Proposing a definition of corruption 
In this thesis we use Transparency International’s definition of corruption (‘What is corruption’, 
n.d.): ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. This definition stretches to include abuse of 
power in public, private and civil sector. Moreover, it is important to note that corruption may 
take several forms such as bribes, gift-giving and extortion, making it important to outline the 
different preconditions that characterize such activities: 
● Misuse or abuse of power may entail ‘the non-performance of a duty, mandate, law, 
regulation, rule, contract or commitment to act in accordance with the interests of the 
public office or company in which the person renders his services’ (Argandoña, 2001). 
This may include the misuse of company assets or resources, but it may also be the 
misuse of people’s trust or the authority of a person’s role in the company or societal 
standing. 
● Private gain includes both financial gain as well as the obtainment of unfair advantage. 
Examples include ‘bribery for the purpose of obtaining or retaining “business or other 
improper advantage in the conduct of international business” […] it is an offence 
irrespective of “the value of the advantage, its results, perceptions of local custom, the 
tolerance of such payments by local authorities, or the alleged necessity of the payment”’ 
(OECD, n.d.) 
 
2.1.2 Pressures and motivations behind the development of anti-corruption programmes 
 
Private companies face increasing demands for having solid anti-corruption programmes in place 
to show their willingness and dedication to counteract the rising number of corruption scandals, 
and the infiltration of the problem into multinational companies. Various external pressures, 
exerted for instance through governmental regulation, has pushed firms to adopt new features to 
their expanding ethics and compliance programs (Michael 2006). There thus exists an 
understanding amongst researchers that ‘organizational ethics and compliance programs may be 
driven, or at least significantly influenced, by the external environment’ (Weber & Walieski, 
2013, p. 622) 
 
With a bird’s eye view, Bass and Heeks (2011, p.1) claims that ‘anti-corruption reforms are part 
of a more general global flow – of knowledge and ideas, of skills and techniques, of technologies 
and tools’. This aligns with the view of Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2010, p. 7) who propose 
that the contemporary global anti-corruption agenda ‘involves a large number of structural 
reforms aimed at reducing the opportunities and incentives for corruption in line with the logic of 
the principal-agent framework’. Globally, it seems that governments, organisations and 
individuals in some way or another are entangled in an overarching web united in the fight 
against corruption. For instance, a recent trend is the increased emphasis on corporate citizenship 
rankings for enhancing organizational reputation, which has increased the importance of 
corporate ethics and compliance programs (Logsdon and Wood, 2005). Both growing legal 
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demands worldwide and stock exchanges have been pressurising companies that are present in 
the international market to act. Strict international legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) add to this pressure by calling for the introduction 
of various measures, such as compliance programmes, business ethics, training courses, whistle-
blowing systems and compliance reviewing (Bussmann & Matschke, 2008). 
 
Corporations are thus forced to react to general trends and external pressures, often introduced 
by governments and international organisations. Such external pressures from a wide range of 
stakeholders pushes companies to look beyond the somewhat stark and unpleasant realities of 
global competition toward what ought to be, and which measures might be taken to improve the 
current situation (Waddock, 2004). Weber and Wasieleski (2013) surveyed 61 organisations that 
belonged to the Ethics and Compliance Officers Association on their ethics and compliance 
initiatives and identified six main pressures to develop an ethics and compliance program. These 
are ranked below, according to perceived importance (Weber and Wasieleski, 2013, p. 614): 
● Maintain legal compliance 
● Reflect company leader’s values 
● Encouragement from employees  
● From the marketplace, competitors  
● Economic incentives, ‘it pays’  
● From community, non-profit groups 
 
Much has been said about fitting the external anti-corruption reforms to specific country settings 
according to the local environment that companies face through their operation. To respond to 
the need for local adaptation, firms may be tempted to resort to ad hoc initiatives, e.g. by 
targeting observed corruption. In this way the companies may successfully put effort into anti-
corruption activities that, if implemented in a suitable way will take care of the problem at hand. 
However, this rather common approach to fight corruption often fails to realise that 
‘simultaneous with the cessation of the old corruption, a new manifestation of corruption will be 
observed’ (Coonjohn & Lodin, 2012, p. 1). If this deductive reasoning is applied whenever 
corruption is observed, one runs a risk of entering a cycle that will continue indefinitely without 
getting closer to addressing the actual roots of the problem. Arguably, such ad hoc responses fall 
short of more holistic approaches (Coonjohn & Lodin, 2012).   
 
Firms’ need for guidance on how to handle their corrupt environments has spurred the rapid 
emergence of a myriad of standards, principles, reporting initiatives, and codes that companies 
are advised to adopt internally. In Europe, the fight against corruption has become a major 
industry in recent years, involving international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Transparency International (TI), World Trade Organization 
(WTO) European Union (EU), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD) (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2010). These all have come up with their own sets of 
principles for anti-corruption frameworks, or have co-operated to develop such. As a 
consequence, the trend has been for firms to use the toolkits of ideas provided by the 
international community in line with the logic of a ‘one fits all’ approach (Persson, Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2010, p. 6). With no agreed upon international standard, companies find themselves with 
a myriad of possible interventions to implement without any reference points or clear ‘best 
practice’ peers to follow (Andresen & Borgen, 2014).  
 
2.2 Anti-corruption initiatives in practice 
 
The presented pressures motivate companies to develop ethics or compliance programmes, 
which can be described as the formal organizational control system designed to impede unethical 
behaviour (Kaptein 2009; Weaver et al. 1999). Such programmes are implemented in a rapid 
pace, as portrayed by the findings of a German study: a total of 52% of large companies reported 
having a compliance programme that generally also contained measures to fight corruption in 
2011, a fraction that only two years later had grown to 72% (Bussmann, 2015). Having an 
effective programme in place functions as a tool for companies to practice corporate self-
governance and thus gives the freedom to ‘manage its own affairs without extraordinary outside 
intervention’ (Copeland, 2000, p. 347).  
 
In this section, we will look at the concept of corporate governance in relation to anti-corruption 
work, and introduce an integrated model for determining efficiency of codes of conduct that also 
is applicable to anti-corruption programmes.  
 
2.2.1 Corporate governance, compliance and anti-corruption programmes 
  
To adequately understand the intended function of an anti-corruption programme it is crucial to 
understand how the function relates to the overall business operation. Anti-corruption 
programmes are usually part of the larger umbrella term of compliance, which in turn may be 
seen as the branch of corporate governance concerned with a more ethical perspective of doing 
business. 
  
Arjoon (2005, p. 344) defines corporate governance as ‘the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures 
for making decisions in corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through 
which the company objectives are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance’. He further highlights that within this definition one has certain key points of 
interests such as transparency, accountability, appropriate risk management measures, 
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information flow, legal and regulatory environment, as well as the responsibility of senior 
management and the board of directors. Instrumental in his view on ethical corporate governance 
is the concern with trust building, both inside and outside of the organisation in order to ensure 
an ethical culture based on freedom for excellence rather than freedom of indifference. Pinckaers 
(2001) sees freedom of indifference as the source of ethics of obligation, i.e. an external 
constraint imposed on the agent. Freedom for excellence, on the other hand, inspires an ethics of 
happiness and virtue, which in turn governs the dynamism and development of a person’s 
faculties of action. 
 
Anti-corruption programmes may be classified as a rather new addition to the corporate 
governance function. Nonetheless, Sullivan (2009, p. 2) promotes a clear link as to how 
corporate governance prevents corruption on all levels of the company: ‘on the day-to-day 
transaction level it makes bribes harder to give and harder to conceal. At the decision-making 
level, it injects transparency and accountability, so that it is very clear how decisions are made 
and why’. Due to its more recent development there exists a substantial lack of theory relating 
solely to anti-corruption initiatives. It may therefore be fruitful to extend the scope to include 
theoretical work on so-called business codes, as anti-corruption programmes exhibit close ties to 
companies’ code of conduct in terms of function and development process.  
 
2.2.2 The integrated model for determining code efficiency 
 
Kaptein and Schwartz (2007, p. 16) define business codes as ‘instruments to steer the conduct of 
management and employees and by doing so to have favourable consequences for the company, 
its stakeholders, and society in general. The extent to which a business code steers the conduct of 
management and employees depends on the process of developing the code, the content of the 
code itself, and the implementation of the code. The implementation of the code has to affect the 
individual characteristics of management and employees and the internal organisational context 
before it can affect their conduct.’ The two authors developed an integrated model for 
determining the efficiency of a business code, which carries a logic that may be applied to the 
process of determining the efficiency of an anti-corruption programme. Figure 3 shows an 
adapted version of their model (Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007, p. 118) 
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Figure 3: Integrated model for determining programme efficiency 
 
What becomes clear through this graphical representation of the process of developing corporate 
codes of conduct, which is also projectable onto the development of anti-corruption frameworks, 
is that overall efficiency hinges not only on one, but several stages of the process. 
  
Firstly the expectations of the external environment need to be addressed in an appropriate 
manner as they will have a direct impact on the company characteristics. Different stakeholders 
raise different concerns and so it is important to take note of any conflicting interests. Stevens et 
al. (2005) found that certain companies were more likely to include their business codes into 
their strategic decisions if pressured by an external environment, which may be seen in close 
correlation to the development of anti-corruption programmes as described in this chapter.  
 
Furthermore, instrumental in assuring a code’s effectiveness is to make sure that its content 
aligns with existing company objectives. This point ties with Trevino et al. (1999) findings that 
key to the success or failure of a programme was how the employees viewed management’s 
motivation for establishing such a programme. The development process may be crucial when it 
comes to ensuring improved awareness of the issue within the company and thereby simulating a 
sense of ownership (Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007). Moreover Weller (1988) noted that there is a 
relationship between the effectiveness of codes and the frequency of revisions or adaptation of 
the code. With regards to the content of such codes or programmes, scholars do not seem to 
agree on the importance of wording, but rather emphasise the mere presence of such a 
programme. Here it may be more significant to speak of the importance of sub-codes as these 
may have a greater local applicability. 
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The efficiency of implementation of business codes is an area that lacks significant empirical 
studies, however Weber & Wasieleski (2013) note that it is not sufficient to only distribute codes 
to employees. To ensure compliance, top management also needs to ensure adequate supporting 
mechanisms such as training, and clearly assign ethical responsibilities within the organisation. 
This then ties in with the issue of employee characteristics, as studies show that employees are 
more likely to act in accordance with corporate codes of conduct when they are aligned with 
their own personal view (Trevino et at, 1999). Internal context is often predetermined by the 
inner workings of an organisation, which is often seen as a mixture between the layout of an 
administrative system and company culture. Both a company’s informal culture and its corporate 
structures may equate to internal pressures, which in turn shape employee behaviour. To ensure 
that a code is efficient it is therefore crucial that one does not neglect this aspect of the process, 
since doing so may result in mere ‘paper compliance’ with anti-corruption programmes 
(Donaldson, 2003). 
  
Lastly, the effectiveness of conduct, and its consequences, may be divided into three different 
levels; micro, meso and macro. According to Kaptein & Schwartz (2007, p. 120) ’micro-
effectiveness refers to the degree of convergence between the objectives the company has with 
its code and the consequences for the company. Meso-effectiveness refers to the degree of 
convergence between what stakeholders expect and the extent to which their expectations are 
realized. And macro-effectiveness refers to the degree of convergence between meso and macro 
codes and the social effects. When determining the effectiveness of a business code, these 
different levels should be taken into account’. 
 
2.3 Corporate Objectives 
 
This section seeks to explain the theoretical backdrop for the different steps of the integrated 
model in greater detail, as relating to corporate objectives developed at the meso-level and 
subsequently received by the operational employees (micro-level). More specifically, we will 
now look at how corporate objectives may have a direct influence on the effectiveness of anti-
corruption programmes. As previously established, external pressures are pushing corporations 
to develop ethics and compliance initiatives to rid their own ranks of corruption. The response of 
firms has been to steer away from rather ad hoc responses to the problem, towards the processes 
of developing and implementing more extensive and all-encompassing anti-corruption 
programmes that affect all three levels. Throughout this thesis, the three levels will be addressed 
as the national, company or employee/operational level. 
 
The top three motivations for having an ethics and compliance programme, and subsequently an 
anti-corruption programme in place are: to do the right thing, to comply with government laws 
and to guide employees’ behaviour (Weber and Wasieleski, 2013). Central corporate objectives 
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are thus normative or ethical motivations, legal compliance and benefits to the organization. By 
‘doing the right thing’ in the eyes of society, corporations tap into one of the benefits, i.e. to have 
a good reputation. Reputation may be classified as an intangible asset that generates a sustained 
competitive advantage. Corporate reputation is thereby linked directly to social responsibility, 
and appearing socially responsible help MNC’s gain customers trust and therein a fruitful 
customer-business relationship (Strike et al., 2006). In this respect, ethics compliance programs 
may function as risk management tools that help companies become responsible corporate 
citizens, and to achieve their broader goals of profitability and enhanced shareholder value.  
 
These motives are closely linked to the benefits of fighting corruption, but also the costs of it, 
which may incur if employees fail to adhere to local or international law (Andresen & Borgen, 
2014). Consequently, having a successful ethics program in place aligns with corporate 
objectives as it promotes ethical behaviour while simultaneously impeding unethical behaviour 
(Kaptein, 2014). Doh et al. (2003) identifies both direct and indirect costs, including monetary 
and non-monetary losses to the firm that negatively affect the company’s ability to do business; 
hence increasing the shareholders’ risk of losing profit. However, Donaldson (2003) argues that 
a ‘ticking-of-boxes’ approach concerned primarily with meeting legal requirements would leave 
companies inordinately preoccupied with fulfilling legal obligations and as a result lose the 
innovative freedom which present day and ethically sound business cultures require. Addressing 
governance failures is said to be a key characteristic of successful anti-corruption programmes, 
and is ensured if the programmes targets a country’s existing quality of governance (Huther & 
Shah, 2000). Hence, the overall objective of legal compliance hinges on how the programme is 
developed, as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
2.4 Development process 
 
Problems relating to the implementation process are often blamed for the failure of anti-
corruption initiatives. However, as Heeks and Mathisen (2012, p. 540) argues, ‘part of the 
problem has often begun well before implementation; inscribed into the design of these 
initiatives’. Researchers have therefore recently engaged in the discussion on how these 
programmes should be designed to sufficiently balance general international principles and vital 
company-specific tweaks.  
 
Practitioners and academics alike stress the importance of having a well-thought out and 
comprehensive strategic plan for fighting corruption, which may translate into being conscious 
as to how the anti-corruption programmes are developed (Coonjohn & Lodin, 2012, p. 4). This is 
key to avoiding the issues that come with ad hoc ‘quick-and-easy’ solutions. Firms are 
particularly urged to avoid blindly using the externally developed toolkits as ‘it is precisely this 
form of oversimplification and one-size-fits-all approach that lead interventions off track’ (Heeks 
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& Mathisen, 2012, p. 533). A main concern is that some of the tools that are adopted by 
companies lack normative reflection (Schwartz, 2005). 
 
Without a normative meaning behind interventions such as codes and training programs, they 
become too generic, fail to consider moral values and face the risk of being ineffective in 
practice, as they are not backed by a culture that supports the underlying values (Weber & 
Wasieleski, 2013).  
 
2.4.1 Addressing the design-reality gap in the development process 
 
To ensure a good development process, firms have to address what some scholars have called the 
‘design-reality gap’, which to a large degree explains the failure of anti-corruption programmes. 
These mechanisms are shown in Figure 4 below (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012, p. 541): 
 
 
	  
Figure 4: Design-reality gaps in anti-corruption initiatives 
 
Such design-reality gaps develop when there are mismatches between the expectations built into 
the design of anti-corruption programmes, as compared to on-the-ground realities in the context 
of their implementation (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012, p. 533). This results in implementation 
problems that cause overall failure of anti-corruption reforms (Fjeldstad & Isaksen 2008; 
Svensson, 2005). In companies with limited amounts of resources available for developing a 
programme, components should therefore be adopted in a sequence that ensures the highest 
possible effectiveness, i.e. in a way that minimises the design-reality gap (Kaptein, 2014). 
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Heeks and Mathisen (2012) propose that having effective design and implementation processes 
in place will ensure a minimisation of the design-reality gap. Relating to the development 
process, Bass and Heeks (2011) suggest that one of the main weaknesses of available 
programmes and interventions are rooted in the fact that the designers are, to some extent 
external to the contexts of deployment and use. Sources of such externality are typically country 
separation or language barriers. As a result, practitioners do not gain ownership of reforms and 
programmes and are thus not willing to act as principals in the fight against corruption. Specific 
ways of overcoming this is to include designers previously employed by the user agency, or 
users with experience of consulting on and implementing anti-corruption systems in other 
organisations (Bass and Heeks, 2011). One may also use soft systems methodologies (e.g. rich 
pictures), embedding and participation to increase designers understanding of the local context. 
The design-reality gap may also be straddled by having ethics officers constantly revising and 
updating ethics programs with input from leaders, employees, and managers in other functional 
areas (Joseph, 2001).  
 
2.5 Content of programme 
 
The next stage of the integrated model is concerned with the content of ethics and compliance 
programmes, and subsequently anti-corruption programmes. This section addresses the various 
principle and characteristics that are fundamental for such programmes to incorporate, according 
to literature. Further, we introduce the elements composing these programmes, as well as the few 
results of researchers relating to the effectiveness of. 
 
2.5.1 Fundamental principles and characteristics of anti-corruption programmes 
 
Companies may use check-lists developed by externals when choosing which elements to 
include in their anti-corruption programmes, and thus avoid spending resources on ‘reinventing 
the wheel’. To counter the threat of confusion and continued lack of implementation, however, 
various actors have recently called for the development of a common set of principles that may 
lay a foundation upon which companies may build their own programme. Such ‘foundation 
principles’ would in case provide ‘a baseline below which it does not make ethical sense to go’ 
(Waddock, 2004, p. 315). Principles of this kind must necessarily be fundamental enough to 
obtain global recognition and create a level playing field for the companies adhering to them. 
Schwartz (2002) proposes a set of universal moral standards that may compose such a fundament 
for further developing codes and principles: trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, 
caring, and citizenship. There are few such foundation principles within the specific field of anti-
corruption, but the core principles of Transparency International are argued to have broad 
applicability: participation, decentralization, diversity, accountability, and transparency. They 
‘form the foundation of possible baseline principles with respect to the interactions of business 
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and government, as well as providing some guidance for business transactions and reporting’ 
(Waddock, 2004, p. 320).  
 
Various actors have also come up with lists of characteristics that ethics and compliance 
programmes should have in place to be effective, as shown in Table 1.  
  
Table 1: Functions of effective anti-corruption, or ethics and compliance programmes 
 
 
Dunfee and Hess (2000, p. 618) present five qualities which anti-corruption principles should 
have to impact the practice of corruption. Copeland (2000, p. 335-344) takes a more specific 
approach, giving a list of seven characteristics that form the ‘minimum’ of an effective program. 
The most comprehensive study on ethics compliance programme elements to date was performed 
by Muel Kaptein in 2014. He examined the impact of ethics programmes on unethical behaviour 
using a scale of unethical behaviours consisting of 37 items, and a dataset of 5,065 respondents 
from different organizations in the US. The effectiveness of ethics programs was studied with 
reference to scope, composition and sequence of adopted components, and he introduces seven 
functions of ethics and compliance programmes. 
 
2.5.2 Components of the programme 
 
Today, many organisations have some sort of anti-corruption/ethics and compliance programme 
in place, consisting of a range of components such as a code of ethics, ethics training, an ethics 
officer, and pre-employment integrity screening (Santosuosso, 2013; Singh, 2011). As 
discovered by Majluf and Navarrete (2011) when studying 54 Chilean companies, the number of 
components of such programmes is positively related to a consistency in values observed, and 
negatively related to the number of ethical conflicts in the firm. Kapteins (2014) data collection 
took place in 2008, and gave grounds for researching the existence of nine various components 
17 
 
of ethics and compliance programmes, arguably the most exhaustive set identified thus far. Two 
years later, Weber and Wasieleski (2013) did an extensive study on American organisations’ 
ethics and compliance initiatives. The results of both studies are shown in Table 2, with the most 
common components listed first.  
 
Table 2: The most common components of organisations’ ethics and compliance initiatives 
Weber and Wasieleski (2013, p. 613) Kaptein (2014, p. 9) 
1. Ethics and Compliance Officer 
2. Code of policy on ethics 
3. Ethics training program for employees 
4. Internal ethics reporting mechanisms 
5. Mission/vision statement 
6. Employee performance appraisal 
7. Public statements by senior management 
8. Risk assessment analysis 
9. Ethics committee 
1. Code of ethics  
2. Training and communication  
3. Accountability policies  
4. Investigation, corrective policies  
5. Pre-employment screening  
6. Ethics report line  
7. Ethics office(r)  
8. Monitoring and auditing  
9. Incentive program 
 
While Weber and Wasieleski (2013) merely gave a report on the status quo, Kaptain (2014) also 
evaluated the effect of each studied component on employees’ unethical behaviour. The study 
found that components 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 have a direct negative relationship with unethical 
behaviour, components 6, 7 and 9 have an indirect negative relationship, while the component 5 
has no relationship at all. Despite the wide adoption of anti-corruption programmes, little 
academic research has been performed to investigate the actual effectiveness of the various 
components, and which of these should compose a programme so that it may hold the above-
presented characteristics. 
 
Sub codes and local adaptation 
Establishing ‘sub codes’ as shown in the integrated model introduced previously may be a good 
way to ensure dynamic and contextually adapted anti-corruption programmes. These codes 
should complement the overall programmes by guiding local behaviour, so that the programme is 
rooted in and adapted to local traditions (Dunfee & Hess, 2001). This aligns with how Weber and 
Wasieleski (2013) suggest to incorporate standards and best practice elements into the 
programmes, while simultaneously ensuring that the design first and foremost is shaped by the 
unique context in which each profession or industry operates so as to minimise the design-reality 
gap. They argue that new organisational ethics and compliance standards must be ‘dynamic 
enough to encompass a greater understanding of human behaviour, and address individuals’ 
tendencies in a normatively meaningful manner’ to be effective (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013, p. 
625). Focusing more on comprehensive ethics programs which are adapted to the contexts of 
deployment, rather than strict compliance is in line with maintaining effectiveness as 
organisational priorities shift by (Joseph, 2001).  
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2.6 Implementation and administration process of programme 
 
Limited empirical evidence exists on the effectiveness of ethics programmes and the 
implementation of these within business organisations (Kaptein, 2014). Figure 5 is adopted by 
Schwartz (2001, p. 251) and explains the relationship between the designed programme, the 
implementation process, and the subsequent behaviour of employees. 
 
	  
Figure 5: The ‘Black Box’ between codes and behaviour 
 
The implementation process is a ‘Black Box’ determining the success of deploying the designed 
code in the actual context of deployment. This illustrates the lack of insight into what constitutes 
the implementation process, which is the case in relation to anti-corruption programmes as well; 
‘there is little actual focus on the ‘missing middle’: the interventions themselves and how they 
can be made to work better’ (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012, p. 533). As with design, effective 
implementation processes ensures a minimisation of the design-reality gap, which further 
enhances the success of implementing a programme that proactively guides the behaviour of 
corporate employees, preventing improper payments in practice (Dunfee & Hess, 2000; Heeks & 
Mathisen, 2012). The gap may also be minimised by ensuring that all employees understand the 
ramifications of corruption on a personal level; the survival of any norm ultimately depends upon 
its effective implementation (Andresen & Borgen, 2014; McCoy & Heckel, 2001). 
 
2.6.1 The ITPOSMO checklist 
 
Trevino et al. (1999) found that what was most detrimental to the successful implementation of 
compliance programmes was an unquestioning obedience to authority, an emphasis on self-
interest and the perception within the organisation that the overarching goal of the programme 
was to protect management from prosecution. Bass and Heeks (2011) adds to this in relation to 
the field of e-government-for-development projects by introducing a checklist of seven 
dimensions that should be addressed in the implementation stage, called the ‘ITPOSMO’ 
checklist. The checklist covers the key features of anti-corruption initiatives (Bass and Heeks, 
2011, p. 1-2):  
● ‘Information (both formal and informal) 
● Technology (mainly information technology) 
● Processes (from individual tasks to broader business processes) 
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● Objectives and values (covering formal strategies and personal goals, and the influence 
of informal institutional forces) 
● Staffing and skills (the quantitative and qualitative aspects of competencies) 
● Management systems and structures (the formal aspects of organisation) 
● Other resources (especially time and money)’ 
 
All of these dimensions are said to be important when trying to close the design-reality gap, and 
may prove valuable for any implementation process if placing less focus on the technology-part 
of the dimensions. By emphasising six of these - ITPSMO - gaps that are sufficiently small or 
can be sufficiently closed, will enable the successful implementation of anti-corruption 
initiatives. However, Bass and Heeks (2011) argue that Objectives and values is the most 
important dimension as it is the only one that will drive the initiative to succeed. It encompasses 
both politics and culture, and focuses e.g. on influencing powerful stakeholders to ‘want 
corruption to be reduced and have the personal impetus and political will to make that happen’ 
(Bass & Heeks, 2011, p. 3). This aligns with the established importance of overall objectives and 
values. 
 
2.6.2 Implementation in relation to overall objectives and values 
 
Schwartz and Davis (1981, p. 48) draw a direct line between strategic plans and the 
implementation process when stating that ‘strategic plan reviews should include an explicit 
assessment of the implementation problems likely to be encountered and a discussion of the 
options to be considered for their management’. Weber and Wasieleski (2013, p. 624) argue that 
the challenge of committing adequate amount of resources to the organisation’s ethics and 
compliance programme ‘is an ongoing test faced by all organizations, including those that 
strenuously emphasize that ethics and compliance are at the core of their organizations’ values 
and culture’. Kaptein (2009) claims that the only programmes that will work to dissuade 
unethical behaviour are the ones consistent with a strong ethical culture within an organisation. 
 
Through their work on Global Business Citizenship, which is linked to codes of business 
conduct, Logsdon and Wood (2005) introduce a process for executives to meet the demands and 
expectations of corporate stakeholders more effectively. Based on the previously established link 
between codes and anti-corruption programmes, their results may well add to the overall 
discussion of this thesis. To be effective, they emphasise that the code must carry an orientation 
toward a set of fundamental values that align with stakeholder expectations. The quality of the 
implementation process is considered crucial for ensuring this in practice, and they advocate four 
action points: ‘clear identification of specific situations that are likely to arise in this industry; 
guidance on what to do when the code is in question or when the culture demands adaptation; 
support for employee ethical development; support for structures, systems and processes that 
facilitate ethical decision making’ (Logsdon & Wood, 2005, p. 60).  
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Finally, continuous improvement is highlighted as a necessity to ensure effectiveness. Logsdon 
and Wood advocate the introduction of systematic learning processes to communicate the results 
of implementation and experiments internally and externally (Logsdon & Wood, 2005). Having 
the right orientation in place, implementing the code in a way that suits local conditions, and 
being accountable is said to enhance such processes. 
 
2.7 The role of culture 
  
Hansen (2004) highlighted the role of culture in ensuring a successful implementation of a 
company’s compliance programme and avoiding that it becomes a subject of mere ‘paper 
compliance’. Culture may be seen as ‘a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the 
organization's members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms that powerfully shape the 
behaviour of individuals and groups in the organisation’ (Schwartz & Davies, 1981, p.33). The 
significant aspect of shaping individual behaviour has given culture an increasingly large focus 
in organisational theory. Yang (2015, p. 173) found that ‘good organisational culture and 
excellent management team are the most important firm fundamentals, which support the 
successful implementation of core competences and core capabilities’. Furthermore Yang claim 
that strong and profiled corporate culture significantly influences several essential corporate 
processes as it explains corporate values, makes internal communication easier to comprehend, 
accelerates the decision-making process, promotes teamwork, and ensures loyalty and stability 
within the organisation. Furthermore Klinkhammer (2013, p. 204) claim that ‘sociological 
systems theory gives reason to assume that corporate cultures generally mediate the legitimacy 
of illegal behavior, and thus even the likelihood of bribery. However strong or weak their 
influence, any management strategy geared towards anti-corruption has to deal with these 
cultures, at the group level and within specific business units’.  
 
However, it is important to note that while culture is undoubtedly important, certain aspects to 
culture are more deterministic for company behaviour than others. Cultures whose beliefs and 
values are more widely shared and accepted have a more pervasive impact due to the large 
number of people whom share them. Furthermore, cultures in which beliefs and values are more 
clearly ordered, i.e. their relative importance is clearly communicated, have a more profound 
effect on behaviour as employees are more likely to know which values should prevail if there 
should be any conflict or ambiguity (Sathe, 1983). With regards to implementation culture may 
then provide ‘a guiding principle that the employees can rely on when close calls are to be made 
without consultation’ (Sathe, 1983, p.12). Moreover, culture may be used to ease the efficiency 
of the organisation in terms of economizing communication, enhancing cooperation and 
strengthen employee commitment.  
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Tone at the top 
As previously mentioned, management's involvement in the design and implementation of anti-
corruption frameworks may prove to be a decisive factors of whether a programme is successful 
or not. Schwartz, Dunfee and Kline (2005, p. 79) note that ‘the ethical role of directors is critical. 
Directors have overall responsibility for the ethics and compliance programs of the corporation. 
The tone at the top that they set by example and action is central to the overall ethical 
environment of their firms’. This again ties in with Trevino et al.’s (1999) view that how an 
employee judges the commitment of top management will directly influence how they chose to 
adhere to the code.  Coonjohn and Lodin (2012, p.1) go even further in their argument as they 
claim ‘the primary cause of the failure has been a combination of two factors: a lack of 
knowledge of the systems and approaches to anti-corruption and lack of political will. In essence, 
anti-corruption initiatives will be as successful and effective as top government leaders want 
them to be’. 
  
Adaptation to local cultures 
Another crucial aspect when considering the design and implementation of a global company's 
anti-corruption framework is its ability to adapt to local cultures. Hofstede (1980) is widely 
acclaimed for his work on the five cultural dimensions relating to power distance, long-term 
orientation, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity. These five dimensions have 
been instrumental in shaping the current understanding of the impact of cultural differences with 
regards to globalisation, and how this may affect companies doing business with cultures 
exhibiting dissimilar characteristics. Sathe (1983) underlines that cultures may serve as a liability 
when shared values and beliefs deviate from the needs of the organisation. This is an important 
aspect with regards to the issue of sub-codes and local adaptation as it, in line with the view 
countering a ‘one fits all approach’, underlines the need for employees to have ownership of the 
ethical guidelines.  
 
Organisational effectiveness and culture  
Morgan (1993) highlights the importance for top management to understand, influence and even 
use culture to ensure an effective organisational structure. Figure 6 shows the relationship 
between strategic management objectives and organisational culture.  
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Figure 6: The relationship between strategic management objectives and organisational culture 
 
Morgan (1993) claim that there are certain conditions in which culture will have a higher 
influence on organisational effectiveness such as when sub-cultures conflict, or top management 
seeks to make and implement critical decisions about company direction and structure. As seen 
from the figure there is a need for a constant feedback loop through which Morgan claim top 
management can assert their prerogatives through either 1) formal systems or 2) personal 
behaviour. 
 
2.8 Theoretical Framework and scope of thesis 
 
In this section, we will introduce a set of functions of an anti-corruption programme that 
summarise the aforementioned theory and provide a basis for tying the presented theoretical 
framework to the empirical findings from our research process.  
 
Six functions are derived from the research conducted by Kaptein (2014), Copeland (2000), and 
Dunfee and Hess (2000) that resulted in three sets of characteristics of effective ethics and 
compliance programmes. These are as follows: 
1. Provide guidance to employees on what is considered ethical behaviour 
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2. Generate involvement at the top management level 
3. Facilitate ethical behaviour at the employee level 
4. Ensure communication throughout the organisation 
5. Ease the detection of misconduct 
6. Direct organisations to respond appropriately to misconduct 
 
These functions together compile the elements from the three sets of characteristics as shown in 
Table 1: 
 
Table 3: Functions of effective anti-corruption, or ethics and compliance programmes 
 
Function Kaptein (2014, p. 2) Copeland (2000, p. 335-344) Dunfee & Hess (2000, p. 618) 
1 
• Offer Clarity to 
Employees 
Regarding 
(Un)ethical 
Behavior 
• Establish compliance standards and 
procedures for employees and 
other agents that are reasonably 
capable of reducing the prospect of 
criminal conduct. 
• Provide guidance 
concerning specific 
practices associated with 
paying bribes 
2 
• Demonstrate 
Role-Model 
Behavior by 
Management 
• Assign the overall responsibility to 
oversee compliance to specific 
high-level officers or executives of 
the organization. 
  
3 
• Provide The 
Necessary 
Resources to 
Employees to 
Behave Ethically 
• Foster a 
Commitment to 
Ethical Behavior 
Among 
Employees 
• Use due care not to delegate 
discretionary authority to 
individuals whom the organization 
knows, or should know, might 
engage in illegal activities. 
• Be relevant to 
organizational 
environments 
4 
• Create Openness 
in the Discussion 
of Ethical Issues 
• Take steps to effectively 
communicate the standards and 
procedures to all employees and 
other agents, through training 
programs and publications. 
Copeland 
  
5 
• Enhance 
Transparency 
Surrounding 
(Un)ethical 
Behavior of 
Employees 
• Take reasonable steps to achieve 
compliance with the above 
standards through, inter alia, 
monitoring, auditing, and reporting 
systems that allow employees to 
disclose criminal activities without 
fear of retribution. 
• Emphasize transparency 
• Be capable of monitoring 
and assessment by 
external, independent 
entities, such as social and 
financial auditors 
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6 
• Reinforce Ethical 
Employee 
Behavior 
• Enforce the organization’s 
standards through appropriate 
disciplinary mechanisms. 
• Take all reasonable steps, 
following detection of an offense, 
to respond appropriately to the 
offense and to prevent further 
similar offenses. 
• Identify itself with and be 
supported by an 
independent entity such as 
a non-governmental 
organization or an 
academic center 
 
In the subsequent parts of this thesis, the emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of 
implementing anti-corruption programmes; functions 2-6 mainly relates to this ‘Black Box’ 
between the programme to be implemented and the actual behaviour of employees. To some 
extent, functions 1-3 also relate to the stages preceding that of implementation. The distribution 
of the six factors across the integrated model is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: The focus of this thesis 
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter aims to outline the research strategy, -design and -method that are applied in our 
research process. Eventually, the quality of the chosen process is discussed in terms of inherent 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
To be able to answer the given research questions (RQs), we have chosen to apply a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. This is done to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
focus and attitudes at the management level of the case companies, while simultaneously being 
able to evaluate the understanding and competence of the general employees. In-depth interviews 
are thus performed on experts, and Compliance Officers employed by the sample companies. 
These responses and their ranking of general factors tied to implementation of anti-corruption 
programmes will be analysed in relation to a survey answered by the general employees. Our 
empirical findings will subsequently be tied to the general theoretical concepts presented in 
Chapter 2 so as to generate new theory. 
 
3.1 Business Research Strategy 
 
A widely used distinction between business research strategy approaches in the social sciences is 
between quantitative and qualitative research. Each of the methods comes with inherent 
advantages and disadvantages (Jacobsen, 2000). These are discussed below with regards to the 
method chosen in this thesis. 
  
Qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantification when collecting and analysing 
data (Bryman, 2008, p. 21-23). It gives a human perspective on a situation and should be chosen 
when the RQ is unclear or if one wants to investigate the background for a concept or 
phenomenon. The approach welcomes new data during the collection process and has an 
inductive orientation to theory with an aim to generate new theory (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In 
terms of weaknesses, this method may for example result in screening bias and be very resource 
demanding. As established previously, our RQ is partly unclear and we are going to examine a 
field of which we have limited previous knowledge; a qualitative approach thus seems valuable 
as a research method. 
  
A quantitative research method, on the other hand, gathers data in the form of numbers that may 
also convey meaning. It is suitable if the RQ is clear, generalisation is desired, one knows a lot 
about the research topic, or when one wants to describe the scope/frequency of a phenomenon. 
This is a more closed approach, with a pre-structured data collection process that aims at testing 
theory rather than generating it (Bryman and Bell, 2007). A disadvantage of the quantitative 
method is that it may be inflexible and superficial. When investigating our RQ the quantitative 
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method would seemingly prove valuable by enabling us to compare some of the collected data 
and draw more general conclusions across our samples.  
 
Mixed methods 
The conventional way of doing research is to choose one of these approaches, but recently it has 
become increasingly common use do a mixed method within the same study (Yin, 2014; Bryman 
& Bell, 2011). Mixed methods are supposed to bridge the differences between the two methods 
‘in the service of addressing a research question’ (Harwell, 2011, p. 151). Combining the two 
approaches ensures that the strengths of the individual methods are combined while their 
weaknesses are coped with. They may then validate each other (Jacobsen, 2000).  
 
For our thesis, we will firstly use a qualitative method to examine the general topic of anti-
corruption work in Norwegian organisations and to generate a good understanding of the various 
elements relevant for the discussion around our RQs. Furthermore, a quantitative method in 
terms of a factor ranking and an employee survey will be introduced to test the fields of interest 
identified when using the qualitative method.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
A research design provides a framework for collecting and analysing data. The five most 
common types of research design are experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, case study and 
comparative design (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In terms of focus, a multiple-case study design 
emphasizes individual cases while cross-sectional design looks on the sample of cases (Bryman 
and Bell (2007).  
 
One has to choose amongst these designs based on the research focus, whether one wants to 
perform a descriptive or explanatory study, and whether one is doing an intensive or extensive 
analysis. This is determined based on the type of research question to be studied. An intensive 
research design is an in depth study that aims at uncovering as many variables as possible when 
studying one or a few units. The output is often relevant and correct data, but the specificity of 
the results makes generalisation difficult. An intensive design should be chosen if the RQ is 
unclear, or if the aim of the research is to understand and explain a given situation. Extensive 
designs, on the other hand, take a broad approach and examine numerous units, but cover few 
variables and thus have lower data relevance. As opposed to intensive designs, they enable 
generalisation, but may give quite superficial results (Jacobsen, 2000). 
 
3.2.1 Choice of Research Design 
 
To be able to explore anti-corruption programmes, and the implementation of these in a way that 
enables generalisation, we considered it necessary to evaluate more cases than what is common 
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for case studies. Even though the individual cases tell us something about specific variables, 
focus areas and challenges, we choose an approach that enables us to draw conclusions across a 
sample of research subjects and that may apply to a larger population: the cross-sectional design. 
This design entails ‘the collection of data on more than one case (usually quite a lot more than 
one) and at a single point in time’ (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p 55). Within the field of leadership 
research, ‘the distinctive case study or multiple case study design has tended to give way to the 
cross-sectional design’ (Bryman, 2004, p. 762). Even though it has been used extensively for 
quantitative research, it is becoming increasingly common to apply it within qualitative research 
and it turns out that it ‘does not differ significantly from quantitative research in terms of its 
fundamental epistemological and ontological assumptions’ (Alvesson, 1996). In fact, employing 
a cross-sectional design for the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data has become a 
common design combination within social science (Bryman, 2006; Bryman, 2004). 
 
This choice is backed up by the necessity of combining the strengths of intensive and extensive 
designs: specific and in depth results and generalisation. Due to resource constraints, the number 
of units studied is restricted, but since units are studied at only one point in time under the cross-
sectional design, we were able to mobilize enough resources to study a sample of 13 companies. 
We could thus move beyond the intensive design in a manner considered satisfactory to allow for 
generalisation of findings and results. A more detailed discussion on the number of respondents 
is given later on. Anonymity has also been an important consideration when deciding on research 
design. The studied topic is of a somewhat sensitive nature, making cross-sectional observations 
more compatible with presenting general findings than what is done in case studies. By for 
instance choosing to present aggregated findings from the employee survey, the threshold is 
lowered for employees to be honest when completing the questionnaire. 
 
3.2.2 Choosing interview subjects for initial mapping (expert interviews) 
 
Due to the somewhat vague nature of our research question at this point, it was essential to 
consult individuals with a broad overview of, and experience with the development and 
implementation of anti corruption efforts in Norwegian companies. Thus, before starting the 
main research phase of our study we consulted several experts within the general field of private-
sector anti-corruption work in Norway. The aim was to gain an understanding of which areas 
were underdeveloped and of particular need of empirical research. Sampling of interviewees was 
based on purposeful and opportunistic sampling; visibility in media, breadth in competence, 
convenience, and contribution to developing the field of study. Moreover, we had already 
initiated contact with some of the experts during our work on the pre-diploma thesis. Five 
subjects were chosen as shown in Appendix 1. 
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3.2.3 Choice of sample size and units for cross-sectional analysis 
 
The choice of both sample size and which companies to study lay the grounds for the resulting 
number of conducted interviews in the qualitative part of our research process. Only one subject 
will be interviewed per company, but survey respondents included in the quantitative part of our 
process will also be chosen from the given sample companies.  
 
Sample size 
Our choice of sample size was made keeping in mind that ‘developing a strategic sample of the 
right size is integral to answering research questions’ (Tracy, 2013, p. 152). Sample size is 
critically important for researchers who need statistical power to generalize, but quality is usually 
more important than quantity for qualitative research (Tracy, 2013). Usually a sample survey is 
carried out on a group of respondents’ representative for the overall theoretical population 
(Jacobsen, 2000). In the main part of our thesis, we want to examine a sample of Norwegian 
companies that is representative for a larger population, within the restrictions of time and 
resources. There is no right answer to the question of sufficient sample size, but since we are 
combining both quantitative and qualitative research, it is necessary to identify a number of 
companies that would support both research methods. For the qualitative cross-section analysis 
we thus decided to contact a sample size of 10-15 companies. This was the largest number that is 
practically possible to cover. 
 
Selection of companies 
Company size is a natural starting point for identifying companies that both have broad 
experience with anti-corruption work and that have enough employees to enable a survey with a 
satisfactory number of respondents. Below are some general criteria for selecting the company 
sampling frame; to conserve the anonymity of participating companies, the level of detail and 
specificity is restricted. The respondent companies needed to be: 
• Of a certain size so that overall sample size is representative for general population 
have production as a main activity abroad 
•  Operating in Norway as well as in countries exposed to high levels of corruption  
• Of Norwegian origin and have formulated and tried to implement a formal anti-
corruption framework 
 
The first criterion was met by starting with a list of the 100 largest Norwegian companies as of 
mid 2014 (DN500). Secondly, we checked whether the head quarter of the mother company is 
stationed in Norway. In addition, to evaluate whether the companies are exposed to high levels 
of corruption, we used Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency 
International, 2014), considering all countries below a ranking of 50 as significantly corrupt. To 
avoid having an overweight of companies within the oil industry, only some of these is selected, 
based on the availability of contact information through Deloitte as discussed below.  
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This process resulted in a list containing 29 companies. To further condense this list of potential 
research subjects, we applied our practical constraints. This included choosing companies with 
headquarters located in geographical proximity so that they could be visited during the same trip. 
Companies within the shipping industry and maritime industry were excluded from the sample 
either due to the geographical location of their headquarters or the lack of developed anti-
corruption programmes. As well, we preferred companies that Deloitte were in direct contact 
with as we assumed that these companies were more willing to participate in our study. In 
addition to the list at this point, two companies were added based on their involvement in recent 
corruption cases and because they were mentioned as particularly interesting during one or more 
of the expert interviews. Finally, we had a list of 15 companies to be contacted. The next 
question thus revolved around whom to contact within each of these. 
 
3.2.4 Choice of interview subjects within the companies 
 
During the expert interviews we understood that most Norwegian companies have a limited 
amount of people working directly with compliance and anti-corruption, and that an interview 
with the Compliance Officer, or person in charge of the anti-corruption programme, would be 
sufficient to gain an understanding of what the company does in the field. One person from each 
of the 15 companies is thus identified as most relevant for our study, based on existing network 
through Deloitte, availability and individuals identified during the work on our pre-diploma 
thesis. The chosen subjects typically hold positions as Compliance Officers, heads of the relevant 
department, or are responsible for the anti-corruption work in the company. 
 
When contacting the potential interview subjects, two of them referred us to another employee 
with a more relevant background or who was more likely to be available. One company did not 
want to participate in our study due to resource constraints, while another was excluded from the 
sample due to a lack of competency on the studied topic. The resulting sample hence consists of 
13 companies.  
 
3.2.5 The use of theory and summary of the research strategy method 
 
There are three main approaches to the relationship between research and theory: deduction and 
induction, or a combination of the two: iteration. In a deductive approach, theory and hypotheses 
form the basis for collecting data, and empirical findings are used to evaluate existing literature. 
The inductive approach, on the other hand starts off by gathering empirical data, which 
subsequently is analysed and used to generate new theory. In practice, the distinction between 
the two approaches is not clear-cut, and choosing an iterative approach may prove to be the best 
alternative at times (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
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Due to the overweight of qualitative research in this study, we chose to apply a mainly inductive 
approach and view theory as an outcome of research; little empirical research has been 
conducted within this field previously and we aim to generate theory by analysing the findings in 
the gathered empirical data. However, the work performed in relation to the pre-diploma thesis 
will to some extent have influenced the research process, making it impossible to use a strictly 
inductive approach. We had already developed a conceptual understanding and gathered 
knowledge of emerging trends and focus areas. The resulting research process as shown in 
Figure 8 is based on Bryman’s (2008) qualitative research process. 
 
Figure 8: Research Strategy Method 
 
3.3 Research Method 
 
A research method is a technique for collecting data that for instance involves questionnaires and 
interview schedules (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The data may either be primary or secondary. 
Primary data is collected by the researcher and used with the sole purpose of analysing a certain 
topic, while secondary data is collected by others, and is often used to analyse a different topic 
than that which the researcher investigates. Jacobsen (2000) argues that the ideal is to use both 
types due to the control and validation effect. In our research process, we used primary data from 
in-depth interviews and questionnaires in the respective MNCs, but also studied the theoretical 
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background of our RQ through academic literature. The following research instruments was used 
to generate data for the cross-sectional analysis in this thesis:  
• Unstructured in depth interviews (qualitative, external experts) 
• Semi-structured in depth interviews (qualitative, top management level)  
• Factor ranking (quantitative, top management level)  
• Survey (quantitative, employee level) 
 
These are outlined in the following sections before the quality and limitations of the chosen 
research methods are discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Interviews 
 
Interviews are a common data collection strategy within qualitative research; approximately 90% 
of all social science investigations rely on interviews (Briggs, 1986). This method enables 
discovery, understanding, reflection and explanation via an organic and adaptive path. Through 
interviews, participants can provide accounts – or rationales, explanations, and justifications for 
their actions and opinions (Tracy, 2013, p. 132). Interviews are characterized by e.g. whether 
they are structured or unstructured, of individuals or a group, or performed face-to-face or 
mediated (Tracy, 2013). For qualitative research strategies, particularly those using a cross-
sectional design, the semi-structured interview tends to dominate (Bryman, 2006). For the 
purpose of the qualitative part of our research, we performed unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews. To ensure that the interviewees would speak freely and share as unrestricted as 
possible on such a sensitive topic, we chose not to record or transcribe any of the interviews.  
 
Unstructured in depth interviews 
The expert interviews were performed as unstructured interviews, which are interviews that are 
more flexible and organic in nature than structured ones. For unstructured interviews the 
interviewer has, at most, a predefined notion of topics or questions of interest (Bryman, 2008). 
This is suitable for our broad focus and lack of insight into which topics are more relevant than 
others. In this way, we ‘stimulate discussion rather than dictate it’ (Tracy, 2013, p. 139) by 
letting the interviewees focus on the topics which they consider to be most important when asked 
fairly general questions. Since the aim of these initial interviews was to specify our general 
research question, the topics were modified after each interview in an iterative process to 
confirm the relevance of some concrete focus areas.  
 
As far as possible, we tried to conduct these interviews in a face-to-face manner to ensure a 
higher spontaneity of responses and to conserve the rich information in terms of nonverbal 
communication that is often lost if interviews are conducted over the phone (Tracy, 2013; 
Bryman & Bell, 2007). Due to resource constraints, two interviews were conducted over the 
phone. Individual interviews are also preferred so that the interviewees’ viewpoints are not 
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coloured by others. Two of the subjects (Guro Slettemark and Helge Kvamme) were, however, 
interviewed together due to convenience in conjunction with an event in Trondheim. Notes 
during the interviews were taken by hand. 
 
Semi-structured interviews of Compliance Officers 
A more structured form of interviews is the semi-structured one. Here, the interviewer has a 
more specified set of questions. Semi-structured interviews allows for an inductive approach 
where the interviewers can keep an open mind to what the interviews will bring about of new 
knowledge, so that ‘concepts and theories can emerge out of the data’ (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p. 
13). As opposed to structured interviews, this interview form still opens for flexibility of 
response and focus (Bryman, 2008).  
 
This interview structure was used when questioning the 13 subjects in the chosen companies. We 
were then able to both generate an overarching understanding of specific topics across the 
section of companies, while maintaining the flexibility of a conversation-like interview style. 
When using such a structure the subjects may share their opinions and knowledge according to 
the areas that they were most engaged in, or experienced with, and as interviewers, we have the 
latitude to ask follow-up questions if interesting topics are discovered.  
 
The interviews with Compliance Officers provided material for developing a survey to send out 
to employees in the respective companies. It was therefore more important to learn how the 
subjects’ weigh the topics covered, rather than what they would answer if asked the same 
questions in the same sequence without the room for jumping back and forth between topics, 
according to how they view the importance of them; their subjective weighing was found to be 
more interesting than having the grounds for direct comparison across the interviews. The 
interview guide used during these interviews is shown in Appendix 2. This was only slightly 
altered after the initial interviews and remained approximately the same for all interviews, 
enhancing the value of cross-sectional analysis. 
 
As with the expert interviews, we strove to conduct these interviews face to face as far as 
possible. This was both to ensure the quality of the information gathering process, but also to 
increase the chances of gaining goodwill from the interviewees so that they would help us 
distribute the survey later on. Ten of the interviews were conducted during a weeklong visit to 
Oslo, while three were conducted over the phone. Notes were taken both by hand and on a 
computer, and both authors were present, limiting differences in interview style. 
 
Processing the interviews 
The next step in our research process was to perform a cross-case analysis based on the gathered 
information, which includes aggregating the findings over a series of individual studies (Yin, 
2009).  
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After the completion of all interviews, we carefully read through our notes and extracted the 
main themes that were included in all of the individual interviews. This was done to condense 
the information and to identify similarities, differences and overarching patterns across the firms, 
which in turn was structured according to a set of topics that intercepts all of the interviews.  
 
The resulting set of topics is shown in Table 4. One of the topics used was a re-formulation of 
our research question (*).  
 
Table 4: Main themes covered in the interviews 
Objective elements Subjective elements 
About the interviewee The interviewees personal perception 
• About the interviewee 
• Background 
• Years with the company 
• Position and responsibility 
• Historical development 
• Trends or changes 
• Zero tolerance 
• Factors affecting implementation success* 
• Current competence of employees 
• Availability of resources 
• Future focus 
About the anti-corruption programme 
• Description of the compliance function 
• Involvement in corruption scandals 
• General information about the programme 
• Degree of input from externals 
• Training 
• Local adjustment 
• Implementation 
• Monitoring 
• Risk assessment 
• Reporting channels 
• Top-down communication 
• Bottom-up communication 
 
For each topic, the relevant information from the individual interviews was subsequently 
structured according to topic and company, and summarised in a large Excel file. The cross-case 
analysis of the content of this file is presented in Chapter 4, and was used to create a list of 
factors to be ranked by the Compliance Officers. Findings from the expert interviews, factor 
ranking and employee survey will complement the cross-sectional analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Factor ranking 
 
After all the interviews were processed, we sought to collect any additional data that may support 
our aim to answer the RQs; the qualitative data extracted from the process was supplemented 
with more quantitative data. This was valuable for comparing the viewpoints of top management 
(Compliance Officers and the like) and the employees responding to our survey. One way of 
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gathering such quantitative data is to merge the various suggestions as to which factors are 
affecting the success of implementation of anti-corruption programmes into a list. This list was 
subsequently distributed to the Compliance Officers so that may rank these based on their 
subjective opinion on the significance of each factor. An additional factor named ‘Other’ was 
added in case they had any amendments, otherwise they were asked to give this option the lowest 
prioritization ‘12’. The evaluation of the resulting ranking enabled us to add to the cross-
sectional analysis, and functioned as a quality check of our subjective understanding of each 
interview since as misunderstandings were more likely to be uncovered when the subjects are 
asked to prioritise the condensed list of factors. 
 
Underway in our research process, we identified 11 factors that incorporated the sum of collected 
opinions as shown in Table 5. Of the 13 Compliance Officers interviewed, all but the one 
employed in Company K submitted a ranking of the factors. 
 
Table 5: Factors affecting the success of implementation of anti-corruption programmes 
 
 
3.3.3 Employee survey/questionnaire 
 
As a part of our research, we decided to make use of a small survey. The purpose of the survey 
was to enable analysis across intercompany levels, as well as across companies included in the 
study based on quantitative data. In this way one might examine whether the answers of the 
employees are concurrent with the information that was obtained through the interviews of 
Compliance Officers, and their ranking of factors. By using a survey we would also reach a 
larger group of employees than by the other methods due to our limitations in time and 
resources. 
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Developing the survey 
To be able to compare the survey results as directly as possible to the information gathered from 
the interviews of Compliance Officers and their factor ranking, it was necessary to include 
questions related to similar topics. Parts of the survey were worked out before the interviews 
took place, while it was worked out in its entirety when the factor ranking had been sent out to 
the Compliance Officers. In terms of questionnaire design it was important for us to 
operationalise our survey, which means that we as surveyor needed to formulate concrete and 
easily quantifiable questions (Jacobsen, 2000). This is particularly important when research taps 
into more abstract issues such as corruption. As stressed previously, ensuring anonymity is also 
important for the research quality of our thesis, henceforth it was crucial that we implemented 
the measures in our questionnaire design that places a high importance on anonymity. See 
Appendix 3 for an overview of the survey questions. 
 
Testing 
Before the survey was sent out, it was tested on individuals that are employed in relevant 
companies in terms of industry, company size and geographical location. In this way, both time 
spent on the survey, difficult questions, problematic formulations and other information was 
identified, enabling us to modify the survey accordingly. Our supervisors did also look through 
the test survey and commented on it based on their experience and academic background. 
 
The respondents were chosen based on convenience as they were acquaintances or previous 
colleagues of the researchers, but those who were asked comprised a broad sample in terms of 
position, years of work life experience, industry and experience with working abroad. A 
significant change made after the responses from the test was to exclude a factor ranking from 
the employee survey and rather ask questions that tapped into similar topics.  
 
Choice of respondents 
Our initial aim concerning the respondents to the employee survey was to target some 
departments and groups, making the sample a mix of both random and targeted selection. The 
selection of respondents within each of the chosen employee groups was to be done at random. 
Due to time constraints of the Compliance Officers there was uttered a reluctance to receiving 
extensive sample characteristics, as this would require more work for them when sending out the 
survey. The resulting sample constraints to be applied were thus: 
● Respondents should both be employees primarily based in Norway and employees 
primarily stationed abroad 
● Respondents should be both regular employees and managers 
 
Within each company we desire to have a total survey sample of approximately 100 employees 
to ensure a satisfactory response rate. If all of the studied companies participate in the survey, 
our final set of responses would consist of 1300 responses. Ensuring an adequate response rate is 
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also vital so that we can confidently draw general conclusions from the sample. Academic 
literature does not agree on what constitutes a minimum response rate, but arguably places the 
accepted minimum somewhere between 60-75% (Robson, 2011). In order to ensure a high rate 
of response the survey was sent out by the Compliance Officer so as to instil the importance of 
the survey to the respondents.  
 
Data collection process 
We decided to use an Internet based survey sent out through a survey system delivered by Select 
Survey. Travelling to the various geographical locations would prove exhausting on our limited 
financial resources, and the time required to conduct such online-based surveys, including 
sending them out and reminding respondents to finalise it, barely lie within the scope of our 
research period. Robson (2011) argues that a realistic minimum for conducting small-scale 
surveys is 3-4 months. Face-to-face interviews of all the surveyed employees would require 
significant amounts of time. The survey programme also ensures anonymity, which is considered 
important considering the sensitivity of the researched topic. The survey was distributed by the 
Compliance Officers in e-mails containing a link to the actual survey, and a reminder was sent 
out after approximately one month. 
 
During the research process, only two of the companies agreed to participate in the survey. This 
was mostly due to the fear of burdening the employees with more surveys than those already 
distributed internally. Table 6 shows the resulting characteristics of the final sample after the 
survey was sent out to 100 employees in each of the two companies. 
 
Table 6: Characteristics of sample responding to employee survey 
 
 
Company D Company G Total 
Total no. of respondents 36 78 114 
Response rate 36% 78% 57% 
Faction of managers/regular employees 17/19 32/46 49/67 
Faction stationed abroad/in Norway 28/8 15/63 44/72 
No. of years with the company 
0-2 years: 4 
2-5 years: 9 
5-10 years: 10 
10-20 years: 8 
20+ years: 5 
 
0-2 years: 23 
2-5 years: 12 
5-10 years: 22 
10-20 years: 15 
20+ years: 6 
 
0-2 years: 27 
2-5 years: 21 
5-10 years: 32 
10-20 years: 23 
20+ years: 11 
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The total response rate fell a bit below Robson’s (2011) recommendation, and the number of 
respondents did not balance between the two companies. Even so, the balance between managers 
and regular employees, and those stationed abroad and those stationed in Norway was considered 
satisfactory. Due to the rather low response rate and few companies participating, the findings 
from this part of our study will be used to a limited extent, considering the findings to be merely 
indications rather than high quality data that should be assessed by quantitative analysis tools. 
 
3.3.4 Documentation  
 
Documentary information is likely to be relevant to almost all case study topics (Yin, 2009). This 
study will make use documentary data from different sources in an ad hoc manner. For example, 
annual reports and material tied to anti-corruption and ethics within each of the companies was 
studied when preparing for the interviews of Compliance Officers. Some data was also extracted 
from the company web pages in the cases where objective information was not gathered during 
the interview process, e.g. due to limited time available when conducting the interviews, making 
us choose to focus on gathering more subjective information.  
 
3.4 Research quality and evaluation of methodology 
 
In this section, the presented research method will be discussed in terms of scientific quality. An 
outline of the concepts of validity and reliability will form the backdrop for the subsequent 
discussion of weaknesses and measures introduced to minimise the negative effects of these. 
This is based on the recommendation by Yin (2009) to evaluate the quality of empirical research 
by applying tests related to four main indicators: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability. Validity is in general concerned with the integrity and accuracy of 
conclusions that are generated in a study, while reliability is demonstrated if the operations of a 
study can be repeated, with the same results (Bryman, 2012). 
 
3.4.1 Construct validity 
 
Construct validity is the test that evaluates whether the applied research method is ‘identifying 
correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’ (Yin, 2009, p. 40).  
 
In an interview setting, an essential part of achieving this type of validity is to ensure that the 
interviewer and interviewee have the same understanding of the concepts being discussed. This 
also relates to whether the interviewer interprets the shared information in a correct way based 
on what the respondent is trying to say. Since this thesis to a large extent builds on empirical data 
from non- and semi-structured interviews, we considered it of high importance to ensure 
construct validity. During the interviews, concepts thought to be potentially vulnerable to 
ambiguity were those related to compliance and zero tolerance. An additional challenge to the 
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validity of our thesis in this respect is the use of both Norwegian and English language. 12 out of 
13 interviews are conducted in Norwegian, while the thesis is written in English; information 
may be lost in the process of translating the interviews. 
 
To some extent, construct validity was ensured by the fact that we had generated a basic 
understanding of the concepts in questions during the work on our pre-diploma thesis. 
Nonetheless, we assumed that we still lacked insight into the researched concepts, and thus ran 
the risk of misinterpreting the information and opinions communicated to us. To close this gap in 
our understanding we tried to avoid asking questions that built upon the concepts that could be 
subjected to ambiguity. Instead we asked questions directly relating to the interviewees’ own 
understanding of those concepts. In this way, we explored the topics instead of assuming an 
established common ground, both during the expert interviews and the sessions of questioning 
Compliance Officers. If the interviewees’ views of how the concepts should be understood were 
differing, this was considered a finding rather than a potential source to reduced validity. 
 
Another way of achieving construct validity is to focus on face validity, which is concerned with 
how the researcher determines that a measure has a very good chance of tapping into the 
underlying idea by asking others to check the items that make up the measure (Becker, Bryman 
and Ferguson, 2012, p. 214). To induce this in our thesis, we distributed the interview guides to 
our supervisors to uncover obvious sources of ambiguity and unfamiliar items. Moreover, the 
questions asked in the employee survey, and the factors to be ranked by Compliance Officers 
were initially distributed to a test group so as to uncover any obvious ambiguities or language 
barriers. 
 
The developed list of factors deducted from the interviews was also sent back to the Compliance 
Officers to be ranked. The items on the list were placed in random order to avoid guiding the 
ranking, and the respondents were given the opportunity to name other factors that they 
considered important. Two of the responses did include additional points as ‘Other’, thus 
improving the validity of our findings by adding to our results based on the interviewees 
understanding. In the employee survey, respondents were also given the opportunity to give 
additional comments in case they felt that the given questions did not collect their viewpoints in 
a satisfactory manner. This way, we would be certain of receiving a high quality set of main 
factors that concurred with the view of the interviewees. Having key informants review a draft of 
the case study report, or as in this case a condensed list of factors, is in line with one of Yin’s 
(2009) tactics to improve construct validity.  
 
Furthermore, the risk tied to writing our thesis in English while responses were mainly given in 
Norwegian was also addressed. Since the Norwegian-speaking Compliance Officers had to rank 
the factors in English, and the Employee survey was distributed in English we assumed that any 
misunderstandings would have been detected when they were given the opportunity to comment 
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on the list of factors. None of the respondents asked questions tied to the language used or 
seemed to have problems with the meaning of any of the factors. The interview conducted in 
English also provided a means for comparing the expressions used in Norwegian and English 
when asked the same questions. 
 
Using multiples sources of evidence is also introduced as a tactic to achieve high construct 
validity (Yin, 2009). This is somewhat achieved in our research process since 13 companies are 
studied and we thus collect viewpoints and data from various industries and types of firms. 
However, only one representative is interviewed from each company during the Compliance 
Officer interviews, making the gathered information subject to personal interpretation. To 
minimise this potential source of bias, the questions were grouped into two sections - one 
covering objective information and the other covering subjective viewpoints (Figure 4). A 
subsidiary goal of our thesis was to uncover such subjective viewpoints to be compared and 
contrasted across the firms, while having some objective data to compare the companies. Other 
main source of data were also included in the study i.e. the expert interviews and the employee 
survey. Even though the latter was only conducted in two of the companies, the extracted 
information helped to broaden the perspective on the researched topics. Being able to generalise 
the data was prioritised when answering our research questions, to some extent at the expense of 
construct validity. 
 
3.4.2 Internal validity 
 
The second test of research quality, also relating to validity, is the one of internal validity 
‘seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to 
other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships’ (Yin, 2009). To ensure this type 
of validity it is necessary to make sure that the assumed interrelationship between two conditions 
is not in reality dependant on a third one. Internal validity is typically weak in cross-sectional 
research designs since the researcher is not able to control the environment (Bryman, 2012). This 
makes it difficult to establish the causal direction from the resulting data and may be a source of 
ambiguity (Muijs, 2011, p. 39). 
 
The causal relationship most evident in this study is the ones between various company specific 
factors and the success of implementation of anti-corruption programmes.  Tactics suggested by 
Yin (2009) to help in the process of improving internal validity are pattern matching, 
explanation building, logic models, and addressing of rival explanations. In our study, the expert 
interviews and relevant theory is used as a foundation for building logical models to be tested. 
Pattern matching was done for instance when comparing elements composing an anti-corruption 
programme as abstracted from theory with the empirical observations in interviews. Overall, the 
study was characterised by the obtained knowledge from the literature review, conducted during 
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the work on our pre-diploma thesis, and the initial study of theory relating to the research 
questions of this thesis. 
 
A potential pitfall of our research design would be if we apply too much freedom in interpreting 
causal relationships, as opposed to causal relationships being described directly by the 
interviewees. This is a relevant concern both in the expert interviews and the interviews of 
Compliance Officers. To avoid this, the data was collected as unbiased as possible, and initial 
questions were asked in a rather open ended manner so that the interviewers would not guide the 
interviewees’ responses. The subsequent follow-up questions would thus have a greater chance 
of being based on an increased understanding of the discussed topics. During the interviews, 
rival explanations also surfaced either between Compliance Officers or between combinations of 
experts, employees and Compliance Officers. These are addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.4.3 External validity 
 
External validity is the final element related to validity, and it refers to defining the extent to, and 
conditions under which the findings of our research can be generalised (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) 
outlines how studies may rely on analytical or statistical generalisation, which are two different 
approaches resulting in different abilities to generalise the findings.  
 
Our research design lies close to that of analytical generalisation in the sense that we strive to 
apply a particular set of results to some broader theory by identifying, generating and 
investigating theoretical insight and relationships. Due to the lack of existing theory on the topic, 
we simultaneously aim at gathering findings from a sample that can be generalised to a larger 
population, which is of a size larger than what is common for analytical generalisation. However, 
the sample size is still too small, due to our resource constraints, to lay the basis for statistical 
generalisation. Furthermore, neither the choice of companies to be studied or the employees to 
respond to the survey entail random sampling, as is common for cross-sectional designs. This 
implies that the representativeness of the results for statistical generalisation may be questioned 
(Bryman, 2004). The resulting combined approach aims at studying the companies more in depth 
than what has been done by researchers previously, while covering a rather large number of 
companies, so that some of our findings may prove applicable to the general population of 
MNCs that are implementing anti-corruption programmes. Nonetheless, the fact that all of the 
studied companies are Norwegian restricts the validity of applying the findings directly to MNCs 
in other countries. Therefore, we do not claim that the findings and recommendations of our 
thesis should directly be projected on to any MNC.  
 
One way in which external validity is improved is by including experts in the initial stages of our 
study, so that subsequent interviews are conducted with a greater understanding of the external 
perspective in mind. We also consider the topic of compliance to be of high relevance regardless 
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of factors such as industry, products/services delivered and external environments, reducing the 
number of threats to external validity. As with Health, Safety and the Environment (HSE), 
compliance is to be paralleled with day-to-day processes and to be incorporated as ‘the way we 
do things’ as expressed by the Compliance Officer of Company M. Our research is thus more 
suited for generalisation than studies of more industry- or country specific topics. Another way 
of ensuring external validity is to apply replication logic. This implies that each case is carefully 
selected so that it either predicts similar results as theoretically assumed (a literal replication) or 
contrasting results, but for anticipated reasons (a theoretical replication) (Yin, 2009). The lack of 
existing theory decreased the option to either validate or discredit compelling theoretical 
assumptions. However, replication logic was used when testing the list of factors necessary for 
successful implementation of anti-corruption programmes across the studied companies. The 
interview guide used during the Compliance Officer interviews was also only slightly altered 
after the initial interviews, ensuring that the questions asked would remain approximately the 
same throughout the process. Using the same structure across the companies in this way 
enhances comparability of the findings across companies (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  
 
3.4.4 Reliability 
 
The concept of reliability is based on the idea that if the same procedure is followed, the same 
conclusions should be reached (Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012). The aim is to minimise errors and 
biases in the study and to present the applied research method so that others can perform an 
identical study. Reliability differs from replication in that it is concerned with how doing the 
same case over again should produce the same results, not on replicating the results of one study 
by doing another one (Yin, 2009). 
 
One of the ways reliability is ensured is through inter-observer consistency so that the level of 
subjective judgement when gathering information, or recording observations is minimised 
(Bryman, 2012). For this mostly qualitative study, it was essential to ensure an as unbiased 
extraction of information as possible. Measures taken to improve reliability were to be two 
interviewers during all interviews. In this way, the subjectivity of resulting findings would be 
challenged, as both interviewers would assess the recorded observations. When sending out the 
factor ranking which is based on the cross-section of observations from the 13 companies, our 
own understanding of the information communicated during the interviews would also have to 
pass the ‘test’ of the Compliance Officers.  
 
As presented by Yin (2009), reliability is ensured if the applied research method is thoroughly 
presented. Throughout this chapter we have methodically outlined all the generic steps of the 
research process which have led to the findings of our study, e.g. the initial generation of 
understanding through the pre-diploma thesis and expert interviews, selection of companies to 
study, collection of data through preparing and conducting interviews of Compliance Officers, 
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the review of interviews and cross-sectional analysis with the subsequent development of the 
factor ranking, the further development of an employee survey, and the discussion of our results. 
The only gap in documentation is tied to the need for conserving anonymity of the studied 
companies, i.e. it may prove difficult for external researchers to identify the exact same 
companies. However, we include information about the industries in which these operate, their 
size and the interview guide in an attempt to improve reliability. Another measure taken is to 
develop a case study database containing all the collected data in a structured and systematic 
manner, as recommended by Yin (2009). This ensured that external factors were not introduced 
to the original observations, affecting the objectivity of the data. 
 
To conclude on the assessment of the strength of the methodology of the study, the features 
investigated regarding validity and reliability are found to contribute to increased quality. This 
implies that the quality of the methodology is sufficient to provide a credible interpretation of 
reality after the various tactics have been applied throughout the research process.	  
 
3.5 , of the applied research methods 
 
Undoubtedly it is important to be aware of any limitation of the findings; qualitative research 
strategies have been criticized for being too subjective, making replication difficult, generalizing 
on too poor grounds, and for having low transparency (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This section 
contains an outline of some of the most significant limitations of this thesis, rooted in the choice 
of research design and practicalities. 
 
3.5.1 Limitations due to the choice of research design 
 
Subjectivity 
Subjectivity may be understood as how ‘your own background, values, and beliefs 
fundamentally shape the way you approach and conduct research’ (Tracy, 2013, p. 3). In our 
research process, subjectivity may be a limitation as it may have affected the way information 
was gathered during the interviews; when taking personal notes instead of transcribing the 
interviews we may unconsciously have screened data based on our own interpretation of it. The 
closeness to the researched unit possibly undermined the critical reflection of their answers as 
well. Since the study relies heavily on interviews, and thus our ability to correctly assess the 
causal relationships discussed, limitations may also be tied to misinterpretation of e.g. the effect 
of various causes for inefficient implementation. Follow-up questions were also based on our 
subjective understanding of the topic as is common for semi-structured interviews. This reduced 
consistency in questions asked may have reduced the quality of pattern matching and 
generalisation. Finally, subjectivity was also present during the data analysis when tying the 
available information to the discussed topics. 
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Little directly applicable theory available 
Due to the lack of directly applicable theory, the foundation for the research process was not as 
sound as it could have been. There was a lack of rival explanations challenging the conclusions 
reached, and explanation building was only to a limited extent based on relevant logic models 
developed by other researchers. This damaged the internal validity of this study. 
 
Lack of transparency 
Even though the research method is thoroughly outlined previously in this chapter, limitations 
are tied to the lack of transparency and subsequent difficulty for externals to establish what we 
actually did to arrive at our conclusions. This is a common concern of qualitative researchers 
(Brymann & Bell, 2009). A possible root cause for reduced transparency are the inherent 
subjective evaluations underlying our chain of evidence; the conclusions derived from theory and 
findings throughout our thesis may to some extent be difficult for an external observer to follow. 
 
Replication issues 
If researchers follow an unstructured approach and make decisions or draw conclusions that 
depend on their own ingenuity it is almost impossible to conduct true replication (Brymann & 
Bell, 2009). Based on the subjectivity and lack of transparency inherent in our research method, 
there may not be sufficient information about our research procedures for other researchers to 
conduct a re-study. For example, the final list of studied companies is not given, and the 
development of factors to be ranked by Compliance Officers is somewhat based on our 
interpretation of the information shared during the interviews. 
 
Instability 
Bryman (2012) assesses the level of reliability on factors such as stability, i.e. if conclusions are 
stable over time. When applying this logic to our thesis, stability is achieved if the responses to 
surveys and interview questions remain stable over time. Since the gathered data include 
opinions related to a field that is rapidly developing, the stability of our research is challenged, as 
it may be altered by interviewees’ day-to-day experiences and external trends. This is tied to how 
data is collected at a single point in time in cross-sectional research designs. 
 
Challenges with generalisation 
Even though this study aim at generating conclusions that apply to more companies than those 
that are researched, it contains several limitations related to generalizability, such as the limited 
number of companies and the lack of a strictly random selection of firms and respondents. There 
is a high uncertainty in representativeness of our findings, especially those extracted from the 
employee survey due to the low number of attending companies. This low number of firms opens 
up for limitations related to misjudging the representativeness of a single firm, and exaggeration 
of data that in reality varies significantly. Aggregated comparative errors may also have 
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developed during the cross-section analysis if we have made wrong generalisations on the 
companies’ behaviour.  
 
3.5.2 Limitations due to practicalities 
 
Language and cultural barriers 
The use of Norwegian language during most interviews when the thesis is written in English may 
result in limitations if content is lost in the translation process. However, the greatest limitation 
in this respect is tied to the employee survey, which is formulated in English, but distributed to 
employees at various geographical locations where English is not the national language. Due to 
reduced language proficiency respondents may misunderstand what is being asked. This also ties 
to the lack of knowledge of the local culture reducing our ability to ensure that questions are 
asked in a way that carries the desired meaning to the employees. 
 
Limited access to research subjects 
The quality of the cross-sectional analysis in this thesis is reduced by the limited access to 
research subjects. Contact with the Compliance Officers was established through Deloitte or the 
switchboard of the respective companies, reducing our ability to critically assess who would be 
the most relevant person to interview. For the employee survey all correspondence had to go 
through the Compliance Officers. Further, only two companies allowed us to distribute the 
survey, and these desired to select whom to send it to themselves, thus removing the option of 
random sampling. Hence, the resulting sample may be misrepresentative for the overall 
population, and we risk omitting relevant factors and perspectives. Another limitation that is 
rooted in the lack of direct lines of communication emerged as the survey enabled respondents to 
tick off for numerous alternatives when answering questions that were meant to have only one 
response. Since this could not be communicated, a small fraction of the responses ticked off for 
more than one alternative and thus undermined the quality of our results. 
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4 Findings 
  
This chapter presents the findings from our empirical research depicted previously. It will be 
presented in the manner portrayed in Figure 9.  
  
	  
Figure 9: Structure of Findings 
 
Following the previously presented structure the expert interviews are meant to address the 
national context, the compliance interviews and factor ranking the company context, whilst the 
employee level will be covered by the findings from the employee survey. The implications of 
said findings will be discussed in greater detail, in relation to the companies’ internal procedures 
in Chapter 5. 
  
4.1 Expert Interviews 
  
The expert interviews were carried out over a period of one and a half months and the 
respondents included a sample of Norwegian corruption experts from a wide range of 
backgrounds. The primary aim of these interviews was to get an in-depth view of the current 
standing of the Norwegian business environment based on their experiences from working within 
the field of anti-corruption and compliance. Furthermore, we sought to gain insight into what 
future trends that we might expect, and henceforth what the future developments of said field 
may entail.  This section reflects this focus and is divided into two parts; status quo of 
Norwegian anti-corruption efforts, and future trends. 
 
In order to increase the readability of the findings the key elements are presented in the table 
below before they are outlined in the subsequent sections (Table 7). 
  
Table 7: Key findings expert interviews 
Key findings Expert Interviews 
Status Quo Future Trends 
·   Majority of Norwegian companies underestimate the 
risk of corruption and henceforth fail to implement 
adequate risk mitigating measures. 
● Top management naïve to the extent that 
·     National legislation will most likely be altered to 
mirror the global development and henceforth include 
regulation that hold companies responsible for 
ensuring adequate implementation and compliance of 
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corruption poses a risk for their company and 
thereby fail to put focus on the issue and 
communicate this to their employees. 
● Norwegian companies underestimate the extent 
of the law and its practical applicability. 
● Several good frameworks have been made 
available by global institutions (see appendix), 
however Norwegian companies fail to 
appropriately adapt them to a local context. 
● Little competence on anti-corruption and how 
to implement anti-corruption frameworks in 
Norwegian companies today. 
● Managers have made little effort to identify 
where they are most exposed to risk as well as 
they have neglected to identify actual internal 
capabilities. 
● Employees are generally unaware of personal 
risk and responsibility when faced with 
corruption. One of the key areas in which 
Norwegian companies fail to assess their 
corruption risk is when dealing with agents and 
other third parties.  
anti-corruption frameworks. 
● Increased focus and henceforth a more rapid 
development of capabilities in industries most 
exposed to external pressures such as banking 
and petroleum. 
● Norwegian prosecution will become more 
concerned with the private sector resulting in 
an increased in the number of corruption 
sentences, which will make the jurisprudence 
of the law much clearer. ·      See a shift in 
compliance function to become more risk 
related. 
● Increase in size of compliance departments as 
companies become more aware of their risk 
exposure. 
 
  
4.1.1 Status quo of Norwegian anti-corruption efforts 
 
All experts concurred in their understanding that most Norwegian companies may be seen as 
immature in their perception of corruption risk, and as an extension, their efforts are on a rather 
infantile stage of development. This is, however, not to say that some companies and industries 
have ignored the issue of corporate corruption, and several of the most prominent companies in 
Norway have started to show significant improvement. Industries such as banking & finance and 
petroleum are considered to be the industries that have responded most extensively to global 
pressure to implement anti-corruption measures into their current corporate governance 
framework. The general perception still remains that top management continues to underestimate 
the necessity for such efforts and by extension fails to establish any precedent for employees to 
take note of. Some of the experts put forward the argument that one has seen an historical 
tendency where top management has tried to cover up cases of corruption, which in turn has a 
rather strong signalling effect on the issue of non-disclosure. Moreover, top management may 
often be involved in corruption themself, which further decreases the likelihood of a strong 
signalling effect towards anti-corruption (Kvamme and Slettemark, 2015). In such cases it is 
important that the board understand their responsibility and henceforth apply pressure to 
establish appropriate safeguards. 
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There are several lessons to be learned from other companies’ misfortune. Several of the 
companies whom are seen as pioneers within the development of anti-corruption frameworks, 
such as Siemens, are companies whom have in fact been exposed to corruption scandals 
previously. Another key aspect to this is the fact that most corruption cases today are disclosed 
by external investigations from agencies such as Økokrim, the World Bank, consultants and the 
media. This is important to note as it highlights the companies’ incompetence with regards to 
assessing their internal situation, which further weakens the company’s ability to respond in a 
manner that warrants minimal damage to their reputation (Kvamme and Slettemark, 2015). 
  
Wolders (2015) moreover highlighted the need for companies to have local Compliance Officers 
in areas with higher exposures to risk. He further claimed that the Norwegian culture is in fact 
quite suited for anti-corruption work as employees often act in a trustworthy and ethical manner. 
Nonetheless, such a cultural tradition may prove to be a double-edged sword in the sense that 
corruption then becomes an issue of cultural relativism which allows for arguments such as 
‘that’s just how they do it over there’. The issue then becomes how to guarantee that employees 
have the appropriate knowledge and training, so that they are able to adequately identify and 
deter corruption. All experts agree that there is insufficient competence on this in Norway, 
however one has seen an increase in the number of companies initiating employee training on 
corruption. They also concur that there are several good and comprehensive frameworks, which 
have been made available from global institutions such as the World Bank and OECD. However, 
these fail to provide adequate guidelines with regards to implementation. This then results in a 
gap between global recommendations and how these are actually translated and implemented 
into each company in practice. 
  
Angell, Kvamme, Slettemark and Wolders (2015) underlined the need for practical training such 
as ‘dilemma-training’ to ease the communication of the practical value of anti-corruption 
measures to employees. This is in order to alleviate the effects of ‘bureaucratic fatigue’ in the 
sense that employees see their training as something that they merely have to complete, but 
which does not add any real value to their day-to-day operations. One inherent impediment of 
corruption is that it is a criminal act that does not present an obvious victim; hence, it may be 
hard to communicate its ramifications to employees in order to deter their engagement in such 
activities.  
 
Paired with the current low risk of corruption being discovered it may be hard to communicate to 
companies what their actual exposure is, and so forth motivate them to allocate appropriate 
amount of resources to respond to the challenges. Third party contracts and integrity due 
diligence is seen as one of the key areas in which many Norwegian companies fail to adequately 
assess their risk exposure. This may furthermore be showcased by some of the more recent 
corruption cases, such as Telenor and Vimplecom (Baksaas, 2015). However, legislation 
stipulates, in rather ambiguous terms, that one may be held responsible for corruption carried out 
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by an agent or contracted third party, which makes it even more paramount to ensure an efficient 
implementation as one also needs to look beyond the immediate organisational structure. 
  
This aspect is further complicated by the lack of cooperation with companies, regulatory and 
legislative agents. The lack of communication between the various actors has made it hard to 
track changes in a transparent and explicit manner. Agencies such as Økokrim have within recent 
years partly shifted their investigation focus from public corruption to that of the private business 
sector (Angell, 2015). Such changes have arguably not been communicated very well towards 
the Norwegian MNCs, and as such they often fail to adequately understand the extent and 
practical applicability of the law. Some experts highlighted the paradox that the government 
encourages Norwegian companies to operate in high-risk countries while simultaneously failing 
to provide transparent guidance as to what they expect of the companies in terms of corruption 
(Kvamme and Slettemark, 2015). Consequently, they argue that governmentally owned 
companies should take the lead in the development of anti-corruption practices, and ensure a 
strengthening in the capabilities of the Norwegian business community as a whole. 
  
There is a distinct need for transparency and communication on this issue, both amongst 
industry-peers, but also on a national cross-institutional level. Concepts such as zero-tolerance 
may muddy the waters, in the sense that some might understand it as a zero-tolerance for the 
existence of corruption rather than a zero-tolerance for not acting on corruption. Experts 
highlight that the solution lies in Norwegian MNCs being more aware of what operating in high-
risk countries entails, rather than avoiding placing operations in such countries. Governments 
and non-governmental agencies must also demonstrate the same understanding and help 
Norwegian companies be better equipped to respond to the challenges, instead of leaving it to the 
global community in its entirety. 
  
4.1.2 Future trends 
 
All experts highlighted that we most likely will see an increase in the number of Norwegian 
MNCs establishing an anti-corruption framework and compliance department. This is partly due 
to the increase in external pressure from global and national actors such as legislators and 
industry peers. One is also likely to see an increase in the focus on anti-corruption as more 
Norwegian companies are expected to expand their operations to high-risk counties. At the same 
time, the experts expect there to be an increase in the number of corruption scandals as the 
national prosecution agency Økokrim has become more perceptive to private corruption. As a 
result, the number of scandals may increase in the media so that the negative value of corruption 
becomes more apparent. This may create a greater external pressure, and so forth internal 
motivation, both for governmental agencies but also small and medium size companies to 
introduce anti-corruption frameworks. This development is in line with global trend, and Søreide 
(2015) argues that we may expect legislation to change in the sense that it will mirror the global 
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frontrunners such as the US (FCPA and SOX) and the UK (UK Bribery Act). If so, one is likely 
to see legislation that places greater importance on the need for an anti-corruption framework, 
but also that demands companies to ensure they have the appropriate systems in place to warrant 
efficient implementation and compliance. 
  
Furthermore, one may expect a more vigilant financial sector, which will increase the risk of 
engaging in corruption as banks and other financial institutions become more aware of the 
mechanisms of corruption, and henceforth start to cover up the loopholes. The developments 
within this sector is likely to provide an example of how other industries may mobilize in order 
to respond to corruption. As a result, we may expect to see compliance departments increasing in 
size. One is also likely to see an increased global awareness and a further strengthening of the 
investigative functions of institutions such as the World Bank. An increase in external 
investigations is in turn likely to impact the motivation of systematising internal investigations 
within the companies themselves. Another prospected trend is the compliance function becoming 
more risk responsive in its resource-deployment, which in turn may result in an increase in the 
number of local Compliance Officers.   
  
4.2 Compliance Officer Interviews 
  
Here, the companies studied in this thesis are introduced before the role and function of the 
Compliance Officer is briefly presented. Subsequent sections deal with the various 
responsibilities and mechanisms behind the different companies’ compliance programmes in 
greater detail. Each section contains both a tabulated portrayal of the results, as well as a relating 
evaluation of the findings. Where we did not obtain sufficient information from the interviews 
the corresponding cell in the table is left blank. 
  
4.2.1 Company Overview 
 
In order to ensure the anonymity of the responding companies we have chosen to present the data 
in intervals according to topics, rather than providing very detailed data on each company as this 
may allow the reader to identify some of them. As previously outlined, 13 companies were 
chosen based on a set of selection criteria; Table 8 provides a short overview of the companies as 
well as their anti-corruption efforts. 
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Table 8: Company Overview 
Company 
Been 
subjected to 
investigation 
Been 
convicted 
Operates in 
high-risk 
countries 
Years since 
establishing 
code 
Number of 
employees 
Permanent 
staff 
outside 
Norway 
A Yes No Yes > 2 years > 15 000 Yes 
B No No Yes > 10 years > 15 000 Yes 
C Yes No No > 2 years > 20 000 Yes 
D Yes No Yes > 10 years > 5000 Yes 
E Yes No Yes > 10 years > 5000 Yes 
F Yes No Yes > 2 years > 2000 Yes 
G Yes No No > 2 years < 2000 Yes 
H Yes No No > 2 years > 2000 Yes 
I No No Yes > 5 years > 25 000 Yes 
J No No Yes > 5 years > 2000 Yes 
K No No Yes > 10 years > 2000 Yes 
L Yes Yes Yes > 10 years > 20 000 Yes 
M Yes Yes Yes > 5 years > 10 000 Yes 
 
 
As the table highlights, all companies have permanent staff stationed outside of Norway. This is 
important as it shows that all 13 companies face the issue of implementing a framework in a 
culture that is distinctly different from the one at home. Even though all of them have operations 
abroad, only 10 of the companies identify their foreign involvement as a substantial contributor 
to total revenue. As the Compliance Officer at (Company H) noted: ‘very little of our operations 
are based abroad, however it is in these areas in which we are most exposed to risk’. This 
underlines the delicate balance between having to deploy resources where they are needed, and 
allocating resources primarily on the basis of where one has the largest amount of operations. 
The sample also shows a wide range in terms of number of employees. A company with over 20 
000 employees may need to structure their training and resource expenditure differently from a 
company with a total staff of around 2 000. However, as will be portrayed later in this thesis, the 
variations in how the compliance function is structured are not necessarily tied directly to 
company size. 
  
What is interesting to note is that 9 out of 13 companies had registered cases of corruption, 
which had been exposed mainly by external agents such as media, the World Bank and Økokrim. 
Even though several of these had gone to trial, only two of the companies had been convicted. 
Others are currently under investigation and as such the real number of companies whose future 
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is uncertain extends beyond these two.  The reason why this data is important ties in with the 
motivation of the company to initiate an anti-corruption programme. Several of the respondents 
highlighted the fact that their internal focus on the issue was a direct result of investigations. 
Moreover the majority of the companies made references to the Statoil-Horton case of 2004, as 
this was one of the first times that a Norwegian MNC was tried for corruption in Norway. It duly 
received large national and global media coverage, and several Compliance Officers pointed to 
this case as being one of the first times the negative effects of corruption, and the risk it posed to 
Norwegian companies operating abroad, was portrayed nationally. A surprisingly little reference 
was made to the 2003 changes in legislation, which may indicate a lack of communication and 
interaction between the relevant actors. 
  
The visibility of the effects of corruption was in turn one of the main motivations for all 
companies to create codes of conducts and compliance documents that include direct mention of 
anti-corruption. Still, five of the companies have adopted such measures rather recently in 
comparison to the others. What is interesting to note is that most respondents highlighted top 
management and the board as those whom have initiated the focus on anti-corruption, even 
though their increased efforts were mainly due to top managements reaction to external pressures 
(from either industry-peers or broader global society). 
 
4.2.2 Compliance Officer Overview 
 
This section briefly presents an overview of the role and function of the Compliance Officer, 
based on the information presented in Table 9. 
  
Table 9: Compliance Office(r) Overview 
Company Background 
Previous 
compliance 
experience 
% 
position 
Years with 
compliance 
experience 
Size of 
compliance 
department 
Primary 
workplace 
Local 
Compliance 
Officers 
A Legal Yes 100% < 2 < 5 Norway No 
B HR No < 100% > 10 < 5 Norway No 
C Internal audit No 100% > 10 < 5 Norway Yes 
D Legal No < 100% > 10 < 5 Norway No 
E Internal audit Yes 100% > 5 > 5 Norway Yes 
F Engineering Yes 100% > 2 < 5 Norway No 
G Business Administration Yes 100% > 2 < 5 Norway No 
H Political Science Yes < 100% > 2 < 5 Norway No 
I Legal No < 100% > 5 < 5 Norway No 
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J Internal audit Yes < 100% > 2 < 5 Norway No 
K Development Management Yes 100% < 2 < 5 Norway No 
L Legal Yes 100% > 5 > 15 Norway/ London Yes 
M Legal Yes 100% > 2 > 15 Norway Yes 
 
Table 9 cont. 
Company Responsibility, as stated by Compliance Officer 
A • Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Screening of projects and assessing status quo 
B 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
• Monitoring implementation at line manager level 
C • Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
D • Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Conduct workshops in various locations 
E 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
• Monitoring implementation 
F 
• Annual Corporate Responsibility Reporting (incl. investigation) 
• Business Integrity Programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training, 
risk assessment) 
G 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, training, reporting mechanism, risk 
assessment) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
• Monitoring implementation 
H • Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, training, reporting mechanism) 
• Conduct workshops 
I • Professional responsibility of anti-corruption 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents) 
J 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
• Monitoring of implementation 
K • Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
L 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training, risk 
assessment) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
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• Monitoring implementation 
• Counselling top management 
M 
• Anti-corruption programme (governing documents, reporting mechanism, training, risk 
assessment) 
• Compliance system (coordinating roles, responsibility) 
• Monitoring implementation 
 
 
As the table portrays the Compliance Officer function proved to be quite diverse across the 13 
companies. Firstly, this was evident in their various backgrounds, ranging from political science 
and business administration to engineering. Nonetheless, it may be beneficial to note that the 
majority of officers had a background from internal audit or legal departments. This ties in with 
the broader structuring of the company’s programme as several of the respondents said they had 
been in charge of development of the programme, and as such their background and capabilities 
may have influenced how they chose to structure their efforts. Which departments the 
Compliance Officer had been recruited from also seem to influence the location of the 
compliance function within the company (Company I). In the companies where the Compliance 
Officer’s position was lower 100%, this was especially evident. In situations where the 
respondent had a split position with compliance, they were split between the Compliance Officer 
and positions in supporting departments such as internal auditing, HR or legal. 
  
Furthermore, there seems to be two primary trends as to the recruitment of the Compliance 
Officers. Three out of four of them, whom had no prior experience from the field of anti-
corruption, had been with the company for over 10 years. The recruitment of the remaining nine 
officers may then be seen in direct correlation with the initiation or intensification of the 
company’s anti-corruption efforts. Several of the officers also had prior investigative experience 
from either being priory employed in consultant agencies or they have been part of internal 
investigations in current or previous companies. The capabilities of the Compliance Officers are 
arguably a crucial part of the compliance function as they are seemingly instrumental in the 
development and day-to-day operations of the programme, which will be discussed in 
subsequent parts of this thesis. 
  
All but one of the respondents had their head of compliance based in Norway, and worked from 
the company headquarters. The majority of these were also members of a Compliance Officer 
Network in which they meet regularly to discuss recent trends and share experiences. Several of 
the respondents referred to this network as highly valuable since they often felt somewhat 
isolated within their own companies, as they often bore the sole responsibility of compliance. All 
Compliance Officers report directly to the corporate management or board. This is important as 
it safeguards the independent investigative function of the role, and also increases its credibility 
with regards to employees, so as to increase the transparency and trust of reporting mechanisms, 
such as for instance whistle-blowing. 
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With regards to the size of the compliance department only three companies had departments 
with more than 5 full-time employees.  The largest departments could be found in Company L 
and Company M, which in turn are the only two companies whom currently have been convicted 
for corruption. They are also some of the companies with the largest amount of employees in 
total. In the interviews, it is suggested that the amount of resources made available for 
compliance is directly correlated to the corruption sentences. This may to some extent point to 
the fact that these companies has have experiences the potential detrimental value of corruption, 
and so forth are more tractable to allocate a larger pool of resources towards compliance.  
  
4.2.3 Providing guidance to employees on what is considered ethical behaviour 
 
The most central component of all of the companies’ policies is the code of conduct, which 
provides information about the fundamental ethical standards and attitudes that employees are 
expected to have, and which they have all have to sign as a prerequisite for their employment. 
Building on this underlying code, the companies make available various guiding principles such 
as corporate anti-corruption policies, governance documents, ethics guidelines, handbooks, anti-
corruption manuals and routines related to receiving gifts. In addition to the internal guidelines, 
some of the companies also have to sign and adhere to the code of conduct of their customers to 
be allowed to do business with them (Company J). Most of the studied companies provide 
employees with anti-corruption resources that to some extent are adapted to the legislations and 
local cultures faced at the operational level. However, the development of the programmes are 
often based on rather generic material provided by external actors such as Transparency 
International and the World Bank, or is done by hired consultants.  
 
The various companies’ inspirations for development of an anti-corruption programme, and 
whether they have a statement of zero tolerance are shown in Table 10 below.  
 
Table 10: Inspirations for developing the programmes and zero tolerance 
Company Inspiration for development 
Statement 
of zero 
tolerance 
A 
• Compliance Officer Network 
• Conferences 
• Jurisprudence and legislation 
Yes 
B 
• Customers and partners 
• Transparency International 
• UN Global Compact 
Yes 
C 
• Compliance Officer Network 
• Consultants 
• Market trends 
Yes 
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D • Compliance Officer Network 
• Existing legislation Yes 
E 
• Compliance Officer Network 
• Conferences 
• Consultants 
• International organisations (UN, OECD, TI) 
• International legislation and guidance (FCPA) 
Yes 
F 
• Conferences 
• Legislation 
• International organisations (TI) 
Yes 
G 
• Compliance Officer Network 
• Conferences 
• International organisations (World Bank) 
• International legislation and guidance (FCPA, UK Bribery Act) 
• Market trends 
Yes 
H • UN Global Compact Yes 
I • Compliance Officer Network 
• Legislation Yes 
J 
• Consultants 
• Customers 
• Peers 
Yes 
K • Conferences 
• Legislation Yes 
L • International legislation and guidance (FCPA, UK Bribery Act) 
• Jurisprudence and legislation Yes 
M • International legislation and guidance (FCPA, UK Bribery Act) 
• British standards and practices (incl. Ministry of Justice, UK) Yes 
 
 
A statement of zero tolerance 
All of the companies claim to have zero tolerance for corruption applicable to the whole 
company. This includes facilitation payments, except in the face of danger to life. The policy is 
often communicated through statements by top management or in overlying anti-corruption 
policies, being the top-down ‘talk’ that lays the foundations for the ‘walk’ of employees.  
 
Company L, Company B, and Company F are positive to the term because it gives clear 
guidelines for how employees should behave, and because it functions as the standard against 
which their actions are measured. A zero tolerance is claimed by some to have a positive effect 
on employees’ choices because they are certain of management support if they have to choose 
between acting ethically or ensuring the highest possible profits (Company A, Company B). 
Employees thus know that they are not allowed to pay facilitation payments, even though it may 
generate higher profits and is considered legal according to local law. Company B claims that the 
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term is often misunderstood as signalling zero tolerance for the existence of corruption within the 
company, while the correct understanding of it is ‘zero tolerance for not learning from your 
mistakes’. 
 
On the other hand, some of the interviewees express reluctance for applying the term because of 
its deterring effect on employees who consider bringing up dilemmas that they face at work 
(Company A, Company G). Furthermore, it is thought to be difficult to practically enforce the 
statement due to its potentially far-reaching effects (Company C, Company D, Company J, 
Company M). In Company D, the occurrence of facilitation payments is accepted to some extent 
because of the difficulty of getting around it. In its most extreme consequence, the Compliance 
Officer of Company C points out that zero tolerance could imply that the company has to avoid 
hiring suppliers that previously have engaged in corruption. It is, however, considered 
unfortunate to be that strict, because companies that have been punished for being corrupt are 
often the safest companies to work with after a time due to the drastic improvements they make 
(Company F). 
 
4.2.4 Showing involvement at the top management level 
 
Compliance has become a prioritised focus for the top management of the studied companies due 
the potential damaging effects of non-compliance on profits and reputation. There has been an 
increased emphasis on compliance globally, and one has seen emerging trends of increased 
media coverage on issues related to corruption (Company J) as well as higher demands from 
customers to suppliers’ implementation of anti-corruption programmes (Company G). The 
interviews uncovered three main drivers for top management involvement: importance of tone at 
the top, the responsibility of top management, and necessity of top management to dedicate 
resources to anti-corruption work. 
 
Tone at the top 
Within the studied companies, tone at the top is one of the most frequently mentioned factors for 
ensuring successful implementation of an anti-corruption programme. What top management 
communicates on the topic of corruption and ethical behaviour is said to set the tone for the rest 
of the company (Company M, Company K and Company I).  
 
To ensure a healthy tone from the top in Company M, the top managers go through four sessions 
where dilemmas and ways to communicate values and attitudes are discussed, and their bonuses 
are tied to tone at the top and company culture. Other ways of ensuring a dedicated and healthy 
leadership, as introduced in various of the companies, are regular reporting on status quo to keep 
the issue top of mind (Company H), special training of line managers to generate a sense of 
responsibility locally (Company E), and staying up to date on general market trends through e.g. 
participating in a national network for Compliance Officers (Table 10). An issue introduced by 
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several of the Compliance Officers is the difficulty of finding good measures for evaluating 
performance of top management in this respect. Company M has an established method for using 
KPIs to assess management behaviour, while Company C, Company L and Company K require 
leaders to openly discuss issues related to corruption. 
 
 
 
Distribution of responsibility to top management 
Ultimately, the responsibility of the company to behave ethically lies with the top management, 
i.e. the board, CEO and Compliance Officer. This includes taking the consequences if corruption 
scandals develop, sometimes as an individual, which effectively involves top management in the 
implementation of anti-corruption efforts. All of the companies had some form of compliance 
function located within the corporate unit (Table 9), either a Compliance Officer or a 
Compliance Office, in direct communication with the board and top management. The stated 
responsibility of this Compliance Office(r) differed from having professional responsibility to 
being responsible for coordinating the corporate compliance unit, developing ethics guidelines 
and implementing the anti-corruption programme (Table 9). In Company B, for example the 
Compliance Office(r) also has a broader responsibility of ensuring that the desired culture is 
rooted in all of the geographically dispersed departments by travelling to the various locations. In 
the long term, the goal of Company M is for the compliance function to be merely a coordinating 
function while every employee takes responsibility for implementing the anti-corruption 
programme in practice. This view correlates with the one of Company A where the local rooting 
of ethical behaviour is considered more important than a well-functioning compliance function. 
 
Dedicating resources 
The amount of resources dedicated in practice may be seen as a strong indicator of the level of 
top management involvement as it may determine the possibilities for preventing, detecting and 
responding to non-compliance.  A general observation amongst the Compliance Officers was the 
correlation between a company being convicted as a consequence of a corruption scandal and the 
scope of resources dedicated to fighting corruption. In most companies, except for Company B, 
Company L and Company M the amount of resources dedicated was considered insufficient for 
developing and implementing the anti-corruption programmes (Table 11). The interviewees in 
Company G and Company I suggested that the experienced reluctance to dedicate resources to 
the work on compliance was rooted in a lack of understanding of its importance. 
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Table 11: Perceived resource availability 
Company Sufficient resources available Company 
Sufficient resources 
available 
A No H No 
B Yes I No 
C No J No 
D No K No 
E No L Yes 
F No M Yes 
G No   
 
4.2.5 Facilitating ethical behaviour at the employee level 
 
For the anti-corruption programmes to be implemented successfully, the interviewed Compliance 
Officers highlighted the importance of generating an understanding of the status quo at the 
operational level and responding to this in a way that would facilitate compliance. The 
competence of line managers is seen as important because most of what is done to implement 
and assure compliance in practice is depending on the local units, with varying degrees of 
support from the Compliance Office(r) (Table 12). Furthermore, their perception of current 
employee competence, and the potential effect of incentives and culture were considered to be 
key elements in the discussion on implementation success. 
 
Table 12: Responsibility of implementation, employee competence and incentives 
Company 
Implementation 
responsibility 
lies in the line 
Level of employee 
competence Use of incentives 
A Yes  No, previously used bonuses 
B Yes 
• Difficult to evaluate 
competence 
• Good attitudes 
 
 
 
C Yes • Low, concerning use of channel 
No 
D Yes • Low, concerning risk understanding 
No 
E Yes • Medium, improving Bonus tied to ethics and integrity 
F Yes • Lacking at employee Bonus tied to knowledge of 
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level values 
G Yes 
• Good attitudes 
• Difficult to evaluate 
competency, but has 
improved 
In relation to promotion, never 
if compromising ethical 
behaviour 
H Yes  Not systematic, evaluation in individual case 
I Yes   
J Yes 
• Differing, but white 
good attitudes 
• Low, when facing 
agents 
• Not sufficient in 
general 
In relation to evaluating top 
management performance 
K Yes 
• Very varied 
competence 
• Low, when facing 
subcontractors 
No 
L Yes 
 
 
In relation to promotion and 
performance evaluation and 
bonuses 
M Yes • High level of competence 
In relation to performance 
evaluation and bonuses 
 
 
Competence of employees 
Most of the Compliance Officers had an opinion on the general competence of employees 
relating to anti-corruption that was rooted in their visits to local units, or handling of incoming 
concerns through the reporting channels (Table 12). A distinction was made between attitudes 
and competence, both being of high importance for successful implementation. The general 
impression was that attitudes were good, but competence and the application of attitudes in 
practice were insufficient. Amongst the studied companies, only Company M claimed to have 
employees with a ‘very mature level of understanding’. 
 
Identified challenges regarding the competence of employees included examples of company 
culture (discussed below), and the ticking-of-boxes mentality that undermines a deeper 
understanding and leads to ‘paper compliance’ (Company E, Company M, Company B, 
Company J). Nonetheless, in Company E and Company G the employees seem to be aware of 
the various reporting mechanisms and policies, such as the zero tolerance statement, but the 
quality of reported cases reflects a lack of understanding of what is actually relevant to report. 
Company J experiences that the employees have good attitudes and a wish to do the right thing, 
which is in line with the company’s positioning as an integrity company. However, a 
misconception of how the communicated anti-corruption programme should be implemented in 
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practice was for instance revealed in a workshop with African employees who did not know how 
to report on the number of trainings conducted.  
 
Suggested ways of facilitating behaviour were pre-employment screening (Company G), 
knowledge of backing by management in the face of dilemmas (Company B), increased local 
ownership to the anti-corruption programme (Company E, Company C), implementation 
techniques tailored to the local culture, and incentives. In some companies this was partly 
ensured through the zero tolerance statement, a systematic way of training employees in a way 
that is somewhat adapted to local risk exposure, and the introduction of incentives. 
 
Incentives 
There is a great variation in the attitudes towards using ‘positive’ incentives such as bonuses or 
promotions to influence employee behaviour (Table 12). Six of the companies have a form of 
positive incentives relating to ethical behaviour. However, in most of the companies using 
incentives, ethical behaviour is only a prerequisite for not activating ‘negative’ incentives in the 
form of punishment. Company H, on the other hand, does not have financial incentives to avoid 
situations where employees must choose between behaving ethically and e.g. reaching a financial 
milestone that releases bonuses. The Compliance Officer of Company A claimed that the use of 
positive incentives can diminish the quality of employees’ ethical understanding as they will 
behave ethically only to obtain an advantage; thus, they have no positive consequences of 
adhering to the anti-corruption policies, but there may be severe downsides of non-compliance. 
Negative incentives are discussed further in section 4.2.8. 
 
Culture 
To achieve well-implemented systems, the Compliance Officer of Company H saw a direct link 
between system and culture, and equated their importance: ‘we are building systems and we are 
building culture’. A rooted company culture opposing change and trivialising the importance of 
compliance is seen as a significant force that negatively affects the successful implementation of 
anti-corruption programmes (Company D, Company M, Company E, Company G, Company F). 
However, only Company M have introduced measures to systematically alter or assess culture at 
the employee level, mainly due to lack of resources and insight into how this could be done. The 
reason for this, as suggested by the Compliance Officer of Company M is that, eventually, ‘good 
culture is irrelevant to the question of corruption guilt’. In the face of prosecution, it is more 
important for companies to initiate measurable activities and mechanisms that directly prevent 
corruption. Company B is the company focusing the most on culture because of its indirect 
effects on compliance, such as ensuring that employees who surface concerns are safeguarded 
instead of excluding or punished by co-workers. Company culture is also tightly linked to the 
openness within a firm, affecting the ease of communication as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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4.2.6 Ensuring communication throughout the organisation 
 
Internally, spreading of information about the organisations’ anti-corruption programmes is done 
both systematically, through training programmes and employee appraisals, and in a more ad hoc 
manner, through channels such as the intranet, information screens, mission/vision statements, 
and top management speeches. Typically, information communicated is the content of the code 
of conduct, applicable legislation, company-specific routines and principles, and relevant stories 
experienced by employees. Information about the companies relating to communication is 
summarised in Table 13. 
 
 
Table 13: Communication and training 
Company Measures to encourage openness 
Training as 
main impl. 
tool 
Form of training 
Some 
mandatory 
training 
Testing 
in e-
learning 
A 
 
 Yes 
New employees: classroom 
New module/programme: 
classroom 
All: e-learning 
Yes Yes 
B 
 
 Yes 
New employees: classroom 
All: e-learning 
Some: classroom/workshops 
Yes Yes 
C 
Dilemma discussions 
Yes 
New employees: classroom 
New module/programme: 
classroom 
All: e-learning 
Yes  
D 
Employee appraisals 
Workshops in local units Yes 
New employees: classroom 
Some: classroom, workshops 
and conferences 
All: e-learning 
  
E 
Discuss improvement areas 
Employee appraisals 
Workshops in local units 
Yes 
New employees: classroom 
New leaders: classroom 
All: e-learning/classroom 
Yes Yes 
F 
Managers open for 
discussion with employees Yes 
New employees: classroom 
New module/programme: 
classroom 
All: e-learning 
Yes 
 
 
G 
No-consequence culture 
Yes 
New employees: classroom 
Some: conferences 
All: e-learning 
No No 
H 
Culture 
Focus in tone at the top 
Weaknesses = education 
Yes 
Some: video conferences, 
classroom, workshops 
All: e-learning 
Yes Yes 
I  Yes Some employees: classroom Yes Yes 
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 All: e-learning 
J   Yes 
Some employees: classroom 
All: e-learning Yes Yes 
K 
Culture 
Dilemma discussions 
Focus in tone at the top 
Yes 
Top management: sessions 
All: e-learning Yes 
 
 
L 
Decisions include 
compliance 
Managers open for 
discussion with employees 
Yes 
Most employees: classroom 
All: e-learning Yes No 
M 
Focus on discussion arenas  
Managers open for 
discussion with employees 
Yes 
New employees: classroom 
Some: classroom 
All: e-learning 
Yes Yes 
Table 13 cont. 
Company Frequency of refreshers 
Division giving 
the training 
Uses dilemmas 
in training 
Basis for 
dilemmas 
Risk based 
training 
A Every 2 years 
Compliance 
Officer, 
HR 
Yes 
 
 Yes, little per today 
B 
 
 
 
 Yes 
Customers 
Internal cases 
Mergers 
No 
C   
 
 Yes 
Internal cases  
Peers Yes 
D   
 
 Yes 
Internal cases  Yes 
E No refreshers 
Compliance 
Office, 
HR 
Yes 
Internal cases 
Developed by 
Compliance 
Officer 
Yes 
F Every 1,5 years Rotating modules 
Compliance 
Officer, 
HR 
Yes 
Internal cases Yes 
Little per today 
G Annually Compliance Officer Yes 
Consultants 
Internal cases 
Developed by 
Compliance 
Officer 
Yes, 
not structured 
H Annually  Yes 
The UN 
Developed by 
Compliance 
Officer 
Board validation 
No 
I Decided by management  Yes 
 No 
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J Annually  Yes 
Internal cases 
Peers Yes 
K   Yes 
 Yes, from 2015 
L Annually Rotating modules 
Compliance 
Office, 
HR 
Yes 
Internal cases 
Peers Yes 
M Every 2,5-3 years Risk dependent 
Compliance 
Office Yes 
Internal cases Yes 
 
Encouraging openness to enhance communication 
Most companies pursue a state of openness around the topic of anti-corruption to enhance 
communication, and some of the Compliance Officers mentioned specific measures that the 
companies take to encourage openness (Table 13). Employee appraisals, workshops and 
dilemma discussions are used to facilitate sharing of information and values between the 
managers and the employees. Through these, cultural barriers for successful communication may 
be uncovered (Company D), furthermore the discussion of compliance dilemmas is encouraged, 
which may subsequently generate increased openness between employees. Company E and 
Company L saw positive effects of introducing routines for discussing compliance in relation to 
improvements or decisions. Another way for managers and the Compliance Officers to create 
openness around the topic of corruption, and gaining a better understanding on improvement 
areas related to this is through the conduction of training. 
 
Training 
In terms of deploying the anti-corruption programmes systematically and effectively throughout 
the organisation, training is the most widely adopted tool (Table 13). Here, employees are given 
relevant information about company, and country-specific policies, applicable legislation, 
reporting mechanisms and the Compliance Office(r). 
 
The most common forms of training on anti-corruption are e-learning courses, classroom 
training, workshops or a combination of these. In most companies, all new employees go through 
introductory face-to-face training that touch on issues concerning anti-corruption. Other 
employees are usually trained as part of a regular training or refresher, or when a new module is 
introduced (Table 13). The Compliance Officer or the HR department conducts the classroom 
training. In Company L, such training is only conducted if an employee from the Compliance 
Office is present, and in Company M the Compliance Officer conducts all the face-to-face 
training. In Company E and Company F the Compliance Officer only conducts such training of 
employees in management positions or who are exposed to high risk. These differences in 
resource spending seem to correlate with the amount of resources available to the compliance 
department. 
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In 11 companies, parts of the training are mandatory, while it is optional in Company G and 
Company D (Table 13). During one or more e-learning modules, seven of the companies require 
employees to respond correctly to a set of questions to complete the course. The other companies 
either do not test employees during training, or did not provide information about this in the 
interview (Table 13). The frequency and consistency of the training varies greatly; some firms 
conduct training once every year, others when the Compliance Officer finds it necessary. E-
learning courses are usually conducted more frequently than the classroom ones due to resource 
constraints (Table 13). Managers in Company G go through refreshers annually, while the 
employees tend to take the refreshing modules less frequently because these are not mandatory. 
 
A central part of the training on anti-corruption for all the companies revolves around dilemma 
training, where the employees are presented with hypothetical situations in which ethical 
behaviour is challenged (Table 13). These thought situations are often inspired by, or a direct 
recount of a real life experience generated based on e.g. internal case or the Compliance 
Officer’s personal experiences, or are developed by externals such as consultants and 
international organisations (Table 13). 
 
4.2.7 Easing the detection of misconduct 
 
Having an anti-corruption programme in place is first and foremost rooted in a wish to minimize 
the existence of corrupt practices within the organisation. With the possible costs of engaging in 
corruption in mind, the studied companies saw the monitoring and detection of misconduct as 
crucial. As the Compliance Officer in Company C put it: ‘we may talk about our good intentions 
and what we do as much as we’d like, but if Økokrim knocks on the door, it is of limited value 
unless we actually do it’. Table 14 shows some of the findings extracted from the Compliance 
Officer interviews related to monitoring and review, reporting channels and risk assessments 
 
Table 14: Monitoring and review, reporting channels and risk assessment 
Company Monitoring and review mechanisms Reporting channel(s) About the channel(s) 
A 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Self-assessment 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Ethics help line 
External party: no 
Externals: Internet 
Internals: intranet 
Not transparent process 
B 
• External audit 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• UN Global Compact reporting (GRI) 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Help line 
External party: yes 
C 
• Monitoring of facilitation payments 
• Business area compliance reporting 
• Reported concerns (frequency and type) 
Alert line 
Various lines 
functioning as 
help lines 
External party: yes 
Somewhat transparent 
process 
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D 
• Business review reporting 
• CSR reporting 
• Employee appraisals 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Workshops in local departments 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
External party: no 
Not transparent process 
Open for guidance requests 
Correlation with information 
level 
E 
• Audit on implementation (last in 2013) 
• Business area reporting 
• Employee appraisals on 
ethics/compliance 
• No. of agents signing Code 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Sample audits 
Alert line 
Help line 
External party: in USA and 
Canada 
Externals: Internet 
Internals: intranet 
Somewhat transparent 
process 
F 
• Audits on the bribes in supply chain 
• External audits 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• People survey 
• Survey of procurement responsible 
• Sample audits 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Help line 
Externals: Internet 
Internals: intranet 
Transparent process 
G 
• Audit 
• Employee survey 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Sample audits (semi-annually) 
• Variance Reporting 
Help line/whistle-
blowing channel 
Internals and externals: e-
mail address 
Transparent process 
H 
• Internal controls (large projects) 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Reported concerns (frequency and type) 
• Sample audits 
• Signing of Code of Conduct 
Integrity 
reporting 
Ethics line 
Externals: e-mail address 
Internals: intranet 
I 
• CSR reporting 
• Internal Audit  
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Signing of Code of Conduct 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Internals and externals: e-
mail address 
No helpline 
Transparent process 
J 
• Internal audit 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Topic reporting: integrity, facilitation 
payment, charity and promotions 
• Sample audits 
Hotline 
External party: yes 
Transparent process 
K 
• Conducted dilemma discussions 
• Employee survey 
• How corruption is avoided – report 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Reported concerns (frequency and type) 
• Sample audits 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Help line 
Externals: Internet 
Internals: intranet 
Transparent process 
L • External audit of all processes 
• No. of conducted trainings 
Whistle-blowing 
channel 
Ethics webpage with Q&As 
External party: yes 
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• Signing of Code (annually) 
• Documenting programme efficiency 
Help line Not transparent process 
M 
• Ethics survey (annually) 
• Monitoring of facilitation payments 
• No. of conducted trainings 
• Reported concerns (frequency and type) 
• Risk assessment (updated quarterly) 
Hotline 
Help line 
Cases are ranked as A, B or 
C priority 
Externals: Internet 
Internals: intranet 
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Monitoring and review 
Monitoring and review are commonly used mechanisms for gathering information about the 
implementation process so as to map out the status quo of the company’s internal affairs and 
examine how well the system is performing, i.e. the extent and effectiveness of implementation. 
As seen in Table 14, the studied companies employ numerous mechanisms for monitoring and 
reviewing the status quo. None of the companies however, have established ways of measuring 
the effectiveness of mechanisms that are supposed to improve openness or improve company 
culture. 
 
The general trend amongst the studied companies is that much of the responsibility of 
implementing the anti-corruption programme lies with the line managers. Decisions regarding 
where the Compliance Officer travels may also be determined by the desires put forward by local 
managers, or is done on a sample basis e.g. according to perceived risk (Company K). 
Nonetheless, the function of the Compliance Officer inherently ensures monitoring to some 
extent as information about the actual conditions at the operational level is gathered when he/she 
conduct training at various geographical locations (Company G, Company L and Company M).  
 
Information is often systematically and formally gathered through risk assessments and various 
‘pull’ reporting procedures on given topics. Furthermore, information that contributes to the 
overall understanding of the system’s implementation may also be collected in a more ad hoc 
manner from ‘push’ reporting of concerns through the company’s reporting structure, in the form 
of a help line, hotline or whistle-blowing channel. 
 
‘Pull’ reporting 
Reporting from the line managers to the corporate unit accounts for large parts of the information 
gathered about the realities of operations. The Compliance Office(r) has a direct line of 
communication for this type of information, e.g. through regular reporting to top management, 
Board Audit Committees or Ethics Committees (Company F, Company L and Company M). 
Thorough reporting on the whole organisation is often done as part of the annual business review 
or people survey, through employee appraisals or as part of a gap analysis based on self-
assessments. The topics to be reported on are decided by the company itself, or by an external 
auditor making the term pull reporting suitable. Typical elements to be reported on are: 
● Employees and agents who have read and signed the code of conduct 
● Employees who have gone through certain training modules on ethics and anti-corruption 
● Corporate Social Responsibility 
● Occurrences of facilitation payments 
● The number of concerns reported through the reporting channel 
● The employees’ knowledge of e.g. corporate values and reporting channels (surveys) 
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In employee surveys and appraisals, the focus often revolves around a given list of questions, 
making it difficult to ensure that all relevant information is gathered. Thus, depending on the 
survey questions or the line manager’s skills, the quality of answers given may vary from mere 
ticking-of-boxes responses to honest outlines of the status quo (Company J). Audits and the 
Compliance Officer’s subjective evaluations may therefore be important for ensuring that the 
final understanding of the corporate unit matches the actual state of affairs at the operational 
level. At present, few of the companies have structured procedures for the details and scope of 
pull reporting, and the evaluation of the results. In some companies, such as Company H, 
Company K and Company A, the Compliance Officer evaluates the incoming results based on 
common sense and personal experiences. This has at times led to the uncovering of 
misrepresentative reporting due to e.g. cultural differences and misconceptions of what the 
reporting aims to do. 
 
‘Push’ reporting 
The reporting channel is given high priority and various forms of such report structures are 
implemented within all of the studied companies, as required by Norwegian law; all Norwegian 
companies must make available a channel for reporting of misconduct that lies outside the 
regular lines of communications and that may even bypass the CEO (typically through the 
immediate supervisor). For serious matters, such as violations of the law, most of the companies 
have procedures for reporting these directly to the board or external parties (Company F). 
Typical denominations of the report channel are hotline, whistle-blowing channel and alert line 
(Table 14). All companies, except Company I and Company J, have introduced a complementary 
or substituting ethics help line where employees may receive counselling in their specific 
situations or dilemmas in a less deterrent manner. For the companies having such an additional 
channel for guidance requests, the terms integrity reporting, help line or ethics helpline are used 
(Table 14). 
 
Most of the studied companies have made a reporting mechanism available for both internal and 
external actors, on the intranet and Internet respectively (Table 14). The complexity of these 
varies greatly; some have outsourced the practicalities of the channels to an external party that 
provides translation services, 24/7 availability, and accepts both written or verbal input 
(Company C, Company J, Company L, Company M, Company B), some make use of an email 
address (Company G, Company H, Company I), while the rest have implemented a structure 
lying somewhere in between the a forth mentioned ones (Company A, Company D, Company E, 
Company F, Company K). Employees are given information about the channel(s) in various 
ways in the different companies, e.g. through the intranet, when signing the code of conduct as 
this contains a section on reporting duties, through classroom training or e-learning, via posters 
at the various geographical locations, in internal magazines, ethics handbooks, e-mails, or at the 
publicly available company webpage (Table 14). Information is also given and checked during 
dilemma discussions, employee appraisals and surveys.  
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The reported concerns are received and handled by corporate level employees or dedicated units 
within the company. In most of the firms, the Compliance Office(r) receives the concerns. 
However, in Company C, Company F, Company I and Company K the internal audit function 
conducts the initial screening of reports, and potentially handles them. Across the companies, 
concerns of a serious or unusual nature are, if considered necessary, discussed by a composition 
of the Compliance Officer, internal Ombudsman, CEO, Ethics Council, group auditor, legal 
department, Board Audit Committee, the board, Helping Committee and the HR department 
(Table 14).  
 
All the companies stress the importance of trying to solve the cases in the line. Nonetheless, a 
few of the companies make line managers report on the number and type of cases. This enables 
the corporate unit to perform quality checks and to monitor and evaluate the decisions made on 
how to handle the incoming concerns. In the studied companies there are differing procedures 
concerning how to handle the incoming reports. Generally, the Compliance Officer or line 
manager evaluates them according to set routines before they are discussed in a dedicated group 
such as an ethics counsel/committee. For very serious matters, the cases are in some companies 
brought directly to the board or the corporate audit function. Some of the interviewees gave an 
account on how the company evaluates serious or complex cases: 
• In Company H, the Integrity Council that consists of the Compliance Officer, CFO, CHR 
and management system manager performs the quality checks  
• In Company E, an Ethics Council meets twice a year to evaluate responses and 
compliance activities. 
• The Compliance Officer of Company K has the responsibility of evaluating responses 
and to involve the group audit committee if changes should be made 
 
To remain anonymous is in most cases an option for the employee wishing to bring up a concern 
(Table 14). The external channels ensure full anonymity, and employees may create e-mail 
addresses dedicated to reporting internally. Depending on the nature of the issue, e.g. if only are 
few people are involved in a specific case, the employee may be identifiable nonetheless 
(Company C). A problem with anonymity, as identified by several of the companies is the loss of 
a direct line of communication with the whistle-blower, making it difficult to ensure sufficient 
evidence for investigating the concern. The level of transparency of the process following the 
reporting of a concern varies greatly between the companies (Table 14); in some, the process is 
publically available, while it in others is not available to employees (Company A, Company D 
and Company K). Depending on the degree of anonymity and type of channel, the whistle-
blower may know the outcome of the report. For example, in Company L the reporter is given a 
PIN-code to a web page where the outcome is published. 
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A general challenge for all the companies is that a high level of the reported cases are concerned 
with conflicts of interest, personnel matters and other issues which have to be sent back to the 
line to be handled, or to other parts of the organisation such as HR (Table 14). In Company A, 
irrelevant cases make up more than 80% of the total number of reports, in Company M the 
corresponding fraction is 70%. The Compliance Officer of Company H, could at times spend 
more time talking employees from reporting a concern than dealing with relevant cases. Issued 
tied to this, as highlighted by the interviewees, are a strain on already scarce resources, a lack of 
insight into the actual number of relevant cases, and a dilemma on how to change this trend 
without deterring employees from using the channel. As concluded by the Compliance Officer of 
Company G: ‘the channel must be meshed enough to capture concerns, while simultaneously 
being granular enough to avoid straining resources’. 
 
In parallel to the issue with few relevant cases, nine of the companies express a concern related 
to the low number of concerns reported in total (Table 14). The number of reported cases varies 
significantly amongst the companies with Company M having 60-70 cases a year in 2013 and 
2014, compared to Company E’s 5-10 in the same period. As compared to best practices and 
available industry benchmarks, the effect of the channel(s) for enhancing the detection of 
misconduct is thus questioned. However, the ‘right’ number of cases seems to be highly 
dependant on company-specific factors, which makes it difficult to determine an appropriate 
benchmark or goal. Another main challenge is the practice of solving issues in the line instead of 
bringing them to the Compliance Office(r) and reporting on them. Only one of the companies 
(Company M) was satisfied with the number of incoming cases, and none of the officers thought 
that the current number of reported concerns was representative for the real number of cases 
occurring in practice. Some of the suggested reasons for the low number of reported cases are 
(Table 14): 
● Culture for handling issues locally, not telling on colleagues, or for resisting change 
● Fear of consequences for job security or the social environment at the workplace, rooted 
in a scepticism of anonymity being preserved 
● Lack of competence in terms of knowledge of how to report, or which cases to report 
● Alternative means for reporting, such as direct communication with the Compliance 
Officer 
● No trust in the value of reporting because the employee has not experienced effective 
responses previously, or know of colleagues with a bad experience 
 
Several of the studied companies see positive correlations between the number of reported cases 
and training, due to the increase in competency and knowledge of how who the Compliance 
Officer is (Company A, Company H, Company G). The interviewee in Company M saw a 
correlation with the general implementation of the anti-corruption programme, while Company L 
experiences increases in reports when faced with irregularities and internal or external changes. 
Both companies see an increase in the use of the help line for guidance rather than reported 
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cases. Company J experience no direct correlation with training, but highlights a challenge of 
how the knowledge of the Compliance Officer results in an increase in the number of personal 
calls, rather than an enhanced use of the channel. For their part, Company B experienced that 
when the corporate compliance unit responded to cases concerning working conditions, they saw 
a rapid increase in the number of reports on similar cases. This was because the employees in the 
affected division saw a beneficial effect of using the whistle-blowing channel for solving 
everyday issues. Even though the studied companies express a wish to increase the number of 
reported cases, the constraints on resources makes it essential to solve most of the issues at the 
operational level. To avoid the unnecessary strain on corporate resources, Company E have 
chosen not publish information about the reporting channel on their intranet because they want 
the cases to be solved locally. 
 
Audits 
In parallel to the monitoring processes, audits are performed by the companies’ audit functions 
and/or by external auditors, with results being directly reported on to the CEO and the board.  
Audits are additional elements that are applied to ease the detection of misconduct (Table 14). 
The focus of the audit function is to some extent based on the results of the monitoring activities, 
so that areas of the company that are particularly exposed to risk are assessed more frequently or 
in greater depth. For issues that are highly sensitive and potentially costly for the companies, 
such as corruption, the studied companies generally strive to ensure that misconduct is detected 
through internal, rather than external audits. Due to resource constraints, several of the 
companies make audit samples internally instead of performing in depth audits of the whole 
company. Some conduct these audits on demand from the departments, while others have stricter 
routines or base the decision of where to monitor on risk assessments. 
 
Risk assessments 
As part of the monitoring process, all companies perform risk assessments (Table 14). In most 
companies, the responsibility for conducting assessments lies with the line manager, while the 
corporate unit provides guidelines and support. Exceptions are Company A and Company J 
where the assessments are conducted by the legal department, Company K where consultants are 
used, and Company L where the corporate unit conducts the assessments, if the cases are of high 
risk. 
 
A common starting point for the assessment of country risk that is used by all of the studied 
companies is Transparency International’s CPI. Beyond that, company specific data is used, 
generated through e.g. yearly internal workshops on risk, previous experiences, in depth 
interviews of employees, and subjective assessments (Company A, Company B, Company E, 
Company F, Company L, Company D). Other elements used for risk assessments are the Dow 
Jones Risk & Compliance Portal, internally developed tools, frequency and type of reported 
cases through the reporting channel, potential effect of corruption scandals on company 
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reputation, and elements such as type of industry, activities, and type of employees engaged in 
the assessed projects or business areas (Table 14). All of the companies, except Company A and 
Company B, explicitly mentioned the use of Integrity Due Diligence (IDD) as an important type 
of risk assessment - a recent addition to the monitoring practices of several of the companies 
(Table 14). It is defined as an analysis of external actors such as partners, agents, or suppliers 
that is performed by the local departments, at times in co-operation with the Compliance Officer. 
 
The risk assessments are mainly used for screening which projects or countries to get involved 
in, developing action plans, conducting gap analyses, CSR or integrity reports, for distributing 
resources to compliance activities, and for tailoring training. Eight companies give employees 
additional or adapted training based on a risk assessments (Table 14). This may include 
employees particularly exposed to supply of corruption, due to their geographical location, 
industry involvement, or role (e.g. procurement or sales), or agents, partners and suppliers with 
weaker ties to the organisation than regular employees. Company A and Company F only tailor 
training based on the level of interaction with public officials and position in the company. In 
addition to the elements included in regular training programmes, risk based training may 
contain country- or industry specific facts, dilemmas of particular importance, and information 
about local legislation. 
 
The degree of impact of the risk assessment varies greatly amongst the studied companies; some 
base most of their anti-corruption work on the assessment’s results and have the CEO approve 
decisions in high-risk areas, while others do not consider risk at all when e.g. distributing 
resources. In Company M, the former approach is taken, and the Compliance Officer claims that 
‘everything is based on risk’. Company K and Company L include the risk assessments in the 
basis for benchmarking against peers and companies exposed to similar risk. For most of the 
companies, risk-based distribution of resources, and more systematic use of the results from risk 
assessments are one of the main future focus areas for fighting corruption internally.  
 
4.2.8 Directing organisations to respond appropriately to misconduct and continuously 
improve 
 
Beyond the use of risk assessment to create plans and prioritise compliance activities, few of the 
companies have good routines in place for improving the anti-corruption programme and its 
implementation. As show in in Table 15, some of the companies have a feedback mechanism in 
place when conducting training, while for most companies this is a future focus. 
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Table 15: Feedback and improvement areas 
Company Feedback from training Future focus areas 
A Classroom 
Local ownership 
Risk based training 
Training 
Whistle-blowing channel 
B No Influence on external environment Training 
C  
Competency of business areas abroad 
Continuous improvement 
Incentives 
Responsibility of line managers 
Whistle-blowing channel 
D Classroom Risk based implementation Better routines for monitoring and reporting 
E No Routines for use of results from training and assessment of ethics and compliance in employee appraisals 
F Classroom Partners and suppliers 
G E-learning 
Evaluation of cultural differences and adjusted policies applied to various 
parts of the organisation 
Establish international unit responsible for local reporting 
Gap analysis (by external party) 
H E-learning  
I E-learning Local adaptation 
J E-learning Increase awareness 
K  
Risk based distribution of resources and compliance staff 
Overview of status at local level and improved information flow 
Improved quality of risk assessment and IDD 
Incentives 
L Classroom E-learning Overview of all concerns reported at various levels/channels 
M Classroom E-learning 
Drive beyond laws 
Compliance part of every employee's job, small compliance department 
 
 
Training is the area in which most companies have some form of continuous improvement 
practice in place, by for instance adapting the cases to enhance dilemma quality or to get an 
impression of the status quo at the operational level (Company L). After or during training, 
several of the companies have mechanisms for gathering feedback from the employees (Table 
15). Five of the companies gather such feedback in the form of verbal comments or a survey 
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during the classroom training. The personal observations of the Compliance Officer may also 
result in improvements and alterations.  
 
Six companies gather and use the comments given to the e-learning course. Company L and 
Company M make use of data from the training process more systematically by tracking 
employee performance and studying the data generated when conducting e-learning more in-
depth. In Company M, questions asked during classroom training may lead to investigations that 
further uncover improvement areas. Company A also gather information systematically from 
their external environment to be included in the gap analysis so as to stay on par with global 
developments. A general trend is the lack of procedures for utilising the available information 
stored after e-learning. Company D, on their hand conducts workshops in the local departments 
to gain an impression of the current standard, but, as with the rest of the companies, the 
generated information is not utilised in a structured way.  
 
Being part of the Compliance Officer Network is said to be the most notable mechanism 
ensuring that the companies learn and are updated on general trends in the external environment. 
Some of the companies also use consultants, which to some extent introduce updated information 
of best practices. 
 
‘Negative’ incentives 
As previously outlined, the responsibility for evaluating occurrences of misconduct may lie with 
the Compliance Officer, a compliance committee, or the board, depending on the channel 
through which it is detected. In most of the companies the cases are evaluated as they surface. 
Some have more structured responses and procedures for taking disciplinary actions. Typical 
negative incentives are the loss of employment, bonus and promotion. However, Company H 
saw the systematic use of punishment as problematic because a ‘culture of consequences’ could 
result in reluctance amongst employees to speak openly about issues such as corruption and to 
challenge their leaders. Negative incentives seem to be the most prevalent mechanism for 
directing ethical behaviour. 
 
Future Focus  
The Compliance Officers expressed numerous improvement areas to be focused on in the future, 
however few identified concrete plans for how to get there (Table 15). Some of these areas 
highlighted during the interviews are: 
● More local ownership and adaptation to improve competence locally (Company A, 
Company I, Company C, Company G, Company J, Company M) 
● Reporting channels with more transparent processes, and restrictions to the scope of cases 
that are handled by the compliance unit (Company A, Company C) 
● More risk based training (Company A), implementation (Company D), and resource 
distribution (Company K) 
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● More standardized training with better procedures for deciding who is conducting the 
training (Company A), with the use of more relevant cases used for dilemma training, and 
it being made mandatory (Company B) 
● Better routines for gathering information from employees (e.g. through training) that is 
used to improve the anti-corruption programme and implementation process (Company 
C, Company E, Company D) 
● Increased insight into the status quo at the operational level and better reporting routines 
to the corporate unit (Company K, Company L) 
● Expanded scope of monitoring activities to include partners, agents and suppliers 
(Company F, Company K) 
● Better use of incentives, both positive and negative (Company C, Company K) 
● Move beyond what is strictly required (Company M, Company B) 
 
4.3 Factors affecting the efficiency of implementation and factor ranking 
  
A part of the empirical findings from the in-depth interviews were related to the question of what 
the interviewees’ considered to be the most important factors for ensuring efficient 
implementation of anti-corruption frameworks. Based on their responses we devised a list 
containing 12 factors, including ‘Other’ as an option to add an additional factor, which we asked 
the respondents to rank according to their perceived effectiveness. The factors were ranked 
according to how they should be prioritised on a scale from 1 to 12, 1 being the most important. 
Figure 10 presents the factors and the results from the ranking: 
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Figure 10: Ranking of factor importance 
 
Out of the 12 respondents, two chose the option ‘Other’. Their responses were as follows: ‘Risk 
assessment and understanding to use resources efficient and to ensure that policies and 
procedures are addressing the highest risks at all time’ (Ranked 2nd, Company L) and ’Anti-
corruption incorporated in the recruiting process, with integrity and ethics as part of the reference 
check’ (Ranked 5th; Company G). 
  
As the respondents were asked to provide a response based on their own experiences, this may 
be further evidence to the influential role a Compliance Officer currently exhibits as they are, as 
previously mentioned, often very instrumental in designing the anti-corruption programmes. 
Understanding how they view the different elements may therefore be of great value as it may 
shed some much needed light on the internal logic of certain programmes. By understanding this 
logic one can in turn hope to be able to extract wider meaning as to how this impacts the 
efficiency and success of implementation and compliance.  
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Other 
Incentive based compliance 
Formalised and systematic processes for internal 
monitoring/audit and control 
 Local adaptation of all compliance/anti-
corruption programmes 
Transparent line of communication and input 
from employees to management 
Practical applicability of compliance/anti-
corruption programmes 
Competence and responsibility of line managers 
Willingness of top management to allocate 
resources 
Understanding throughout the organisation of the 
importance for the company 
Culture of openness and trust within the 
organisation 
Continuous training throughout the organisation 
Top management involvement (tone at the top) 
Prioritisation
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Firstly, with regards to the findings, it is interesting to note that none of the factors had a 
unanimous score, which arguably highlights the subjectivity of the issue. Nonetheless, from the 
results there are four factors that arguably stand out; tone at the top (1.42), continuous training 
(3.83), culture of openness and trust (4.08), and understanding of the importance of corruption 
(4.50). Furthermore, several of these factors will present a challenge in the sense that they are not 
easily quantifiable, nor necessarily easy to identify. 
  
The least important factors are thought to be formalised process for monitoring and control 
(9.08) and incentivised compliance (10.42). This is to some extent surprising when taking into 
consideration the number of Compliance Officers with a background from internal audit 
departments. It is also in contrast to the most favoured factors, in the sense that both of these may 
be somewhat easier to systematize and control, and would also present themselves as parameters 
of a more quantifiable nature. The Compliance Officer in Company M expressed the view that 
compliance debate needed to become more preoccupied with the technical aspects of the 
concept. It was argued that there was little need to engage in activities in a manner that did not 
allow for data to be collected and used to monitor future progress. This officer’s ranking of 
factors, however, did not sway from the general line of respondents, and as so it may highlight 
that even those in favour of a quantifiable and systematic approach to compliance place greatest 
importance on securing top managements’ involvement. 
  
Moreover, another key finding is the respondents’ view on the competence and responsibilities 
of line managers (ranked 6th). This finding is of interest because of how it ties in with the overall 
structure of many of the compliance programmes in which the responsibilities of many day-to-
day handlings are placed in the care of line managers. To some extent, this finding contradicts 
the interviewees’ opinion that they are uncertain with regards to the level of competence of their 
staff and line managers. Only one of the companies (Company A) had initiated a company-wide 
self-assessment in order to map the internal competence and awareness level of the company. As 
demonstrated above, the majority of the other respondents said they lacked an appropriate 
understanding of what the actual level of knowledge was on the issue within the company. 
Furthermore, several highlighted this as one of the key benefits of Compliance Officers 
participating in face-to-face training, as they gained a better understanding of their staff’s 
competence, or lack there of. 
  
This then ties in with the issue of practical applicability (6.75) and local adaptation (8.67) of the 
anti-corruption programmes. Again, linked to the concept of lack of homogenous cultures in 
many of the countries where these companies operate, one might have expected these factors to 
be ranked differently. As experts advocate for programmes to demonstrate a clear and strong 
practical value for employees, while they at the same time criticise the Norwegian business 
community for failing to adequately understand the practical value themselves, these findings are 
rather interesting. This aspect will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 
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Moreover, it is to some extent surprising to see that the need for a transparent line of 
communication and input from employees to management scored relatively high (6.92), as many 
of the Compliance Officers identified this area to be one where they had a lack of knowledge and 
lacked an efficient system which allowed for gathering of employee feedback.  
  
It is also worth noting that several of the respondents found the process of ranking the factors 
quite demanding, and expressed the view that one cannot identify some key factors - one needs 
to see the whole process in context and ensure that the different factors do not contradict one 
another. 
 
4.4 Employee Survey 
 
The employee survey outlined in chapter 3 got a total of 114 respondents from two of the 
participating companies (Table 6). This section presents the overall results from the total sample, 
and looks at how variables such as holding a management position, being stationed abroad and 
the format of received training affects the employees’ perception of the company’s anti-
corruption efforts. The results are divided into two categories: general statements, and view of 
focus and resource spending. First, the general statement section deals with how the employees 
perceive a given list of statements regarding the company’s anti-corruption programme, before 
the latter taps into how they view the focus and resource expenditure at three company levels: 
corporate, line managers and their own. 
 
4.4.1 Total Sample 
 
General statements 
In general, most employees look upon the companies’ anti-corruption efforts favourably, as can 
be seen in their tendency to either agree or strongly agree with the given statements (Figure 11). 
There are, however, some areas in which the employees seem to be in disagreement with regards 
to their perception of the companies’ efforts. These issues are primarily tied to the transparency 
of the compliance function, which can be seen in the employees’ lack of confidence in being able 
to identify the correct reporting channels and those in charge of the programme. They also lack 
an understanding of what corporate management does to warrant anti-corruption. This is an 
interesting observation as it highlights the inadequacy of corporate management to provide 
sufficient transparency and communicate their efforts to the employees. Moreover this is in 
contrast to the Compliance Officers’ perception of top management being key to the successful 
implementation of the programme. 
 
There are also a notably high number of respondents whom feel neutral towards the given 
statements, which may stem from an apathetic attitude or lack of knowledge regarding the 
programmes. The neutral responses are primarily tied up to statements asking employees to what 
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extent current procedures are adequate, or if they are well informed. These are in turn highly 
subjective responses, and as such the employees may feel that they are not necessarily competent 
to assess what adequate or well informed entails.  
 
 
Figure 11: General statements, total sample 
 
Resource spending and focus 
With regards to the employees’ view on the companies’ resource spending and focus they are 
predominantly consistent in their positive outlook, as the majority of respondents find it 
appropriate (Figure 12). It is noteworthy that the level in which the employees find resource 
spending and focus to be insufficient is at the line manager level - the level with which the 
employees primarily interact. This finding should also be seen in light of the previous 
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discussions, which has highlighted the role of line managers as key with regards to 
implementation and daily interaction with the anti-corruption programme.  
 
Moreover, corporate management focus is found to be somewhat excessive. Yet, as we saw 
previously, employees lack an understanding of what measures they actually take and as such 
may be less tolerant towards an increased resource expenditure, at least if it is not followed by a 
more explicit and transparent communication with regards to what these resources are being 
spent on.  
 
	  
Figure 12: Focus and resource spending, total sample 
 
4.4.1 Management or non-management position 
 
General Statements 
Managers tend to ‘strongly agree’ with the statements in comparison to employees not in a 
management position, whom tend to ‘agree’ (Figure 13). Non-management employees also seem 
to be more critical or remain neutral in comparison to management. This may tie into the 
previously mentioned explanation that these employees disagree, or remain neutral, due to a lack 
of insight into the company’s programme and as such feel more alien towards the anti-corruption 
programme. Furthermore it may be seen in junction with the fact that management tends to have 
a higher degree of face-to-face training (Appendix 4.2).  
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Figure 13: General statements, management position vs. non-management position 
 
Resource spending and focus 
As can be seen in Appendix 4.2-4-3, employees in management positions tend to view corporate 
resource expenditure as excessive. Corporate management is also the level in which other 
employees feel that resource expenditure and focus is excessive. Moreover, they still tend to 
view line managers’ focus as the main area that they deem insufficient, and as so are in 
concurrence with the previous findings from the total sample. 
 
4.4.1 Stationed abroad or not 
 
General Statements 
Those whom have never been stationed abroad are more likely to ‘agree’ rather than ‘strongly 
agree’ (Figure 14). This is in comparison to those stationed abroad who seem to have a more 
favourable outlook of the company’s efforts.  Those areas in which this trend deviates are with 
regards to training and general understanding, to which they are less positively inclined. Again, 
the main areas of disagreement are with regards to which parts of management are in charge of 
compliance, as well as a lack of oversight as to what is being done. This then tie into the 
employees’ concern that that they are less likely to be able to identify which channels or 
processes they should use if they need to report on corruption.  
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Figure 14: Responses to statements, never been stationed abroad vs. been stationed abroad 
 
Resource spending and focus  
Those whom have never been abroad are more likely to see focus and resource expenditure as 
excessive (Appendix 4.4-4.5). This may point to those whom are stationed abroad as having 
better knowledge of what is being done or seeing the practical value of the anti-corruption 
efforts.  Again, it is the line managers’ role that is classified as insufficiently prioritised.  
 
4.4.1 Training 
 
General Statements 
Those whom had received face-to-face training included those who had received classroom-, 
workshop or group based training. These were more inclined to ‘strongly agree’ with the given 
statements (1-9) whilst at the same time this was the only group that ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly 
disagreed’ with any of the statements (Figure 15). This may support the previously mentioned 
theory that those who remain neutral do so due to the lack of knowledge or competence. There 
are few other obvious observations to be made, which may in turn be noteworthy in itself as the 
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difference between receiving face-to-face training vs. e-learning does not seem to be a key 
variable of what shapes the employees’ perception.  
 
	  
Figure 15: Responses to statements, have had some form of face-to-face training vs. only had web 
based training 
 
Resource spending and focus  
Those whom had received face-to-face training were more inclined to deem the focus as 
excessive, yet they still viewed the role of line managers as insufficient (Appendix 4.6-4.7). 
Nonetheless, those whom had only received online training saw expenditure and focus as 
insufficient and were less inclined to see it as excessive. As such, one may argue that those only 
receiving e-learning are left with a feeling of inadequacy with regards to the company’s anti-
corruption efforts and are less inclined to view the work favourably. 
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5 Discussion and recommendations 
 
Based on the factor ranking, we identified nine topics that proved most relevant for the success 
of implementation. These will now be discussed in detail in relation to theory and findings, and 
recommendations for future improvement are presented within each topic. The topics are: 
1. Company Culture 
2. Tone at the Top 
3. Resource allocation and distribution 
4. Training 
5. Communication 
6. Closing the design-reality gap 
7. Internal audit, monitoring and review 
8. Employee competence and incentives 
9. Risk based resource expenditure 
 
5.1 Company Culture 
  
From the factor ranking it is evident that all companies place an importance on the role of culture 
when discussing the efficiency of implementing anti-corruption programmes. Paired with the 
importance placed on the need for a strong and visible commitment from top management, their 
understanding seems to correlate quite nicely with the view of Morgan (1993). However, one of 
the main components to Morgan’s theory is the need to build a programme that adequately 
addresses the duality of system processes and personal behaviours. 
  
Most Compliance Officers were under the impression that, at least in Norway, the company 
culture was one of trust and openness. Employees generally prescribe to a strict moral code by 
their own accord, and as such they wish to do the morally or ethically right thing when faced 
with corruption. Wolders (2015) also agrees that one of the primary motives of Norwegian 
employees’ behaviour is the wish to act in accordance with the law and socially accepted norms, 
whom all view corruption as wrong. The issue then may become one of educating the Norwegian 
staff on how they successfully identify corruption so that, when one secures freedom from 
excellence, employees will act in accordance with company code. This is key, as corruption may 
often take on various forms dependent on local norms and industries, and its prevalence may be 
contingent on local cultures. 
  
As previously noted, for a company to behave ethically one needs to ensure that the employees 
behave ethically. This, however, may prove exceedingly difficult as most of the studied 
companies have operations in countries exhibiting a wide range of local sub-customs and sub-
cultures. Trying to implement a company-wide programme may become increasingly difficult, as 
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the different locations are less likely to exhibit a close psychic distance throughout the 
organisation (Hostede, 1980). As one of the respondents from the employee-survey noted: ’in 
[country X], corruption is the most important issue. Sometimes we cannot refrain from engaging 
in bribery when doing business, but at least we try to decrease the customer rebate/customer 
entertainment [bribery]’.  This quote underlines the difficulties faced when corruption becomes 
an issue of interpretation and moral relativism. As this employee shows, they have an 
understanding of what corruption is. However, they may not be sure as to where in the moral 
hierarchy they should place it, and as a result may chose to allow corrupt practices on account of 
securing profit. 
  
Academics argue that a successful implementation process is conditional on the lack of friction 
between the system being implemented and the company culture. However, our research show 
that even as all respondents seem to agree on the positive outlook of Norwegian company 
cultures, none of them have made systematic attempts at verifying their assumptions. This in turn 
makes it hard to monitor any changes, or frictions between the current programmes and its 
implementation process. It also makes the discovery of such frictions more likely to be one of 
chance, which in turn increases the risk of omitting any potential negative influences or 
divergent cultures. Many Compliance Officers found it very useful to hold the training sessions 
themselves, as they were able to gain valuable insight as to where the programme needed further 
explanation or expansion. Nonetheless, again, this process mainly exhibited traits of ad-hoc 
interactions rather than systematic feedback from employees. 
  
Company G highlighted the need for a pre-employment screening to include an assessment of the 
candidate's view of anti-corruption to ensure that their observations and understandings were in 
line with that of the company. However, Kaptein (2014) claim that such a pre-screening will 
prove less valuable as there is no evidence to support that such a process efficiently deter the 
existence of corruption. It then becomes more of an effort to implement a system that will make 
it easier to detect, or at least remove, incentives for deviation of employees’ behaviours. Such 
mechanisms of ‘checks-and-balance’ will arguably make it easier to communicate to employees 
what type of behaviour is expected from them in the cases where sub-cultures diverge from that 
of Norway. 
  
Another issue tied closely to that of culture is communication. In a homogenous culture in which 
the members share values and beliefs, communication is expected to flow more easily and be 
characterised by a larger degree of openness and mutual trust (Hostede, 1980). This aspect is 
quite crucial as all of the companies expressed a need for a better line of communication from 
employees to top management. In an organisation with high levels of trust, one is more likely to 
see a larger degree of informal and causal feedback loops which in turn, according to theory, will 
accelerate decision-making process and increase overall organisational effectiveness. 
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Based on our research we will highlight some primary areas of further focus. Firstly the 
companies stand to gain from getting a better understanding of their current company culture and 
adhering sub-cultures. This is so that they may be better equipped to address any deviations from 
the desired company culture, while simultaneously being able to allocate additional resources 
where such deviations exist. They may thus ensure that adequate measures are put in place to 
alleviate the negative effects of non-correlation. Doing so at the early stages of the company’s 
compliance programme is paramount, as it will help create a smoother process if one needs to 
make any changes to the organisational systems prior to implementation. It will also help 
alleviate communication barriers, as well as facilitate a more efficient organisational process. 
Furthermore, such a need-based approach would allow the company to spend fewer resources in 
locations where the culture is less likely to exhibit signs of friction towards the company 
programme (Huther & Shah, 2000). 
 
5.2 Tone at the Top 
  
From the findings it is interesting to note the experts’ shared perception of how there is a lack of 
willingness by top management in Norwegian companies, which may have directly contributed 
to the sluggish development of the compliance function. At the same time, all 13 companies 
claim that their programmes were initiated by a proactive top management, either as a result of 
internal or external pressures. All the Compliance Officers highlighted the efforts of the top 
management as vital for the development process of a company’s anti-corruption programme. As 
Copeland (2000) argues, one of the main responsibilities of top management with regards to anti-
corruption is to assign responsibilities to high-level officers. This seems to be the case in all of 
the companies, and as such the compliance function is inextricably linked to the will and 
intentions of corporate management. Management is the governing body allocating resources to 
the Compliance Officer and so, in line with the views of Coonjohn and Lodin (2012), they may 
have a direct influence on the efficiency of the programmes.  
  
Nonetheless, even as most Compliance Officers report directly to top management and the board, 
they all seem to receive little explicit instructions from their superiors. Some officers noted that 
given the previous corruption convictions, which held top management responsible for other 
employees’ wrongdoings, they were mostly concerned with ensuring that the quality of the 
programme met a satisfactory standard so as to avoid legal repercussions. Such a focus, however, 
is arguably detrimental to the programme if it damages the employees’ perception of top 
management's authenticity when they advocate an anti-corruption standpoint. As Kaptein (2014) 
argues, top management needs to appear as role models for the message to be efficiently 
communicated to the employees. An interesting aspect to note in this respect is the employee 
perspective on top management, which seems to be generally positive towards their ability and 
willingness to allocate resources to fight corruption. Nonetheless, fewer seem to agree that 
current procedures are adequate, and employees feel less informed of what management is doing 
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to prevent corruption. The latter observations may point towards a lacking ability of top 
management to communicate their efforts in an explicit manner, which in turn may weaken their 
position as role models. 
 
It is arguably a strenuous exercise to communicate top management's’ behaviour throughout the 
organisation, especially in some of the larger organisations where management may be far 
removed from certain operations or localisations. Company G made a reference to the CEO, who 
made a point of mentioning the work done on anti-corruption in his address to the company in 
order to assert the tone at the top. However, the majority of those employees who said they 
lacked a good understanding of what is being done by management were employed at this 
company. This may portray that more could be done to explicitly communicate this message to 
employees.  
 
This ties into the alignment of need and ability for top management to shape the efficiency and 
overall success of the compliance function. In companies where management fail to adequately 
communicate the seriousness of the programmes they also fail to communicate the moral 
hierarchy of decision-making. In effect, when employees are facing difficult situations in which 
they must make rapid ad-hoc decisions, it will be harder to ensure freedom for excellence if the 
employee fears punishment when making financially less profitable decisions on account of 
ethics. This is the case unless they feel that top management has a genuine desire to ‘do good’. 
Furthermore, a lack of initial management involvement will only damage the implementation 
process of the programmes and so forth make it harder to revise and alter it later on. In line with 
Trevino (1999) and Bass & Heeks (2011) it is therefore crucial that the companies demonstrate a 
clear company- and corporate management policy on corruption so as to ensure an efficient 
programme. 
 
Our recommendation would be to use top management more explicitly in training and thereby 
make them more visible to the entire company, as training is currently the medium through 
which all employees are exposed to the company’s overall strategy on anti-corruption. This 
could be done in a manner of ways, for instance Company B incorporates their wish to be a 
source of positive development in the countries in which they operate into their strategy. By 
providing real life examples of how corporate management has acted in a manner that 
demonstrated their commitment to the cause, would also make it more evident to staffers that 
they have a genuine desire to go beyond the basic need to warrant themselves against personal 
litigation, and as such avoid mere paper-compliance.  
 
5.3 Resource allocation and distribution 
  
As previously mentioned, resources were allocated by top management in all of the 13 
companies. The companies with the largest pool of resources were those whom had experienced 
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prosecution by the authorities or received a corruption sentence. Only three of the companies did 
not explicitly express the need for additional resources; they saw the introduction of additional 
resources to be less likely to generate more than an incremental increase in efficiency. The 
majority of the officers, however, expressed that there was an internal struggle for resources and 
as such they often had to make priorities in terms of how much to include in the programme. For 
instance, many cited the lack of face-to-face training as a consequence of resource constraints. 
What is interesting to note is that some employees’ perceive the resource spending by corporate 
management to be excessive (16%) while 55% of the employees strongly agreed that current 
procedures were necessary. It is thus hard to reach a definitive conclusion with regards to their 
actual opinion, but these finding may suggests a current misconception of what is being done and 
the amount of resources spent on implementing and operating the programme. 
  
The majority of the companies seem to have used external partners to some extents. This may be 
linked to the companies in which the compliance department consist of very limited personnel or 
officers in a shared position. Furthermore the Compliance Officers had little formal training on 
anti-corruption and often seem to use external experts in the preliminary stages of their 
compliance programme. The danger in relying too much on external competence is that one may 
omit certain key characteristics of your own organisation as the knowledge and experience of 
consultants tend to be portrayed in a more general manner, again increasing the risk of incurring 
some of the negative fall-backs of implementing a ‘one fits all’ solution. 
  
It is also interesting to look at the current trends exhibited by the finance & banking industry, 
where companies on a much larger scale are increasing their resource spending on compliance, 
compared to other sectors in Norway. Some argue that this is due to the increased external 
pressure on the industry, primarily from global financial institutions as well as industry-peers. 
Regulations in this section is also considered to be more explicit in the sense that issues such as 
suspicious transactions or attempts of money laundering must to be reported to the prosecuting 
authorities immediately following detection. The cooperative interplay between the finance & 
banking industry and the authorities is also a more established one. These trends seem to project 
the challenges that the companies studied in this thesis will face in the future.  
 
Thus, we recommend MNCs to study the practices of finance & banking firms as this can give 
them a head start in the race for compliance within their own industries. For example, MNCs in 
general should look to how such firms have implemented support systems that ease the process 
of detecting misconduct. These systems are developed to alert the company of any activities out 
of the ordinary, increasing the probability of discovering any unwanted behaviours overall. 
Corruption if often cited as a notoriously difficult criminal activity to discover, a view shared by 
the experts in our findings. The risk of getting caught is therefore rather low, making people 
more likely to engage in such activities.  Implementing a support system would mitigate some of 
these incentives by increasing the chances of detecting misconduct, and as such make it more 
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likely that one would be able to create a self-regulating compliance function over time that does 
not rely on detecting corruption by chance. This aligns with the characteristics of a successful 
anti-corruption programme as introduced by Huther and Shah (2000) who promote programmes 
that address the underlying governance failures so as to lower the opportunities for gain and 
increase the likelihood of sanctions. 
  
Another of our recommendations is tied to the previously mentioned notion that one could stand 
to gain from allocating a larger amount of resources to the initial phases of introducing a 
programme. This rooted in the effort needed in order to close the design-reality gap, by 
addressing the frictions between the programme and existing cultures and ways of doing things. 
The initial training also needs to be given by people with a high degree of competence on the 
issue. When the programme has been established, however, the responsibility for conducting 
training may be shifted to personnel in the line who have been trained by the Compliance 
Officer. The need for dedicating a rather large amount of resources to ‘kick-start’ the 
implementation process may prove difficult for the companies that are already strained on 
resources. As well, when the programme has become an integrated part of the company, there 
may be reduced need for a big compliance department with expertise knowledge. One way of 
circumventing these somewhat negative prospects is to use external consultants specialising in 
anti-corruption work in the beginning. Pairing up with such agencies will lower the transaction 
costs of the company in terms of building specialised competence internally. In this case, key 
focus areas are to develop a programme to which the employees feel ownership even though it 
has been developed by externals, and to introduce ways of acquiring the knowledge from the 
consultants so that it is contained with the company even after the collaboration has ended.  
  
Furthermore, we recommend distributing the resources on a continuous need-based approach. 
The need for resources may present itself in certain geographical locations, or in operations more 
exposed to the supply of corruption. Spending the limited resources where they are most needed 
rather than distributing them uniformly throughout the company will allow for a more efficient 
resource deployment, making it more probable that one will be able to overcome any internal 
frictions. Having a more flexible resource structure will in turn make the organisation able to 
respond more quickly to any changes or trends and make the company more likely to offset any 
damaging developments both internally and externally.  
 
5.4 Training 
 
As found through the interviews of Compliance Officers, training (face-to-face and e-learning) 
seems to be the most important tool in the implementation process. It is used to ensure 
communication throughout the organisation, together with monitoring mechanisms, by 
systematically spreading information about the content of the code of conduct, legislation and 
company specific principles. This aligns with the lists provided by Weber and Wasieleski (2013) 
92 
 
and Kaptein (2014) where ethics training programmes for employees and training and 
communication were found to be the third and second most common components of 
organisations’ ethics and compliance initiatives. It also corresponds to Wolders’ (2015) 
observation of an increase in the number of companies that implement training programmes to 
equip employees so as to better identify and deter corruption. Based on the employee survey, the 
existing training seems to have had significant effects as 91.22% and 85.97% of the respondents 
agree or strongly agree to the statements ‘The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work’ and ‘The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption’ respectively. Of the employees taking the survey, 
98.29% have received training in some form. 
 
As seen by Copeland (2000) the studied companies thus have implemented one of the elements 
that form the minimum of an effective anti-corruption programme, and may use it to directly 
generate ethical behaviour. Performing training also contributes to closing the design-reality gap 
by addressing the ‘Staffing and skills’ dimension of the ITPOSMO dimensions introduced by 
Bass and Heeks (2011). One of the ways in which the studied companies tie theoretical training 
to the realities faced by employees is to make use of dilemmas. As argued by Angell, Kvamme, 
Slettemark and Wolders (2015) this helps communicate the practical value of the anti-corruption 
measures to employees. Training may thus be considered key to provide guidance concerning 
specific practices associated with paying bribes that are relevant to organisational environments, 
thus impacting the practice of corruption (Dunfee & Hess, 2000). In terms of frequency, most 
new employees get face-to-face training when they start working, but not all of the companies 
have set routines for refreshing the training or has made this mandatory. It is thus difficult to 
ensure a consistent level of competence across the employee base.  
 
Furthermore, it seems that the person who is conducting the training greatly affects the quality 
and effectiveness of information sharing. In the companies where the classroom training is 
mainly done by the Compliance Officer, essential synergies were identified in the sense that the 
officer generated an increased understanding of the status quo at operational levels. It also 
enabled a direct flow of information that compensated for the low use of reporting channels. In 
some companies it also resulted in an increased use of the reporting channels since the 
knowledge of who the Compliance Officer is, lowered the barriers for reporting or requesting 
guidance. The importance of face-to-face training as an arena for discussing the implications of 
the material and ensuring understanding, challenges the widespread use of e-learning as an 
adequate alternative as this may result in a ‘ticking-of-boxes’ tendency among employees. This 
relates to the challenge of ‘bureaucratic fatigue’ as identified by Angell, Kvamme, Slettemark 
and Wolders (2015). An advantage of conducting e-learning is the extreme cost savings as the 
roll-out of new modules to all employees is made significantly easier and quicker than in the case 
of face-to-face training. This was seemingly the reason behind why all of the studied companies 
utilised e-learning as part of their training programmes. Even though most companies had access 
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to data from these e-learning trainings, none of the interviewees claimed to make use of it in a 
systematic manner. 
 
MNCs should further take advantage of the synergies made available when the Compliance 
Officer travels to the local units, but in a more structured manner. Ways of achieving this could 
be to introduce routines for what to assess when travelling to the local departments, and to make 
use of standardised reporting forms so that it becomes easier to assess improvements and track 
the development of local trends. By travelling out to the geographically dispersed units, the 
Compliance Officer also has the ability to give direct feedback, address misunderstandings that 
surface during face-to-face training, and to ensure that the employees who receive the training 
pay adequate attention. If using other employees than the Compliance Officer, the companies 
should develop routines for gathering information about employee competence during the 
training through reporting mechanisms. They should also consider giving special training to line 
managers to equip them to follow up on the received training and guide the employees in 
applying their new knowledge in practice. Surveys should in addition be distributed at the end of 
the training sessions so as to make employees assess the quality of the training and its relevance 
for their specific working environment. It also seems essential to inform the employees about the 
process followed their entering of a concern or guidance request, and making them familiar with 
the responsible parties for handling the reports.  
 
Despite their loss of the advantages generated when meeting employees face to face, firms may 
utilise e-learning as mandatory refreshers of initial classroom-based training sessions so as to 
increase the consistency in the training given throughout the organisation. Alternatively, 
companies may consider combining electronic training with subsequent workshops or dilemma 
discussions initiated by line managers, so as to ensure a better understanding of how to apply the 
gained knowledge to the local context. Another way of increasing the value of e-learning is to 
develop routines for analysing the generated data so as to ensure continuous improvement and 
thus direct organisations to respond appropriately to misconduct and continuously improve. This 
aligns with the desire to establish better routines for gathering information from employees that 
is used to improve the anti-corruption programme and implementation process (Company C, 
Company E, Company D). For example, results from the testing of employees’ understanding 
may uncover gaps in knowledge and employee competence, which calls for the development of 
customised training modules, improved risk assessments or targeted sample audits. Such a needs 
based customisation of training is in line with the importance of responding appropriately to 
misconduct by e.g. activating preventive measures (Copeland, 2000). 
 
5.5 Communication 
 
The ‘top-down’ spreading of information in the studied companies is done in a more or less 
systematic manner, with variations in the use of channels such as training, internal screens, 
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posters, intranet and statements made by top management. According to Copeland (2000), 
ensuring effective communication of anti-corruption principles and procedures to be adhered to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of the programme. Kaptein (2014) also identifies training and 
communication as essential tools for reducing unethical behaviour. However, the term 
communication may span a broader scope than purely the spreading of information from top 
management to employees. A key focus is the flow of information from the operational level, 
thorough the line managers, to top management. This enforces transparency and subsequently 
eases the detection of misconduct (Kaptein, 2014; Dunfee & Hess, 2000). As uncovered from 
studying the companies included in this thesis, training seems to be the main way for spreading 
information in the companies, and continuous training through the organisation is rated by the 
Compliance Officer to be the second most important factor for successful implementation.  
 
Moreover, tone at the top as related to top management involvement is considered the most 
essential factor for ensuring a solid programme rollout. In relation to communication, this may 
indicate that public statements by top management made e.g. in social contexts, as well as clearly 
stated mission/vision statements significantly affects the understanding and practices of 
employees. Based on the employee survey one may deduct that top-down communication is 
effective in practice; 99.12% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I 
have a good understanding of what management expects of me with regards to corruption’. 
Closely related to the spreading of information about ethics, is the openness in the discussion of 
ethical issues within the organisation (Kaptein, 2014). This is related to culture, as already 
introduced, since a homogeneous culture where values and beliefs are shared eventually 
encourages openness and trust. The resulting environment is characterised by improved 
communication as feedback loops naturally develop from the operational level and upwards, and 
because issues concerning ethics and anti-corruption are more quickly brought to management’s 
attention for discussion. Dilemma discussions and workshops beyond regular training were the 
only mentioned ways in which some of the companies enhanced horizontal sharing of 
information and actively tried to generate openness amongst the employees. Spreading of 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ information both seems to be important elements of effective 
implementation of anti-corruption programmes. 
 
Using the presented channels for reporting concerns and/or requesting guidance are the only 
systematic ways for employees to get in direct contact with the ‘higher’ levels of the organisation 
in many of the companies. The reporting mechanisms enable the bypassing of line managers and 
regular lines of communication, such as, in case the employee is uncomfortable with discussing 
the issue with his/her supervisor. In the pursuit of an effective programme, Copeland (2000) 
emphasises the importance of having access to such a mechanism for disclosing criminal 
activities without the fear of retribution. Nevertheless, the interviewed Compliance Officers 
considered fear to be one of the main reasons for the experienced inefficiency of the formal 
reporting channels, undermining their theoretically claimed importance. Furthermore, 79.82% of 
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the respondents to the employee survey agreed, or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am well 
informed of how I can report on issues of corruption’. Since the vast majority of cases entered 
through the channels were irrelevant according to the Compliance Officers, this indicates that 
there are significant weaknesses tied to the communication of the channels’ purpose. 
 
The interviewees assumed that the majority of concerns faced in practice were either solved in 
consultation with local line managers or never reported. Several of the interviewees therefore 
placed great value on the observations made by the Compliance Officer when visiting local units. 
This was due to the fact that it ensured a sharing of experiences between line managers and the 
officer concerning the anti-corruption programme’s actual effectiveness. It seemed that the 
observations made in ‘the field’, and relationship with local line managers to a large degree 
ensured the necessary ‘vertical’ communication. However, without formalised routines for 
communication between local line managers and the corporate unit, the companies did not seem 
to be able to assess and guide day-to-day decision making in a satisfactory way. Few of the 
companies had structured these mechanisms, which corresponds to the rather low priority given 
by Compliance Officers to the factor Transparent line of communication and input from 
employees (6.67). The issues tied to the effectiveness of reporting channels and structured ways 
of assessing practices at the operational level may be seen in relation to the design-reality gap 
developing when assumptions inherent in the programmes to be developed do not match the 
reality of the context of deployment (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012). As argued by Bass and Heeks 
(2011) successful implementation is ensured if such gaps are sufficiently small or may be 
sufficiently closed; thus, a threat to implementation is the growth in mismatch between corporate 
level understanding and local practice. 
 
To avoid the current messy and unclear practices related to vertical communication, the 
companies should further equip line managers to handle cases locally, while narrowing the scope 
through which cases are considered relevant for the reporting channels. In this way resources are 
spent on improving competence locally where there is greater proximity to the actual cases as is 
discussed previously. When receiving issues through the channels it is thus key that irrelevant 
cases are directed back or redirected to the correct unit, so as to avoid the situation experienced 
by Company B where the handling of one irrelevant case resulted in a rapid increase in similar 
cases.  
 
Routines should also be introduced for spreading information ‘upward’, e.g. from trainings, local 
management reporting and employee surveys and appraisals to ensure that the basis for decision 
making is as close to the reality as possible. To ensure the quality of the information flowing ‘up’ 
to top management level, line managers should be made aware of how to distinguish relevant 
information from the rest, and their reporting should be systemised so that it is not dependant on 
their relationship with the Compliance Officer. Simultaneously, the companies must assign clear 
responsibilities for handling the information and incorporating it back into the implemented anti-
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corruption programme. Furthermore, a continued focus on transparency and openness of 
communication is also essential for enhancing horizontal communication and surfacing of 
corruption issues. This may be done by increasing the use of workshops and dilemma 
discussions so that employees are given arenas for sharing their concerns and challenges with 
their managers. Line managers should also be equipped to generate openness and the surfacing 
of concerns during employee appraisals. There should also be clear communication within the 
local units about the importance of reporting concerns, but also about which cases to report on 
and which to solve in the line. 
 
5.6 Closing the design-reality gap 
 
Corporate objectives and strategies are underlying the development of anti-corruption 
programmes; the design of these is influenced by the preconditions for their existence. Examples 
of such guidelines are ‘to do the right thing’, ‘to comply with government laws’ and ‘to guide 
employees’ behaviour’ (Weber and Wasieleski, 2013). As identified during the interviews of 
Compliance Officers, the trend of introducing anti-corruption programmes has developed rather 
recently. This seems to correspond to the observations that the development of suhch 
programmes is inspired by trends, legislation, and international organisations and peers that are 
setting the standards for best practice in the market (Table 10). Corporate objectives are said to 
drive the anti-corruption initiatives to succeed, making them an essential fundament for the 
subsequent roll-out and implementation at the operational level (Bass & Heeks, 2011).  To avoid 
failure of anti-corruption initiatives Schwartz and Davis (1981) point to the necessity of 
considering potential implementation problems and how these should be managed, already when 
reviewing the underlying strategic plans; i.e. strategic plans should be adapted to apply to the 
local environment. 
 
The main threat to successful implementation of anti-corruption programmes is argued to lie in 
the design phase due to the risk of there developing a design-reality gap, which may put a strain 
on implementation effectiveness. This point of view aligns with the general concern expressed 
by the interviewed experts about the lack of competence on implementation of anti-corruption 
programmes amongst Norwegian companies. They also noted that theoretically promising 
frameworks failed to provide adequate guidelines with regards to implementation, resulting in a 
gap that decreased their effectiveness in practice (Angell, Kvamme, Slettemark and Wolders, 
2015). Such gaps are said to emerge when the designers are externals to the context of 
deployment and when practitioners do not feel ownership to the introduced programme 
(Fjeldstad & Isaksen 2008; Svensson, 2005). This seems to be another key challenge of the 
studied companies since the anti-corruption programmes are developed by the Compliance 
Office(r) in the corporate unit or by hired consultants, while the responsibility for implementing 
it lies with the line managers.  
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A central discussion thus revolves around what the ‘Black Box’, as introduced by Schwartz 
(2001), should contain. An effective programme arguably has to be relevant to the organisational 
environment and to provide guidance concerning specific practices associated with paying bribes 
(Dunfee and Hess, 2000). Logsdon and Wood (2005) add to this by emphasising the need for 
adapting the programme to local culture so as to support employee’s ethical development and 
facilitate ethical decision-making. Some of the Compliance Officers shared this view and 
suggested the introduction of implementation techniques tailored to the local culture; they were 
certain that local units played a vital role in ensuring compliance at all levels of the company. 
This relates to the introduction of sub codes which complement the overall programme by 
providing guidance applicable in the contexts of deployment and thus reducing the design-reality 
gap (Dunfee & Hess, 2001; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013; Joseph, 2001). Most companies seem to 
have some way of adapting the anti-corruption programmes to the local contexts. Examples 
include making use of dilemmas suited for the given operational environment, having dilemma 
discussions, employee appraisals and workshops to evaluate the applicability of the programmes 
in practice, and basing anti-corruption activities on risk assessments conducted at the operational 
level. However, the Compliance Officers do not seem to consider the factor of local adaptation 
of all compliance/anti-corruption programmes as noteworthy compared to other elements as it is 
given the fourth lowest priority of 8.08. This may be founded in a lack of experience with how 
implementation success is affected by local adaptation.  
 
To strengthen the overall success of the integrated model, one of the main goals of the 
development process is to avoid that elements far removed from local realities creep into anti-
corruption design. To improve the design of the programme, employees with an understanding of 
the context at the operational level should be included (Bass and Heeks, 2011). This corresponds 
to how Wolders (2015) during the expert interviews stressed that Norwegian companies are in 
need of gaining greater insight into the status quo at the operational level, and that they should 
consider having local Compliance Officers in areas of high risk exposure. Arguably, it is easier 
to address the local culture in a strategic way and adapt programmes to organisational 
environments when one is familiar with the context of deployment. The programme should also 
be constantly revised and updated with input from leaders, employees and management in other 
functional areas (Joseph, 2001). Competence and responsibility of line managers is rated as a 
somewhat important factor - it is given a priority of 6.42.  
 
Since the general trend amongst the studied companies is that much of the responsibility of 
implementing the anti-corruption programme lies with the line managers, we suggest that the 
closing of the design-reality gap should start there. We recommend companies to distribute 
greater responsibility to line managers at local units e.g. by giving them the role as local 
Compliance Officers. Line managers have greater insight into the practices at the context of 
deployment and thus will be better equipped for implementing programmes and tailoring these to 
fit local culture and risk. Due to their knowledge of local conditions, line managers should also 
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be included in the development process of anti-corruption programmes. They may not need to be 
directly involved in the process, however, they should provide feedback as to what they deem 
important, so as to ensure that all ‘blind spots’ are adequately addressed. As opposed to ‘regular’ 
employees at the operational level line managers may have a better understanding of the overall 
aims of management and how these can be met in practice. Giving them insight into the design 
process may also spur a sense of ownership, which easily is transmitted to the employees 
working with the line manager due to their proximity to the rest of the unit. Increased local 
ownership to the anti-corruption programme by the line managers was considered an important 
focus in the future (Company E, Company C). Involving line managers to a greater extent also 
proves relevant in relation to updating the programmes later on, since input from both leaders, 
employees and management in other functional areas is easily gathered through vertical 
communication. 
 
To ensure a satisfactory understanding of the background for, and the aim of implementing the 
given programme, these managers should be given special training and regularly report to the 
corporate unit. Further, incentives specifically related to the performance of line managers and 
how they ensure compliance locally should be considered, and they should have the option to 
discuss difficult cases and improvement areas directly with the Compliance Officer. When given 
a greater responsibility for successful implementation of the programmes and the corresponding 
training, issues of corruption also become more top of mind, making local managers more aware 
of the local practices. This enhances the probability of unethical behaviour being detected and 
also ensures the quality of how issues are handled locally. Given the current situation of 
vanishingly few cases being reported to the corporate unit, the way these cases are solved at the 
operational level is of great importance to show employees that reporting is worthwhile. 
 
Another recommendation is to ensure that employees have enough resources available when 
faced with dilemmas challenging them to choose between ethical behaviour and company profit 
or short-term gain. This in line with the findings of Kaptein (2014) and relates to the 
effectiveness of implementation of anti-corruption programmes. In general, when implementing 
such programmes we suggest that the companies invest sufficient amount of resources to alter 
existing practices in a way that sufficiently closes the design-reality gap, and thus creates a 
lasting change. As mentioned by the Compliance Officer in Company M, the ideal situation 
could be that the compliance function is strictly a coordinating unit while compliance is a natural 
part of the day-to-day activities of all of the company’s employees. 
 
5.7 Internal audit, monitoring and review 
 
Auditing, monitoring and review are mechanisms used to assess the degree of compliance within 
corporations. As found by Kaptein (2014), ‘monitoring and auditing’ is the eight most common 
element of an ethics and compliance programme, which directly relates to employee behaviour in 
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a positive way. Top management and boards are ultimately responsible for the company’s 
actions, and these tools are considered essential for gaining insight into the status quo at the 
operational level ‘so that managers may sleep well at night’ (Company A). They are also used to 
generate data that enables benchmarking against peers, providing the companies with an idea of 
their own position in relation to others. The recent trends highlighted by the interviewed experts 
also point to an increased importance of having good routines in place for assessing behaviour 
within the company: Økokrim’s shifted targeting towards private companies and the focus in 
future legislation on how companies secure efficient compliance and implementation. This 
follows in the wake of the American researchers, Dunfee and Hess (2000), who already in 2000 
stressed the need for companies to be capable of being monitored and assessed by external 
independent entities. 
 
All of the companies studied in this thesis have some kind of internal monitoring and auditing 
process in place to ensure compliance amongst their employees, typically conducted by the 
internal audit function, Compliance Office(r) or line managers (Table 14). In relation to training, 
some companies report on the number of employees who have taken the training, some 
companies test the understanding of employees as part of the training, and some of the 
Compliance Officers gain insight into the level of understanding travelling to the local units. 
However, the companies diverge when choosing whether to make the training mandatory and to 
what extent the information gathered is used. Audits by both internal and external units is, in 
some companies initiated on a routine basis while others merely perform sample audits on 
demand from local departments. The content of ‘pulled’ reports also varies significantly; some 
firms report according to guidelines provided by global actors such as the UN while others have 
developed their own guides for what is to be reported on. As discussed in the aforementioned 
sections, analysing the incoming concerns through the ‘push’ reporting channels cannot be 
considered an effective way of monitoring due to the low number of cases entered, and the lack 
of routines for handling the entered concerns. 
 
An underlying goal seems to be gathering information that is relevant and of high quality so that 
gaps in implementation are actually uncovered. Information is a central element in the 
ITPOSMO checklist - the information withdrawn should be relevant to stakeholders and reflect 
the true implementation status at local departments. Copeland (2000) also sees monitoring, 
auditing, and reporting systems as keys to achieving compliance at the operational level, and 
subsequently contributing to programme efficiency. Nonetheless, amongst the Compliance 
Officers of the studied companies, Formalised and systematic processes for internal 
monitoring/audit and control is considered the second least important factor; it is given a priority 
of 8.67 out of 12. This may be because the Compliance Officers emphasise short-term efficiency 
when ranking the factors, while monitoring/audit and control has a greater impact in the long run 
in relation to improving of the programme. The fact that Understanding throughout the 
organisation of the importance for the company is prioritised significantly higher (4.75) is 
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backing this assumption, as this factor to some extent achieves the same goals as that of 
monitoring and auditing. 
 
In a sense, monitoring and review is also thought to function as a part of the implementation 
process itself since it generates increased awareness at all levels of the company. Keeping the 
issue of corruption top of mind may also contribute to increased transparency within the 
company, making it less attractive to engage in dubious activities, and more accepted to talk 
about issues and challenges tied to fighting them. Both Kaptein (2014) and Dunfee & Hess 
(2000) consider transparency to be a valuable characteristic of anti-corruption processes, which 
ensures effective implementation. Amongst the respondents to the employee survey, 99.12% 
agreed or strongly agreed to the statement ‘I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption’. This may indicate that the perceived transparency is 
rather high. 
 
A potential challenge of monitoring and review as introduced by the Compliance Officers is to 
have too many procedures and assessments in place so that the daily activities of the company 
are staggered (Company G, Company H). This relates to how companies constantly run the risk 
of having a ‘ticking-of-boxes’ approach to anti-corruption work (Donaldson, 2003). 
Consequently, companies must balance the need for detailed reporting and monitoring with the 
appropriate distribution of resources and reduced flexibility, as this adds more steps to already 
complex day-to-day processes. This balancing is compared to choosing how many locks to use 
when securing a bicycle - safety must be ensured while simultaneously considering the time and 
effort required to lock and unlock the bike every time it is moved. Finding the optimal balance of 
monitoring and auditing mechanisms may be tied to the need for systematic learning processes 
within the companies to implement anti-corruption programmes successfully (Logsdon & Wood, 
2005). For the focal companies in this thesis, the detection of gaps in implementation, and 
enhanced understanding of local practices are used as the basis for annual business plans and 
alterations in the strategies for ensuring compliance. Risk assessments, which are key in this 
respect, will be discussed in greater detail later on. Good routines for continuous improvement 
are, however considered one of the main weaknesses of the companies per today (Company C, 
Company E, Company D). 
 
The list of future focus areas contains several elements related to auditing, monitoring and 
review, revealing insufficient routines for gathering information from the operational levels and 
for applying risk assessments. Lacking mechanisms for monitoring actors that are more loosely 
bound to the companies, such as partners, suppliers and agents are also highlighted. A general 
impression expressed by the interviewed Compliance Officers was that none of them felt they 
could identify good measures for assessing the actual implementation of the various anti-
corruption initiatives. This calls for better routines for auditing, monitoring and review in 
general. In many of the companies HSE has become an integrated part of daily routines making 
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it relevant as an inspiration when implementing compliance, as suggested by several of the 
Compliance Officers. Companies should consider utilising structures and processes that are 
already successfully implemented in day-to-day activities. This could be done by including 
elements related to compliance into the established practices, or by performing monitoring in the 
same successful way.  Such an approach would address Kaptein’s (2014) observations in terms 
of sequence of implementation, as the companies would be able to adopt more anti-corruption 
components than what their budget or time constraints would imply. 
 
To ensure that all employees are exposed to some type of control mechanism where divergent 
attitudes or gaps in understanding are uncovered, some parts of the training should be mandatory. 
The training should also be followed by a test of the employee's’ ability to apply the acclaimed 
knowledge in practice, either through control questions, subsequent dilemma discussions or 
setting of personal goals for improvement during employee appraisals. Furthermore, the 
targeting and frequency of sample audits should be based on risk assessments to optimise the 
‘return on investment’ by increasing the chances of uncovering misconduct. Conduction of 
audits by external agencies, such as consultancy firms, is also recommended due to the increased 
quality and added value of such audits. The company will then be audited by experts who 
possess in-depth knowledge that internal auditors and Compliance Officers do not posses, which 
is generated during assessments of other companies. Another way of utilising external 
competence and insight is to attend conferences and engage in corporate networks such as the 
national Compliance Officer network. In this way, the companies may share their experiences 
with monitoring mechanisms and how to measure compliance. 
 
Beyond this, the companies should strive to increase the transparency of internal processes by for 
example making routines and procedures available to employees together with information about 
who are responsible for them. Even though employees consider the transparency to be adequate, 
the level of insight into what is actually expected from them may differ from that which 
management actually holds. Increasing transparency in practice may also enhance the 
understanding of why the various monitoring mechanisms are introduced, thus facilitating the 
implementation process, as employees are more willing to cooperate. When determining the 
distribution of responsibility tied to monitoring and review, the line managers should be given 
greater responsibility due to their proximity to local environments. They have knowledge of local 
nuances and the ability to quickly sense changes that may prove valuable when continuously 
improving the mechanisms for monitoring, review and auditing. 
 
5.8 Employee competence and incentives 
 
From the findings it is worth noting that only one company (Company A) had made a conscious 
effort to attempt to map the overall competence of their employees with regards to corruption. 
They had recently initiated a companywide self-assessment with the intention of mapping how 
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the different operations and locations viewed their maturity level on compliance. Furthermore, 
once the data had been collected those offices whom had very high or low scores, compared to 
the expected average, were given special attention. This was done to the extent that someone 
from the compliance team travelled to the office in question to verify whether their self-
assessment was in line with that of the home office. In this manner they were able to gain a better 
overview of what the actual internal employee competence was, as well as highlighting areas that 
required more, or less, attention in the future. It is also a good way of gaining a better overview 
of what is currently being done by line managers, and it presents an opportunity to draw from 
various capabilities within the company. This relates to the observation that many good solutions 
may exist further out in the line. Such a mapping of employee awareness may also prove fruitful 
with regards to the design of more locally adaptable anti-corruption programmes. 
  
What is interesting to note is the fact that the majority of Compliance Officers classified the need 
for a better mapping of employee competence as one of their main areas in need of improvement. 
Most companies believed their employees to behave ethically and have attitudes in line with the 
desired company culture. However, they expressed an impression of a general lack of 
competence on corruption – especially with regards to offices located in countries with a higher 
risk of exposure to corruption (Table 12). This poses several challenges. Firstly, as very few 
undertake the task of mapping the initial competence and capabilities of staff, there is little data 
from which to monitor progress and efficiency of anti-corruption programmes. This makes the 
process of tracking improvements very difficult, or at least a rather diffuse task, which in turn 
makes it harder for Compliance Officers to justify needs-based resource spending to corporate 
management. Furthermore, not being able to adequately track employee progress will make it 
harder to adequately identify the need for additional support mechanisms in areas prone to risk. 
To illustrate this, having 98% of your staff complete an e-learning module does not necessarily 
imply that 98% of your employees are equipped to correctly identify and deal with corruption. In 
that sense, this e-learning module is more likely to be an embellished form of paper-compliance, 
rather than a genuine effort from top management to educate employees. As previous discussions 
portray, such lack of top management involvement may be detrimental to the implementation of 
the overall programme. 
  
One way of strengthening the focus on the issue of corruption amongst employees is through the 
use of incentives. From the factor ranking we saw that Compliance Officers tended to disregard 
the use of incentives for increasing the efficiency of their programmes. For leader however, the 
use of incentives may prove useful for communicating the importance of the issue. In most 
companies, certain targets are set in order for employees to have a better understanding of what 
is expected of them, and in turn incentives are used to demonstrate the value of reaching said 
targets (i.e. bonuses or promotions tied to meeting milestones). Some of the companies, such as 
Company D, include corruption in their performance appraisals, and so has made employees’ 
active contribution to the company’s anti-corruption efforts 
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advancement. What seems to be more common, however, is the existence of negative incentives 
with regards to corruption. Most of the Compliance Officers highlighted that any involvement in 
corruption would be grounds for immediate dismissal, as it was seen as a violation of trust and an 
indefensible departure from company values. This is in line with Copeland’s (2000) view of the 
need to enforce the organisation’s standards through the use of appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms. However, this should be seen in correlation with the very nature of corruption as it 
is often considered an activity in which the risk of getting caught is rather low, and so employees 
may underestimate the negative effects of corruption if they stand to gain short-term financial 
profit for which the company has created positive incentives. 
  
Our recommendation would be for companies to make a more conscious effort to map the 
current level of knowledge and employee competence throughout the organisation. These 
findings should be made accessible to employees throughout the firm so as to highlight the issue, 
as well as to create a more transparent company standpoint. Thus, the employees may also be 
able to track future developments and be engaged more actively into the company’s fight against 
corruption. Self-assessments may be used to generate higher levels of awareness of the issue, 
whilst facilitating discussion and knowledge sharing amongst different levels of the organisation. 
  
Furthermore, we suggest that companies give more focus to positive incentives and tie these 
more directly to anti-corruption and compliance. By including anti-corruption efforts into 
performance reviews one is more likely to generate employee-awareness, for instance by asking 
staff to identify which areas they find challenging in practice, and how they are going to handle 
these. Moreover, such an inclusion of questions relating to compliance into the performance 
appraisal may prove valuable for the line managers as they will get a better understanding of 
what their subordinates find challenging, and subsequently to which areas more resources should 
be devoted in the future. This understanding can in turn be shared with Compliance Officers, and 
as such function as a periodic monitoring of employee awareness and improvement areas. 
  
5.9 Risk based resource expenditure 
  
The experts interviewed were unanimous in their perception of the Norwegian business 
community and their ability, or lack of such, to assess risk (Expert Interviews). As previously 
mentioned, those companies with the greatest amount of resources (Company M, Company L, 
Company E) were also the companies who were most preoccupied with securing a more risk-
based structure relating to resource-expenditure. Several companies said that they initiate a more 
thorough and practically applicable training at local offices, where they feel that they are more 
exposed to risk. Some companies, such as Company C and Company L, also have employed 
local Compliance Officers in key locations so as to strengthen the compliance function and 
subsequently raise awareness of the anti-corruption work. 
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Another key issue, highlighted both through the expert- and Compliance Officer interviews, is 
the risk posed by interactions with agents or other third parties. Slettemark drew attention to the 
fact that several of the most recent corruption cases were rooted in the company's inability to 
assess risk, or lack of oversight with regards to their partner’s doings (Slettemark & Kvamme, 
2015). This is a particularly complex area as companies are legally obligated to ensure that their 
partners act according to legal requirements. As such they are responsible for a company whose 
culture and internal motivations may deviate from their own, and thus the potential of cultural 
friction may be even higher. They may therefore need to spend quite a lot of resources on 
ensuring that there exists a mutual understanding of both risk and corruption between themselves 
and external third parties. Currently, this risk assessment is done primarily through the use of 
IDDs. These are often comprehensive and should, if communicated correctly, be an adequate risk 
assurance towards third parties. Nonetheless, the majority of IDDs are conducted by operational 
staff in departments such as procurement. This then moves the risk assessment process from the 
direct control of corporate management down to an operational level, which entails that if one 
omits gaining an oversight of the controlling mechanisms on this lower level one has little 
chance of truly understanding one’s own vulnerability. 
  
This then ties in with the previous section of employee competence. If operational employees are 
those responsible for conducting the risk assessments in areas where the company is most 
vulnerable to corruption, it is only logical that it is the same employees whom should be best 
equipped to correctly identify corruption. As mentioned by Company G, they found that when 
they tried to introduce a more comprehensive IDD with regards to third party contract, these 
attempts were met by a lot of hostility by employees whom saw the new measures as 
unnecessary and an over-bureaucratisation of current processes. Based on experience and more 
thorough risk assessments, the solution then became to streamline some processes and IDDs by, 
for instance, removing some steps from IDDs tied to contracts with existing partners, whilst 
making process tied to new partners more exhaustive. 
  
Our recommendation is that companies should adopt a more risk-based resource planning 
strategy. Most companies would ideally dedicate more resources to the anti-corruption efforts, 
and so they are all forced to prioritise and make sacrifices. With a risk-based approach, 
companies are more likely to be able to allocate resources where they are most needed, and as 
such they are more likely to maximise their capabilities while minimising the risk of omitting 
something. With regards to local adaptation one need to spend resources at the initial stages of 
the programme, so as to understand where the company is exposed to corruption risks and where 
local culture diverges from that of the home office, so as to spend the resources more efficiently. 
Local staff may also have a different view of what constitutes corruption and thus, if they are set 
as the operational frontier meant to safeguard against corruption, one may need to deploy 
additional training or control mechanisms to ensure a homogenous understanding throughout the 
company. 
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Furthermore, we propose to establish a system of monitoring and auditing based on risk. This 
would entail that areas or operations exposed to higher levels of risk would be audited by the 
headquarter to ensure that those assessing risk at operational level share the corporate 
understanding and capability of risk assessments. Such audits would allow for top management 
to ensure coherence between their strategy and its implementation at the operational level, 
especially at the introduction stage of the programme. Correctly equipping the operational units 
to assess risk would ensure optimal use of resources as these units are already conducting similar 
evaluations.   
  
Moreover, companies could also consider branching out and use computerised systems to assess 
risk as a potential solution to the resource constriction. Several global databases are becoming 
available, which may help industries pool resources and increase transparency; especially 
concerning third parties as such databases usually show areas with higher risk exposure, helping 
the employees identify risk and as such make more vigilant when they enter into partnerships or 
enlist agents. Such databases could also help resource-constrained compliance departments track 
global developments and trends.  
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6 Compliance function lifecycle and implications for practitioners 
 
As shown in the previous chapters we have identified the alignment between a code and its 
ability to efficiently secure wanted behaviour of employees as one of the key issues of 
implementation. This chapter presents our previously outlined recommendations structured 
around the concept of a ‘compliance function lifecycle’, as well as a brief overview of what this 
concept will entail for practitioners. Based on our recommendations in chapter 5 we have 
identified nine factors, which all ties into the overall efficiency of an anti-corruption programme. 
These nine may be further classified into three overall groupings: prerequisite, core function and 
support function, containing various elements as shown in Table 16 below.  
 
Table 16: The compliance function lifecycle 
Prerequisite Core function Support function 
• Tone at the Top • Company Culture 
• Communication (Top mgt. and 
employees) 
• Resource allocation (Risk based) 
• Training 
• Employee competence and incentives  
• Internal audit, monitoring and review 
• Line managers’ responsibility  
• Risk assessment  
 
 
These three groups together represent our solution as to what lies behind the previously 
discussed ‘black box’ linking code and behaviours, as portrayed in Figure 16. 
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Tone at the top seems to be a prerequisite for securing the very existence of anti-corruption 
programmes or a company’s compliance function. While in the future one may see this 
becoming a legal requirement, as it currently stands, top management’s realisation of the 
importance and value of allocating resources to a compliance function is one of the key factors 
determining the programmes efficiency.  
 
With regards to the four core functions, we see these as the key responsibility of the compliance 
unit. This will be independent of time in the sense that the Compliance Officer should be the 
main architect and coordinator securing that these functions are at all times in alignment with 
company needs and current regulation. As an example, in the more mature stages of the 
programme, when line managers are those in charge of conducting the training, Compliance 
Officers should still be in charge of the format and content of said trainings. Moreover it is the 
compliance unit’s responsibility that the available resources are allocated to where they are most 
needed, henceforth distributed on the basis of level of risk exposure. Furthermore, as part of the 
transition to a more coordinating role, the Compliance Officer should ensure a communication 
structure which allows for a transparent and easy flow of information and feedback from both 
employees and top management. This may be done through the solicitation of line managers and 
periodical reviews, however as the officers still represent the face of the anti-corruption 
COD
E 
BEHAVIOU
R 
Pre-
requisite 
Core 
function 
Support 
function 
Figure 16: Compliance function lifecycle 
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programme they should ensure a direct communication channel which bypasses line managers, 
such as for instance helpline or alert line, so as to warrant that all internal concerns or suspicion 
are brought forward. This however requires that the Compliance Officers communicate a strong 
value-based company culture in which employees both trust and understand the importance of 
the company’s anti-corruption efforts.  
 
Lastly, the support functions aim to take advantage of structural elements and capabilities 
already in place in most companies. By strengthening or redefining these existing structures, the 
strained pool of resources will be given a much-needed alleviation and one may draw on already 
existing expertise and local knowledge that may previously have been overlooked. One of the 
key issues of this support structure is the redefining role of line managers. As portrayed in 
chapter 5 this function is currently widely used by Compliance Officers, however few companies 
have put substantial focus on explicitly clarifying the role of line managers in the company’s 
anti-corruption efforts. Furthermore, as line managers are those in charge of daily operations 
they are also most likely to interact with their employees in a more informal manner, and 
henceforth gain access to an unsystematic flow of information about the employees’ perceptions 
and concerns regarding to corruption. By giving additional training to and allowing line 
managers to take on a more formal role, whilst systematizing communication channels between 
compliance units and operational levels, they will be able to make the anti-corruption effort more 
transparent as well as raising employees awareness. This also ties in with risk assessment and 
employee competence as line manager and local staff are more likely to be aware of the inner 
workings of their surroundings and as such, given they are provided the necessary knowledge, 
will be more equipped to respond to any suspicious or unwanted behaviours. This aspect is key 
as it will allow the compliance function to be a more flexible and responsive unit as those in 
direct contact with risk prone areas such as third party contract will be more acutely aware of 
what they should look for as well as their personal liability with regards to corruption. Involving 
the employees in this manner is likely to keep the issue top of mind and as such ensure that 
employees are alert and assertive when tackling issues of corruption.  
 
Figure 17 shows how the structure of the compliance lifecycle is intended to look over time. The 
y-axis may present several variables such as for instance resources allocation and capability 
structure. 
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Figure 17: Compliance function lifecycle 
 
To illustrate, following the rationale depicted above, the amount of resources spent by the 
compliance department at the initial stages of developing an anti-corruption programme is likely 
to be different from what is the case later on, when the programme has become more ingrained 
into the operational structure of the company. In the beginning the compliance team will 
represent the majority of the company’s core capability on anti-corruption and as such they will 
have to take a larger share of the operational responsibility. More explicitly, in the beginning the 
compliance department will bear the responsibility of both the core and support function, 
however, as time passes and the organisational structures become more set and the design-reality 
gap is closed, one will be able to move much of this daily responsibility to an operational level. 
In the beginning the compliance department will for instance need to have a dedicated team who 
deals with internal audits and IDDs while simultaneously training the audit department so as to 
ensure that they are competent to take over this role in due time. When the compliance 
department then feels that the internal audit department is equipped to handle issues of anti-
corruption to a satisfactory degree, they may alleviate themselves of this responsibility and from 
a compliance viewpoint establish a sample based audit approach aimed at monitoring this 
support function. 
 
In many ways, the aim of viewing the compliance function as a lifecycle is that it attempts to 
secure a restructuring of company resources and capabilities where they are most needed, and 
henceforth in the most efficient manner. If line managers are given adequate training they will be 
capable of undertaking activities, such as employee assessments, and thereby freeing these 
resources from the compliance department. The Compliance Officers will then in large part have 
an overall coordinating responsibility as it continues to develop the different functions, such as 
training, to assure that these are on trend and adhere to current requirements.  
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7 Implications for theory, limitations and future research 
 
In this chapter, the implications of our findings for theory are considered. Further, the limitations 
of our research method relating to practicalities and resource constraints are highlighted before 
the chapter concludes with a recommendation of what future researchers should focus on. The 
recommendations are paired with some suggestions as to what form such endeavours may take.  
 
7.1 Implications for theory 
 
Despite the widespread use if ethics programmes and subsequently anti-corruption programmes, 
limited empirical evidence exists on the effectiveness of such programmes within business 
organizations (Kaptein, 2014). Our research presents in many ways an academic maiden voyage 
into the research field of what determines the effectiveness of implementing anti-corruption 
programmes. The existing research gap is addressed from the outlook of five experts and 13 
Norwegian MNCs. 
 
The implementation of anti-corruption programmes has often been done in line with the logic of 
a ‘one fits all’ approach, which has proved too simplistic when faced with the realities of 
operational environments, leading to the development of so-called design-reality gaps (Persson, 
Rothstein & Teorell, 2010; Heeks & Mathisen, 2012). The subsequent failure of implementation 
is by several academics tied to the role of culture (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013; Hansen, 2004; 
Yang, 2015; Pinckaers, 2001). During our research process we find that the failures of anti-
corruption programmes are tightly related to the lack of insight into the required balance between 
systems and culture, i.e. the programme to be implemented and the people to make use of it in 
their day-to-day activities. Based on the material gathered, we add to current theory by 
introducing the concept of a compliance function lifecycle to illustrate how various elements that 
affect the success of implementation should be given various levels of emphasis over time. 
 
There has been a growing focus on the functions of, and elements composing ethics and 
compliance, or anti-corruption programmes amongst researchers (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013; 
Kaptein, 2014, Dunfee and Hess, 2000; Copeland, 2000). Our thesis has taken this research 
further by focusing on the effectiveness of such elements, what they contain in practice, and 
more importantly the interaction between them in order to ensure effectiveness and successful 
implementation. The existing theory on Codes of Conduct lay the foundation for our study of 
anti-corruption programmes due to the lack of more applicable frameworks. We suggest nine 
elements that Schwartz’ (2001) ‘Black Box’ of implementation should contain to ensure that 
introduced programmes actually promote ethical behaviour amongst employees. Thus, we add 
meat on the bone of a very recent field of study and provide a basis for future research on anti-
corruption programme implementation in practice. 
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7.2 Limitations due to resource constraints 
 
Our findings do not present clear-cut results and so the results will be exposed to errors such as 
causality fallacies or misinterpretations. This section contains an outline of some of the most 
significant limitations of this thesis tied to resource constraints: large amounts of peripheral 
theory and constraints on time and financial resources. The limitations due to the choice of 
research design, as well as the measures taken to limit the impact of these are discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Large amount of peripheral theory 
There are a large number of topics and theoretical perspectives in the periphery of our research 
questions that relate to the various phenomena studied, such as Code of Conduct, 
Implementation of programmes and whistle-blowing. However, due to the insufficient resources 
available the inclusion of these was constrained - we had to prioritise amongst them. Relevant 
theoretical concepts are thus not included, and the included ones are not covered exhaustively, 
limiting the quality of our study. 
 
Constraints on time and financial resources 
Our thesis is marked by the lack of time and financials available for conducting our research. For 
example, data was gathered within the frames of one month in 2015, making the contributions of 
large parts of our study short lived as the practical implications of the studied topic is rapidly 
changing. We also had to put constraints on the number of companies interviewed and the time 
spent on each interview. The period of time over which the employee survey was open also had 
to be sufficiently long, shortening the time available for analysing the result. Furthermore, we 
were not able to send the revised abstracts from the interviews back to the Compliance Officers 
for review, reducing the construct validity of our study. Together with the financial restrictions, 
the time constraints deprived us of the opportunity to conduct in-depth interviews of the 
employees at the various geographical locations, which may have resulted in the loss of 
information and understanding of the individual situations. 
 
7.3 Future research 
 
On the background of the findings and conclusions of this thesis researchers should consider 
adding to the field of study by building on our results. They should consider gathering empirical 
data to build a generic model showing the detailed components of the Black Box that must be in 
place to ensure successful implementation. It would also be interesting to evaluate which 
activities and measures to implement at various stages in the process of establishing an anti-
corruption programme, to and look at how this varies according to country-, activity- and 
industry specific factors. Other potential areas for further research is how implementation 
success should be measured in a way that distinguishes real compliance from paper compliance, 
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and how the design process of anti-corruption programmes should be conducted so as to 
minimise the design-reality gap. 
 
Furthermore, there are other areas of study that might shed light to different aspects of 
implementation of anti-corruption programmes than what is covered in this paper. For example, 
researcher should consider adding to the field by drawing parallels to how systems are 
implemented in the financial sector, where support structures are successfully used to counter the 
spread of money laundering. It could also prove valuable to study the development of anti-
corruption work over time to provide a sounder basis for predicting future trends and learning 
from previous experience. Looking to existing literature and theories within complementary 
fields of study, or performing a multidisciplinary study should also be considered for future 
research. Disciplines of interest are areas such as internal audit, quality assurance, HSE, and 
legal, which are far older fields within organisational theory. To uncover a more accurate set of 
factors for successful implementation, a broader sample of firms should be studied that is 
representative for a larger population of global MNCs, and include factors from the external 
environment. Examples of such external factors are the role of industry peers, proximity to 
research institutions, civil society engagement, the political situation, local culture and the 
reactiveness of local legislative agencies. 
 
Finally, research performed in the future should take into account the outlined limitations to 
improve the quality of the results. Alternatives may include to perform an in-depth study of a 
single company at all organisational levels and across geographically dispersed business units, or 
to look into a specific industry to reduce the limitations of generalisation of this study. 
Researchers should also consider conducting structured interviews across a large sample of 
companies securing a better response rate than what was achieved in this thesis, so as to improve 
the quality of cross-sectional analysis. 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
 
To conclude this thesis we revisit the research questions from the introduction in order to 
demonstrate to what extent they have been adequately answered by our findings. As mentioned, 
we have looked at 13 companies from various industries and as such we argue that our findings 
may to some extent be representative for the majority of the Norwegian business community. 
Moreover, as those companies in question are multinational companies operating in the global 
business community, our findings may also have merit for companies outside of Norway. By 
embarking on such a comprehensive and ambitious journey as this thesis has done we feel that 
our contribution is one of distinct value for scholars and practitioners alike, and as such 
accomplished what it aimed to do. As can be seen below, it also provided highly satisfactory 
answers to our initial RQ’s.  
 
RQ1:  What constitutes a ‘good’ anti-corruption programme?  
 
Primarily, a good anti-corruption programme is one that accomplishes what it sets out to do. As 
we have demonstrated earlier, however, this is not a task without its challenges. A good 
programme is one that reflects all the different levels of the company, and allows for a 
transparent flow of communication. Our findings promote the adoption of a compliance lifecycle 
mind-set through which one allows for the creation of a long-term function that is engrained into 
the company’s daily operations. Through such a mind-set one will allow for a more robust 
system to be built around the risks and vulnerabilities of a specific company, and as such will be 
able to draw on existing internal capabilities. Such a system will also help close the design-
reality gap by building on an initial screening of areas with high-risk exposure or cultural 
friction. This may require a substantial amount of resources in the beginning of the programme 
introduction, which top management may be hesitant to allocate. However, it is our opinion that 
this approach will allow for a more efficient implementation process and hence save the 
company for unnecessary resource expenditure in the long term. 
 
Furthermore, a ‘good’ compliance programme is one that is adaptable and knowledgeable in 
terms of spending resources on the basis of risk exposure. It also promotes a visible top 
management so as to ensure that employees are satisfied with the company’s message, so as to 
not engage in corruption even if it warrants short-term financial gain. Employees’ acceptance of 
this message will make them more likely to exhibit wanted behaviour if ever exposed to 
corruption, and thereby safeguard the company.  
 
A good compliance programme is henceforth one that allows for a seamless alignment between 
system and culture, in which the role of the Compliance Officer becomes a more coordinative, in 
which they can focus on monitoring and improving the existing programme to ensure that it is in 
line with current regulations and requirements.  
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RQ2: What are the crucial factors in ensuring efficient implementation of, and 
compliance with anti-corruption programmes in Norwegian MNCs? 
 
Our findings allowed us to identify nine factors, which are key to ensuring an efficient 
implementation of, and compliance with anti-corruption programmes. These were in turn 
classified as prerequisite, core and support functions within the compliance lifecycle model. Our 
research has shown that one cannot, and should not, try to minimise the role and responsibilities 
of a compliance function to only being concerned with one factor - rather they should seek to 
look at how the various factors interact. As such, there are certain key factors of which the 
Compliance Officer should remain in control, even in the later stages of a compliance 
programme. These factors are listed under the core function: communication, training, resource 
allocation and company culture. Culture is important as it is in many ways the ‘wolf in sheep's 
clothing’ and when little is done to examine the cultural frictions, one run the risk of not being 
able to close the design-reality gap and as such cause detrimental effects to the effectiveness of 
the programme.  
 
RQ3: How do employee perspectives on Norwegian MNCs’ anti-corruption  
efforts align with that of top management? 
 
On a very general level, the perspectives of employees and top management align quite well. 
This is particularly on the issue of training which both top management and employees tend to 
look upon favourably. With regards to the use of resources, however, their views do not align as 
seamlessly; employees tend to have trouble in understanding what management is explicitly 
doing and henceforth feel corporate management spend an excessive amount on the issue. 
Furthermore, employees are less likely to be able to identify those in charge of compliance and 
express a concern regarding their inability to correctly identify the ways in which they should 
report on corruption. Moreover, both Compliance Officers and employees express a concern that 
the company should have measures in place to warrant corruption, and as such one may expect 
that employees in companies that currently lack an anti-corruption programme share this view.  
 
Another key finding is that employees tend to see themselves as competent to deal with 
corruption when management, however, seem to be less confident. Nonetheless, little is done by 
Compliance Officers to adequately map out the current capabilities of their staff and as such they 
rely on a perception of company culture rather than real data. This is important as it highlights 
the existence of a knowledge gap between what the company thinks to be true, compared to what 
it knows to be true. Said gap arguably represents one of the main weaknesses of Norwegian 
MNCs as they then fail to correctly assess whether their areas of risk exposure correlates with 
their capabilities. A non-alignment between these two is likely to create so-called blind spots in 
which the company is less likely to be able to protect itself against corruption, and as the 
introduction states, and this thesis clearly shows: ‘the only way companies can be ethical, is for 
people to be ethical’. 
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Appendix 1 Interview Overview 
 
 
Expert Title Date 
Duration 
(min.) Type Place 
Tina Søreide PhD Scholar UiB 07.02 45 Telephone 
Trondhei
m 
Helge 
Kvamme Lawyer, Selmer 09.02 60 
Face-to-
Face 
Trondhei
m 
Guro 
Slettemark Generalsecretary TI 09.02 60 
Face-to-
Face 
Trondhei
m 
Albert Wolders 
Leader Anti-Corruption and 
Fraud, Deloitte 05.03 45 Telephone 
Trondhei
m 
Arnt Angel 
Lawyer Forensic Services, 
Deloitte 13.03 60 
Face-to-
Face Oslo 
 
 
Company  Date 
Duration 
(min.) Type Place 
A 
 
09.0
3 100 Face-to-Face Oslo 
B 
 
10.0
3 90 Face-to-Face Oslo 
C 
 
05.0
3 90 Telephone Trondheim 
D 
 
19.0
3 60 Telephone Trondheim 
E 
 
10.0
3 90 Face-to-Face Oslo 
F 
 
13.0
3 60 Face-to-Face Oslo 
G 
 
11.0
3 90 Face-to-Face Oslo 
H 
 
10.0
3 110 Face-to-Face Oslo 
I 
 
11.0
3 60 Face-to-Face Oslo 
J 
 
12.0
3 60 Face-to-Face Oslo 
K 
 
12.0
3 60 Face-to-Face Oslo 
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L 
 
19.0
3 60 Telephone Trondheim 
M 
 
12.0
3 60 Face-to-Face Oslo 
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Appendix 2 Interview guide (In Norwegian)  
 
 
Introduksjon 
Informasjon om format, prosess og anonymitet. 
 
Generelt 
Din bakgrunn og erfaring 
●   Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i bedriften? 
●   Hvor lenge har du jobbet med compliance (antikorrupsjon)? 
●   Hva er din bakgrunn? 
●   Hvilken erfaring har du med antikorrupsjon i denne/tidligere bedrifter? 
 
Korrupsjon i dagens bedrifts-Norge 
●   Hvordan vil du definere korrupsjon? 
●   Oppfatter du korrupsjon som en relevant problemstilling i Norge i dag? 
●   Oppfatter du korrupsjon som en relevant problemstilling for bedriften? (På hvilken måte, 
har dere støtt på noen utfordringer) 
●   Har du noen eksempler på korrupsjonssaker i Norge idag. 
 
Spesifikt 
Anti-korrupsjonsarbeid i din bedrift 
●   Hvor mange jobber med antikorrupsjon i bedriften? 
○   I Norge og i utlandet? 
●   Hvor lenge har en ev. compliance-funksjon eksistert? 
●   Hva er ansvarsområdene dine? 
○   Hva er din rolle i utviklingen av antikorrupsjonsstrategier? 
●   Fortell oss om bedriftens antikorrupsjonsstrategi 
●   Hvordan utarbeides denne (i forkant og underveis)? 
○   Hvor dere henter inspirasjon (internt/eksternt) 
●   Hvilke endringer har du sett over tid? De siste 20, 10, 5 årene?   
○   Hvorfor utvides compliance-avedelingen? 
 
Anti-korrupsjonstiltak og implementering 
●   Hva gjøres for å implementere bedriftens anti-korrupsjonsstrategi? 
○   Hvordan kommuniseres bedriftens anti-korrupsjonsstrategier overfor de ansatte? 
○   Hvordan gis de ansatte opplæring i antikorrupsjon? Hvem, hvordan, oppfølging 
○   Engangstiltak eller periodiske øvelser? 
●   Hvilke verktøy bruker dere for å sikre etterlevelse hos de ansatte? 
●   Hvordan måles grad av implementering? Eks. signering av code of conduct 
●   Hva ser du på som ledelsens rolle i denne prosessen? 
●   Hva ligger til grunn når dere skal bestemme satsningsområdene innenfor anti-korrupsjon 
●   Hvilke aspekter blir prioritert når dere skal utforme en slik strategi/rammeverk? 
 
Deler av bedriften med høyere korrupsjonsrisiko 
●   Hvordan rangeres bedriftens avdelinger mtp korrupsjonsrisiko? Eks. CPI 
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●   Hvordan sikres compliance her? Spesielle tiltak? Spesiell opplæring? 
 
Varsling og varslingssystemer 
●   Hvordan er varslingsmuligheter lagt opp i bedriften? 
○   Interne/eksterne kanaler 
●   Hvordan følges varsler opp? 
○   Prosess 
○   Hvem er ansvarlig? 
○   Hva slags kompetanse skal den som mottar et varsel ha? 
●   Gjør dere forskjell på en varslingslinje og en hjelpelinje? 
●   Hva gjøres for å sikre at ansatte har tiltro til bedriftens varslingssystem? 
●   Interne vs. eksterne insentiver for varsling? 
●   Hvilke utfordringer ser du ved effektiviteten til dagens varslingsystem? 
○   Hvilke faktorer tror du påvirker denne? 
○   Hvilke forbedringer kunne vært gjort for å øke denne? 
Nulltoleranse 
●   Ser du noen utfordringer ved null-toleranse? Tror du dette kan påvirke antall 
varslingssaker som meldes inn? 
 
Avslutning 
●   Har du noen avsluttende kommentarer? 
●   Har du noen spørsmål? 
●   Ønsker dere å motta oversikt over resultatene i etterkant? 
 
Informasjon om veien videre 
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Appendix 3 Employee Survey Template 
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Appendix 4 Employee Survey Results 
 
4.1 Total Sample 
 
 
Information about sample, total sample 
  
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 27 Management position (yes/no) 49/65 
2-5 years 21 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 43/71 
5-10 years 32 Had face-to-face training 81 
10-20 years 23 Only had web based training 32 
20+ years 11 Not been trained 1 
130 
 
 
 
Responses to statements, total sample 
  
0	   10	   20	   30	   40	   50	   60	   70	  
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A	   Strongly	  Disagree	   Disagree	   Neutral	   Agree	   Strongly	  Agree	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Focus and resource spending, total sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0	   10	   20	   30	   40	   50	   60	   70	   80	   90	   100	  
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A	   Excessive	   Appropriate	   InsufEicient	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4.2 Management position 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 10 Management position (yes/no) N/A 
2-5 years 8 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 19/30 
5-10 years 14 Had face-to-face training 41 
10-20 years 11 Only had web based training 7 
20+ years 6 Not been trained 1 
Information about sample, management position 
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Responses to statements, management position 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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Focus and resource spending, management position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
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4.3 Non-management position 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 17 Management position (yes/no) N/A 
2-5 years 13 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 24/41 
5-10 years 18 Had face-to-face training 41 
10-20 years 12 Only had web based training 24 
20+ years 5 Not been trained 0 
Information about sample, non-management position 
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Responses to statements, non-management position 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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Focus and resource spending, non-management position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
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4.4 Never been stationed abroad 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 21 Management position (yes/no) 30/41 
2-5 years 12 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) N/A 
5-10 years 21 Had face-to-face training 47 
10-20 years 11 Only had web based training 24 
20+ years 6 Not been trained 0 
Information about sample, never been abroad 
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Responses to statements, never been stationed abroad 
 
Focus and resource spending, never been stationed abroad 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
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4.5 Been stationed abroad 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 6 Management position (yes/no) 19/24 
2-5 years 9 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) N/A 
5-10 years 11 Had face-to-face training 35 
10-20 years 12 Only had web based training 7 
20+ years 5 Not been trained 1 
Information about sample, been stationed abroad 
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Responses to statements, been stationed abroad 
 
Focus and resource spending, been stationed abroad 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
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4.6 Have had some form of face-to-face training 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 15 Management position (yes/no) 40/41 
2-5 years 17 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 34/47 
5-10 years 24 Had face-to-face training N/A 
10-20 years 17 Only had web based training N/A 
20+ years 8 Not been trained N/A 
Information about sample, have had some form of face-to-face training 
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Responses to statements, have had some form of face-to-face training 
 
Focus and resource spending, have had some form of face-to-face training 
 
0	   5	   10	   15	   20	   25	   30	  
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible for 
the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A	   Strongly	  Disagree	   Disagree	   Neutral	   Agree	   Strongly	  Agree	  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
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4.7 Only had web based training 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 12 Management position (yes/no) 8/24 
2-5 years 3 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 8/24 
5-10 years 8 Had face-to-face training N/A 
10-20 years 6 Only had web based training N/A 
20+ years 3 Not been trained N/A 
Information about sample, only had web based training 
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Responses to statements, only had web-based training 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that 
I face in my current work situation 
I have a good understanding of what management 
expects of me with regards to corruption 
The training I have received has made me more aware 
of the corruption risk that I face at work 
 The training I have received has made me better 
equipped to adequately deal with corruption 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility 
when faced with corruption 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my 
colleagues 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by 
management to tackle the issue of corruption 
I know which parts of management are responsible 
for the anti-corruption programme in my company 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to 
management 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of 
corruption 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that 
these would be handled professionally 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
necessary 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are 
adequate 
N/A Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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Focus and resource spending, only had web based training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
Line-managements resource spending on anti-
corruption is -  
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  
My focus on anti-corruption is -  
N/A Excessive Appropriate Insufficient 
147 
 
4.8 Has not received training 
 
Years with the company Characteristics of respondents 
0-2 years 0 Management position (yes/no) 1/0 
2-5 years 1 Been stationed abroad (yes/no) 1/0 
5-10 years 0 Had face-to-face training N/A 
10-20 years 0 Only had web based training N/A 
20+ years 0 Not been trained N/A 
Information about sample, has not received training 
 
Statement Response 
I have a good understanding of the corruption risk that I face in my current work situation Agree 
I have a good understanding of what management expects of me with regards to corruption Agree 
The training I have received has made me more aware of the corruption risk that I face at work N/A 
 The training I have received has made me better equipped to adequately deal with corruption N/A 
I am well informed of my own legal responsibility when faced with corruption Disagree 
I can freely discuss issues of corruption with my colleagues Neutral 
I have a good understanding of what is being done by management to tackle the issue of corruption Disagree 
I know which parts of management are responsible for the anti-corruption programme in my company Strongly Disagree 
I can freely report on issues of corruption to management Strongly Disagree 
I am well informed of how I can report on issues of corruption Strongly Disagree 
If I were to report issues of corruption, I trust that these would be handled professionally Strongly Disagree 
Current company procedures on anti-corruption are necessary Strongly Agree 
Response to statements, has not received training 
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Focus and resource spending Response 
Corporate managements resource spending on anti-corruption is -  Insufficient 
Corporate managements focus on anti-corruption is -  Insufficient 
Line-managements resource spending on anti-corruption is -  Insufficient 
Line-managements focus on anti-corruption is -  Insufficient 
My resource spending on anti-corruption is -  Insufficient 
My focus on anti-corruption is -  N/A 
Focus and resource spending, has not received training 
 
